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RACISM IN THE CREDIT CARD INDUSTRY*
ANDREA FREEMAN**
In a social and financial climate characterized by deep racial and
socioeconomic divide, racism against credit card applicants and
consumers is a core piece of the systemic inequality that perpetuates
dramatic disparities in wealth, employment, health, and education.
Over several decades, credit cards have evolved into an essential
tool for lower- and middle-class families to maintain financial
stability through strategic balancing between debt and disposable
income. Now, without a credit card, many households cannot
manage to meet the basic needs of their families. Credit card
companies take advantage of this reality, imposing exploitative fees,
interest rates, and other conditions on consumers who have no
choice but to use the companies’ products. Even worse, the
companies do so in a racially discriminatory way, burdening Black
and Latino customers with the worst credit card terms, often
unrelated to credit risk. This type of consumer racism dates back to
the Reconstruction era and reflects an unbroken chain of laws and
policies cementing racial economic inequality. Social norms and
stereotypes make the resulting inequality appear cultural and
personal instead of systemic and structural.
This Article is the first to apply a critical race theory analysis to the
problem of racism against credit card consumers. After describing
the role that history and stereotyping play in allowing credit card
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corporations to discriminate against consumers, it identifies fatal
flaws in the two laws designed to address racial discrimination and
inequality in credit, the Equal Credit Opportunity Act and the
Community Reinvestment Act. It then proposes amendments to the
Consumer Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act based
on rehabilitative reparations theory and slavery disclosure laws that
would require credit card companies to make significant
investments into the communities they harm.
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INTRODUCTION
I’m Kan, the Louis Vuitton Don
Bought my mom a purse, now she Louis Vuitton Mom
I ain’t play the hand I was dealt, I changed my cards
I prayed to the skies and I changed my stars
I went to the malls and I balled too hard
‘Oh my god, is that a Black Card?’
I turned around and replied, why yes, but I prefer the term
African American Express
Kanye West, Last Call1
When Karyn Morton applied for a Capital One credit card online,
the company’s website offered her two cards based on information
gathered from a data mining company after Karyn clicked once on the
company’s website.2 To its credit, Capital One accurately identified
Karyn as a Black, Detroit homeowner who reads major metropolitan
newspapers and watches the NAACP Image Awards.3 But Capital One
also got a lot wrong. It assumed that Karyn was over sixty-five years old
and retired and that she had no children and some high school
education.4 In fact, Karyn was thirty-three years old, had a five-year-old
child and a law degree, and earned a salary three times higher than
Capital One predicted.5 Based on the algorithm that assessed Karyn,
Capital One classified her in its “City Roots” segment and showed her
two credit cards.6 Both cards sought to lure her in with a zero interest,
six-month “teaser” rate.7 After half a year, the interest rate shot up to
either 24.9% or 13.9%.8
In contrast, analyzing Thomas Burney after he clicked once, Capital
One correctly labeled him as a White college graduate who skis but
predicted a salary higher than his actual one.9 The company’s data

1. KANYE WEST, Last Call, on THE COLLEGE DROPOUT (Roc-A-Fella Records 2004).
2. See One Smart Cookie: Interactive Graphic, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 4, 2010, 12:01 AM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748704017904575409021400239454 [https://perma
.cc/6SE8-ES2M (staff-uploaded archive)].
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. The segment into which a consumer is categorized determines which cards they
will be shown. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
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software classified Thomas in its “God’s Country” segment and offered
him a card with a relatively low 11.9% interest rate.10
This type of discrimination against credit card applicants through
algorithms and data mining is an unregulated, but increasingly common,
phenomenon.11 Further, this example of discrimination and the ones that
follow demonstrate ubiquitous racism against credit card consumers in
settings that include an applicant’s initial inquiry, retail shopping with
credit, and the collection of unpaid bills. Collectively, they illustrate the
hostile climate in which Black and Latino consumers interact with credit
and the need for significant reforms to industry practices, law and policy,
and social attitudes in order to alter this environment.
In February 2015, three Black women, Kimmell McIntosh, Maxine
Henry, and Melanie Henry, were enjoying a girls’ day out birthday
celebration at Brooklyn’s Massage Envy Spa when several New York
Police Department (“NYPD”) officers disrupted their day by entering
the spa to question them.12 The officers then hauled the women into the
station to detain them on suspicion of credit card fraud.13 A spa
employee had incorrectly reported that the women used a stolen credit
card because the card’s number was very close to another client’s card,
but the officers failed to check for this simple mistake before making
their dramatic and unnecessary bust.14 Outraged by the officers’
assumptions of their criminality, the women subsequently planned to
bring a suit against NYPD and the spa for false arrest and racial
profiling.15
Similarly, in 2013, Robert Brown, star of the HBO series Treme,
bought a $1,350 Movado watch at Macy’s for his mother as a graduation
present.16 After he made the purchase, NYPD officers loudly accused
10. Id.
11. See, e.g., Latanya Sweeney, Discrimination in Online Ad Delivery, COMM. ACM, May
2013, at 44, 50–52 (analyzing advertisement text next to Internet searches and finding that
Black-identifying names generated ads suggestive of an arrest at a higher rate than Whiteidentifying names).
12. Keldy Ortiz & Reuven Blau, African-American Women to Sue NYPD After They
Were Accused of Using a Stolen Credit Card, Arrested, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Mar. 12, 2015, 2:30
AM), http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/black-women-sue-false-arrest-birthday-partyarticle-1.2146258 [https://perma.cc/8PG3-QRBC].
13. Id.
14. Id. Similarly, police officers institutionalized Kamilah Brock, a Black woman who
truthfully claimed that she was a banker with her own BMW. Geenius at Wrok, A Black
Woman Says She’s a Banker? She Must Be Insane, DAILY KOS (Mar. 24, 2015, 4:48 PM),
http://www.dailykos.com/story/2015/03/24/1373087/-A-Black-Woman-Says-She-s-a-BankerShe-Must-Be-Insane [https://perma.cc/A6L4-AHR8].
15. See Ortiz & Blau, supra note 12.
16. Susanna Kim & Gillian Mohney, Black Actor Alleges ‘Nationwide Pattern’ of
Profiling in 2nd Suit Against Macy’s, ABC NEWS (Nov. 14, 2013), http://abcnews.go.com
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him of credit card theft, handcuffed him, paraded him through the
crowded Macy’s store, and detained him.17 In response, Brown filed a
class action suit against Macy’s for racial profiling, which the parties
settled for an undisclosed amount.18
In the same year, four NYPD officers disguised in plain clothes
stopped and accused twenty-one-year-old Black nursing student Kayla
Philips of credit card fraud in the middle of the street, three blocks away
from Barneys, where she had just purchased a long-coveted $2,500
orange suede Celine purse after cashing a tax return.19 Barneys settled
her case for $525,000 and promised to stop discriminating against Black
and Latino customers.20 This incident came on the heels of a lawsuit filed
by eighteen-year-old Trayon Christian against Barneys and the NYPD.21
After Christian purchased a Ferragamo belt for $349, undercover NYPD
officers followed him from the store, claimed his card was a fake, and
detained him in a holding cell.22 Christian eventually received a $45,000
settlement from the city.23
These incidents inspired protests and captured media attention,
particularly in the wake of Oprah Winfrey’s “shopping while Black”
experience of racial discrimination in Switzerland, where a store clerk
refused to show her a crocodile purse because it was too expensive.24
/Business/black-actor-alleges-nationwide-pattern-profiling-2nd-suit/story?id=20880469 [https://
perma.cc/XX3T-WS3D].
17. Rande Iaboni, HBO Star Files Lawsuit Against NYPD, Macy’s, Cites Racial Profiling,
CNN (Nov. 14, 2013, 8:21 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/11/13/justice/hbo-star-lawsuit/
[https://perma.cc/4GRZ-9SSN].
18. Class Action Complaint at 1, Brown v. Macy’s, Inc., No. 13 CV 8092 (S.D.N.Y.
November 13, 2013), 2013 WL 6003108; Order, Brown v. Macy’s, Inc., No. 13 CV 8092
(S.D.N.Y. July 16, 2014), ECF No. 23 (order recognizing settlement agreement); Julia Lull,
‘Treme’ Actor Settles Racial Profiling Lawsuit Against Macy’s, NYC, CNN (July 19, 2014, 1:55
PM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/07/19/justice/hbo-star-lawsuit/ [https://perma.cc/S69L-THB4].
19. Tina Moore & Ginger Adams Otis, Another Black Barneys Shopper Accused of
Credit Card Fraud After Buying $2,500 Purse: Claim, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Oct. 24, 2013, 8:02
PM), http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/black-barneys-shopper-accused-buying-2g-pursearticle-1.1494855 [https://perma.cc/AV83-2W8W].
20. Dominic Rushe, Barneys to Pay $525,000 in Racial Profiling Settlement, GUARDIAN
(Aug. 11, 2014, 11:14 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/11/barneys-racialprofiling-settlement [https://perma.cc/TK5L-B3G5].
21. Victoria Bekiempis, Black Student Wins $45G Settlement over Alleged Barneys
Profiling, NYPD Stop-Frisk, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Jan. 20, 2016, 4:10 AM), http://www
.nydailynews.com/new-york/manhattan/black-student-wins-45g-settlement-barneys-stop-friskarticle-1.2502760 [https://perma.cc/2XCL-NRR3].
22. Id.
23. Order, Christian v. Barneys New York Inc., 1:14-cv-01303 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan 20,
2016); Bekiempis, supra note 21.
24. Nick Thompson & Diana Magnay, Oprah Winfrey Racism Row over Switzerland
Shop Incident, CNN (Aug. 11, 2013, 10:32 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/08/09/world/oprahwinfrey-racism-switzerland/ [https://perma.cc/K4H6-FU6V]. A shop clerk in a high-end bag
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Despite remonstration, however, racial profiling against Black and
Latino credit card users persists.25 It also takes place in the debt
collection phase of credit card use.
Maria Guadalupe Mejia’s life became fraught with anxiety when
Portfolio Recovery Associates, a company that collects on credit card
debt, relentlessly pursued a lawsuit against her for a $1,000 debt that
wasn’t hers.26 Mejia, a Latina from Kansas City, Missouri, shared,
My husband and I were already struggling just to keep the
children fed and the lights on. The lawsuit terrified me. I feared
they would take my house and I feared they would arrest me. I
was very shocked that they sued me for one year and three
months [until the court dismissed the case] even though I never
had the credit card. And after they dismissed the case, they said
they might sue me again.27
A jury awarded Mejia more than $82 million in damages,28 but this type
of compensation is rare. Most harassment from credit card debt
collectors goes unremedied.29 Also, although there are no significant

store, Trois Pomme, refused to show the celebrity a crocodile purse due to it being “too
expensive.” Id. The day after the story aired, on his late night talk show, Conan O’Brien
joked, “Oprah was shopping in Switzerland recently and a Swiss clerk refused to show her a
$38,000 purse because she didn’t think Oprah could afford it. To prove a point, Oprah bought
Switzerland.” TEAMCOCO, http://teamcoco.com/jokes/aug-12-2013-oprah-s-been-a-big-storylately-oprah-was-shopping-in-switzerland [https://perma.cc/Q322-LK26].
25. See, e.g., Earl G. Graves, Sr., The Fight Against ‘Racial Profiling’ and ‘Shopping While
Black’ Continues, BLACK ENTERPRISE (Nov. 6, 2013), http://www.blackenterprise.com/blogs
/racial-profiling-and-shopping-while-black/ [https://perma.cc/H69A-9V9M] (“Today, African
American consumers are tolerated, at best, and deemed suspect, at worst, by too many of the
retail outlets that benefit from our more than $1 trillion in spending power. From worldrenowned African Americans such as Oprah Winfrey to Barneys shoppers Trayon Christian
and Kayla Phillips, black consumers continue to be racially profiled as potential thieves, credit
card fraudsters, or otherwise unable to legitimately afford high-end merchandise available for
purchase.”). For a classic example of both racial profiling and legal storytelling, see PATRICIA
J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 44–51 (1991).
26. Dan Margolies, Jury Awards KC Woman $83 Million in Debt Collection Case, KCUR
89.3 (May 14, 2015), http://kcur.org/post/jury-awards-kc-woman-83-million-debt-collectioncase [https://perma.cc/XW34-S5C6]; see also Anneta Konstantinides, Missouri Woman
Awarded $83Million After Debt Collection Agency Sued Her for $1,000 and Harassed Her
Non-Stop over a Credit Card She Never Even Owned, DAILY MAIL.COM (May 20, 2015, 9:07
AM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3088875/Woman-awarded-83million-debtcollection-agency.html [https://perma.cc/JSY5-S6LU].
27. Id.
28. Portfolio Recovery Assocs., LLC v. Mejia, No. 1216-CV34184, 2015 WL 13106253, at
*3 (Mo. Cir. Ct. July 20, 2015); see also Margolies, supra note 26.
29. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT:
CFPB ANNUAL REPORT 2015, at 7, 12 (2015) (reporting that, in 2014, 77 million Americans
debts were in the process of collection and only 88,300 complaints were registered during this
time period).
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differences in how many times Black and White credit card users pay
their balances late, a survey found debt collectors make harassing phone
calls to seven out of ten Black borrowers but only five out of ten White
borrowers.30
In a social and financial climate characterized by deep racial and
socioeconomic divide, racism against credit card applicants and
consumers is a core piece of the systemic, structural inequality that
perpetuates dramatic disparities in wealth, employment, health, and
education. Each of the preceding stories represents one aspect of both
the explicit and structural racism that complicates credit card use by
consumers of color. These incidents arise from cultural misperceptions
shaped by racial stereotyping and historical discrimination. Further, the
attitudes and conduct of police, merchants, and bill collectors against
consumers of color provide context for how credit corporations perceive
and interact with non-White consumers. They also demonstrate the
benefit of applying a critical race theory perspective to understand
discrimination against credit card consumers and to guide the
formulation of effective responses.31
Over several decades, credit cards have evolved into an essential
tool for lower- and middle-class families to maintain financial stability
through strategic balancing between debt and disposable income. Now,
without a credit card, many households would not be able to meet the
basic needs of their families. These households rely on credit for basic
subsistence as well as to cope with financial emergencies.32 Credit card
companies take advantage of this reality, imposing exploitative fees,
interest rates, and other conditions on consumers who have no choice
30. See Alan Pyke, Debt Collectors Hound Black Borrowers More Frequently Than White
Ones, THINKPROGRESS (Dec. 18, 2013), http://thinkprogress.org/economy/2013/12/18/3079731
/debt-collectors-race/ [https://perma.cc/5H3L-SBR9].
31. Despite recognizing that racism against consumers of color is broad and
comprehensive, this Article focuses mainly on how credit card companies treat Black
consumers.
32. JOSÉ A. GARCÍA, DĒMOS, BORROWING TO MAKE ENDS MEET: THE RAPID
GROWTH OF CREDIT CARD DEBT IN AMERICA 1 (2007), http://www.demos.org/sites/default
/files/publications/Demos_BorrowingEndsMeet.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q9SD-48KX]; MILES
RAPOPORT & JENNIFER WHEARY, DĒMOS, RUNNING IN PLACE: WHERE THE MIDDLE
CLASS AND THE POOR MEET 1, 8 (2013), http://www.demos.org/sites/default/files/publications
/RunningInPlace_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/AYC5-7GVM]; CATHERINE RUETSCHLIN &
DEDRICK ASANTE-MUHAMMAD, DĒMOS & NAACP, THE CHALLENGE OF CREDIT CARD
DEBT FOR THE AFRICAN AMERICAN MIDDLE CLASS 1 (2013), http://www.demos.org/sites
/default/files/publications/CreditCardDebt-Demos_NAACP_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/DM77AFS8]; AMY TRAUB & CATHERINE RUETSCHLIN, DĒMOS, THE PLASTIC SAFETY NET:
FINDINGS FROM THE 2012 NATIONAL SURVEY ON CREDIT CARD DEBT OF LOW- AND
MIDDLE-INCOME HOUSEHOLDS 1–2 (2012), http://www.demos.org/sites/default/files
/publications/PlasticSafetyNet-Demos.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y9RJ-V57E].
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but to use their products. Even worse, the companies do so in a racially
discriminatory way, burdening Black and Latino customers with the
worst credit card terms, compared to White consumers, and often
unrelated to credit risk.
For example, a 2008 survey found that, although Black borrowers
carried lower balances on their cards, they paid more interest.33
Specifically, a Black family that carried consumer debt with an average
interest rate that made average monthly payments paid at least $100
more in interest on the debt than an average White family, despite the
fact that the Black family borrowed less.34 This type of consumer racism
dates back to the Reconstruction era and reflects an unbroken chain of
laws and policies cementing racial economic inequality.35 Social norms
and stereotypes serve to make this inequality appear cultural and
personal, instead of structural.
Unfortunately, although the financial precarity caused by
institutional and corporate racism against credit card consumers is a vital
and urgent issue, similar to the racial disparities in the treatment of
mortgage and home consumers that capture national attention,36 both
the media and legal scholars have largely neglected this issue. This
Article seeks to fill that gap. By focusing a critical race theory lens on
predatory and discriminatory practices of the credit card industry, it
opens the door to innovative approaches to reducing economic
inequality. This perspective goes beyond the traditional legal formula of
individual remedies for individual acts of discrimination by proposing
systemic relief for communities besieged by institutionalized, structural
racism supported by social and cultural stereotypes.

33. RUETSCHLIN & ASANTE-MUHAMMAD, supra note 32, at 8.
34. Id.
35. See infra Section I.A.
36. See, e.g., Ta-Nehisi Coates, The Case for Reparations, ATLANTIC, June 2014, at 54, 57;
Peter Eavis, Study Strongly Links Baltimore Mortgage Denials to Race, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17,
2015, at B3; Emily Badger, Why a Housing Scheme Founded in Racism Is Making a
Resurgence Today, WASH. POST: WONKBLOG (May 13, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost
.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/05/13/why-a-housing-scheme-founded-in-racism-is-making-aresurgence-today/ [https://perma.cc/74XV-9CGJ]; Jay Fitzgerald, Black, Latino Mortgage
Rejection Rates Still High, BOS. GLOBE (Dec. 22, 2015), https://www.bostonglobe.com/business
/2015/12/21/blacks-latinos-still-rejected-for-mortgages-higher-rates/kng3Kuc4v3uIK1pmDqBSjO
/story.html [https://perma.cc/22FB-AZT5]; Jeff Guo, If You’re Poor, Your Mortgage Rate Can
Depend on the Color of Your Skin, WASH. POST (Dec. 23, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost
.com/news/storyline/wp/2014/12/23/if-youre-poor-your-mortgage-rate-can-depend-on-the-colorof-your-skin/ [https://perma.cc/4FTU-BCJB]; Hamilton Nolan, There Is Still Racial
Discrimination in Mortgage Lending, GAWKER (July 19, 2016, 10:32 AM), http://gawker.com
/there-is-still-racial-discrimination-in-mortgage-lendin-1783915158 [https://perma.cc/5VU3ETXS].
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This Article is the first to apply a critical race theory analysis to the
problem of racism against credit card consumers, using this framework
to propose a solution grounded in rehabilitative reparations theory.
Beginning from the premise that the credit card industry’s success
depends on a business model that both perpetuates and exploits
structural inequality,37 the Article explores the specific role that credit
discrimination plays in maintaining the racial economic divide.
Critically, it crosses the bridge between theory and practice, inviting
regulators to make concrete, fundamental changes to consumer law that
would simultaneously deter acts of discrimination and alter the broader
racial economic landscape.
The Article begins in Part I with a history of race and wealth in the
United States that outlines the laws and policies precipitating the
existence of a 20:1 wealth gap between White and Black Americans
following the 2008 mortgage and financial crisis.38 This crisis likely led to
increased dependence on credit for Black households.39 Further,
statistically, there are racial disparities in every aspect of credit card use,
from the application process to the terms of agreements to the need to
37. See Andrea Freeman, Payback: A Structural Analysis of the Credit Card Problem, 55
ARIZ. L. REV. 151, 153 (2013) (“Although most economists and legal scholars view the ‘credit
card problem’ of excessive consumer debt as one of market failure, it is in fact a story of
overwhelming market success. Through the use of sophisticated underwriting technology, the
credit card companies learned that consumers who are on the verge of bankruptcy represent
their greatest source of profits. The industry responded to this information by completely
altering its business model. Instead of seeking customers who would pay off their bills at the
end of each month, known in the industry as convenience users or deadbeats, the companies
began to target low-income consumers who would maintain balances from month to month,
known as revolvers.” (footnotes omitted) (first quoting Oren Bar-Gill, Seduction by Plastic, 98
NW. U. L. REV. 1373, 1374 (2004); then citing Oren Bar-Gill, Seduction by Plastic, 98 NW. U.
L. REV. 1373, 1379 (2004); then citing Ronald J. Mann, Bankruptcy Reform and the “Sweat
Box” of Credit Card Debt, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 375, 385–91; and then citing Adam J. Levitin,
The Antitrust Super Bowl: America’s Payment Systems, No-Surcharge Rules, and the Hidden
Costs of Credit, 3 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 265, 317–18 (2005))); id. at 154 (“Consequently, lowincome consumers now receive credit cards with high fees and interest rates, while higherincome consumers reap the rewards of credit card use, such as travel miles and concierge
services. Credit card companies target vulnerable consumers for inferior products through
tactics such as teaser rates, mass mailings of preapproved cards, . . . overly complex credit card
agreements, and credit-card redlining. As a result of these practices, 80% of the industry’s
profits now come from interest payments and . . . fees instead of annual and interchange fees.
This shift represents a massive redistribution of wealth from the poor to wealthier consumers
and corporations.” (citing U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-06-929, CREDIT
CARDS: INCREASED COMPLEXITY IN RATES AND FEES HEIGHTENS NEED FOR MORE
EFFECTIVE DISCLOSURES TO CONSUMERS 67 (2006))).
38. PAUL TAYLOR ET AL., PEW RESEARCH CTR., WEALTH GAPS RISE TO RECORD
HIGHS BETWEEN WHITES, BLACKS, HISPANICS 1 (2011).
39. See REBECCA PERRON, AFRICAN AMERICAN EXPERIENCES IN THE ECONOMY:
RECESSION EFFECTS MORE STRONGLY FELT 22–23 (2010), http://assets.aarp.org/rgcenter
/econ/economyaa.pdf [https://perma.cc/NNY7-HKVU].
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forego necessary medical treatment and abandon educational
opportunities due to excessive debt. Part I describes the dramatically
different experiences that White and Black households have with credit
and the intersection of corporate conduct and structural inequality that
accounts for these differences. Then, it explores the role that stereotypes
about Black consumers play in creating and justifying racial disparities
in credit. These stereotypes focus the blame for bad credit squarely on
the individual, making legal reform and corporate responsibility appear
both futile and unnecessary.
Part II looks closely at the two laws designed to address racial
discrimination and inequality in credit, the Equal Credit Opportunity
Act (“ECOA”) and the Community Reinvestment Act (“CRA”). This
Part investigates the legislative history behind these statutes, identifying
the problems that the laws’ proponents sought to solve with their
enactment. It then outlines the major substantive and procedural aspects
of these laws, describing the weaknesses that render them unable to
fulfill their intended purposes. Acknowledging that these laws neither
deter nor provide effective relief for racial disparities and discrimination
in credit, Part II then calls for a new approach to consumer credit law
founded on the insights of critical race theory.
Part III proposes amendments to the Consumer Accountability
Responsibility and Disclosure (“CARD”) Act designed to reduce or
eliminate racial discrimination by credit card companies, as well as to
promote economic growth in underserved communities. Rehabilitative
reparations theory provides the model for these proposals. Accordingly,
Part III provides an overview of the history and philosophy of
rehabilitative reparations theory, edifying its focus on uplifting
communities instead of making individuals whole. Next, Part III details
the history and success of slavery disclosure laws. These laws, which
require certain companies to disclose their past ties with slavery, seek to
create corporate accountability for racial harms. Part III argues for
similar, but stronger consumer laws requiring credit card companies to
disclose any racially discriminatory conduct and to compensate for it
through significant investments into the harmed communities. The
Article concludes by briefly engaging potential counter arguments to
this proposal and acknowledging the major obstacle posed by the
financial industry’s influence over politics.
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I. RACE AND CREDIT
A. How Law and Policy Shaped Race and Wealth in the United
States
Analyzing modern conditions of race and credit from a critical race
theory perspective requires delving into the economic history of race in
the United States. This history begins with slavery and continues to the
present, when economic inequality continues to create a high and
captive demand for credit in Black families and individuals. This
economic history reinforces several key critical race theory principles:
that racism is permanent,40 subject to relief only when White interests
converge with the interests of those subject to racial oppression;41 that
race is a social construct designed to perpetuate White privilege;42 and
that law is a tool implemented to define race and enforce racial
boundaries.43
The 20:1 wealth gap between Blacks and Whites in the United
States is not a manifestation of cultural or individual differences, but the
product of a long history of discriminatory laws and policies that
inscribed racial disparities into society.44 This history began when
40. See DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF
RACISM 12 (1992) [hereinafter BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL]; see also
DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL JUSTICE
156–57 (1987) [hereinafter BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED] (discussing the “ideological
hegemony” of white racism).
41. See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education & the Interest-Convergence
Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 522–30 (1980).
42. See Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Book Review, The Law and Economics of
Critical Race Theory, 112 YALE L.J. 1757, 1759 (2003); Teresa J. Guess, The Social
Construction of Whiteness: Racism by Intent, Racism by Consequence, 32 CRITICAL SOC. 649,
650–51 (2006).
43. See, e.g., Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 419–20 (1856) (holding that
no Black person, whether free or enslaved, could claim U.S. citizenship and, therefore,
enslaved persons could not petition the Court for their freedom); Kenneth B. Nunn, Law as a
Eurocentric Enterprise, in CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE CUTTING EDGE 429, 429–36
(Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic eds., 2d ed. 2000) (contending that the law is “part of a
broader cultural endeavor that attempts to promote European values and interests at the
expense of all others”). See generally IAN HANEY LÓPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL
CONSTRUCTION OF RACE (rev. ed. 2006) (arguing that current race law, while purporting to
be “colorblind,” nevertheless perpetuates racial inequality); Laura E. Gómez, Understanding
Law and Race as Mutually Constitutive, 8 J. SCHOLARLY PERSP. no. 8, Fall 2012, at 47, 51
(contending that “law and race co-construct each other”).
44. TAYLOR ET AL., supra note 38, at 1; see also Freeman, supra note 37, at 181–84
(describing the impact of the Social Security Act and the Fair Housing Act on Blacks’
inability to accumulate wealth at the same rate as Whites, as well as restrictions on business
opportunities and price and credit discrimination). See generally IRA KATZNELSON, WHEN
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION WAS WHITE: AN UNTOLD HISTORY OF RACIAL INEQUALITY IN
TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA (2005) (analyzing the discriminatory impact of key laws
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enslaved Africans replaced European indentured servants as the source
of labor for tobacco plantations.45 The White servants’ displacement
brought them a number of advantages, placing them higher on the social
scale than the newly arrived Africans who, viewed as property instead of
humans, lacked legal personhood.46
After slavery officially ended, the exploitation of Black labor
continued through Black Codes.47 Black Codes were criminal laws
designed to incarcerate Blacks in order to take advantage of the
Thirteenth Amendment’s exception allowing the government to impose
forced labor on convicted criminals.48 Section 1 of the Thirteenth
Amendment states that: “Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude,
except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly
convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to
their jurisdiction.”49 To allow for broad discretion in arresting and
incarcerating freed slaves, the southern states enacted Black Codes that
attached criminal penalties, including prison time, to common activities.
For example, a Mississippi Black Code criminalized:
[A]ll rogues and vagabonds, idle and dissipated persons, beggars,
jugglers, or persons practicing unlawful games or plays, runaways,
including the Social Security Act, the G.I. Bill, and labor laws implementing unemployment
benefits, a minimum wage, and union protection); MELVIN L. OLIVER & THOMAS M.
SHAPIRO, BLACK WEALTH/WHITE WEALTH: A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON RACIAL
INEQUALITY (2d ed. 2006) (explaining how the wealth gap between Blacks and Whites in the
United States has evolved and presently accounts for entrenched inequality that policies
focused on income and taxation fail to address); DARIA ROITHMAYR, REPRODUCING
RACISM: HOW EVERYDAY CHOICES LOCK IN WHITE ADVANTAGE (2014) (exploring how
racial privilege is perpetuated throughout generations through residential segregation,
nepotism, and other social practices).
45. See, e.g., JAMES OLIVER HORTON & LOIS E. HORTON, SLAVERY AND THE MAKING
OF AMERICA 28–30 (2005); PETER KOLCHIN, AMERICAN SLAVERY: 1619–1877, at 7–14 (rev.
ed. 2003).
46. See, e.g., EDMUND S. MORGAN, AMERICAN SLAVERY, AMERICAN FREEDOM 328–37
(photo. reprint 2003) (1975) (positing that the status of Black slaves elevated that of White
indentured servants, informing the development of race-based slavery in the Virginia colony);
see also Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 398–99; HOWARD ZINN, A PEOPLE’S HISTORY OF
THE UNITED STATES 23–52 (1980).
47. E.g., St. Landry, La., An Ordinance Relative to the Police of Negroes Recently
Emancipating Within the Parish of St. Landry, No. 35, §§ 4, 8 (July 15, 1865), reprinted in S.
EXEC. DOC. NO. 39-2, at 93–94 (1865); An Act to Amend the Vagrant Laws of the State, § 1,
1865 Miss. Laws 90, 90; Mechanics, Artisans, and Shopkeepers, § LXXII, 1865 S.C. Acts 279,
279.
48. E.g., An Act to Amend the Vagrant Laws of the State, § 1, 1865 Miss. Laws 90, 90. See
U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1; DOUGLAS A. BLACKMON, SLAVERY BY ANOTHER NAME:
THE RE-ENSLAVEMENT OF BLACK PEOPLE FROM THE CIVIL WAR TO WORLD WAR II, at 53
(2008); Baher Azmy, Unshackling the Thirteenth Amendment: Modern Slavery and a
Reconstructed Civil Rights Agenda, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 981, 1015 (2002).
49. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1.
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common drunkards, common night-walkers, pilferers, lewd,
wanton, or lascivious persons, in speech or behavior, common
railers and brawlers, persons who neglect their calling or
employment, misspend what they earn, or do not provide for the
support of themselves or their families, or dependents, and all
other idle and disorderly persons, including all who neglect all
lawful business, habitually misspend their time by frequenting
houses of ill-fame, gaming-houses, or tippling shops . . . .50
It is difficult to think of a person who does not habitually commit at least
one of these so-called crimes. Thus, by criminalizing such innocuous and
prevalent conduct, Black Codes allowed states and municipalities to
continue oppressing newly-freed slaves and restrict their access to
potential economic opportunities.
Further, despite the promise that freed slaves would receive forty
acres and a mule to work their own land, the government has yet to give
reparations to slaves or their descendants.51 Instead, the federal
government awarded up to $300 per slave to their past owners, to
compensate for their property losses.52 Also, although some Blacks
continued farming, with Black land ownership peaking at 218,000 Blackowned farms in 1910, discrimination and exclusion by the U.S.
Department of Agriculture (“USDA”) over the following century
resulted in that number dwindling down to 18,000 Black-owned farms by
1992, a decline of 92%.53 Additionally, although the approximately $2
50. An Act to Amend the Vagrant Laws of the State, § 1, 1865 Miss. Laws 90, 90; JAMES
M. MCPHERSON, ORDEAL BY FIRE: THE CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION 511–12 (1st ed.
1982).
51. W. T. Sherman, Special Field Orders, No. 15 (Jan. 16, 1865), in 47 THE WAR OF THE
REBELLION: A COMPILATION OF THE OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE UNION AND
CONFEDERATE ARMIES 60, 60–62 (U.S. War Dep’t ed., 1985); see also GEORGE R. BENTLEY,
A HISTORY OF THE FREEDMEN’S BUREAU 100–02 (1955); PAUL SKEELS PEIRCE, III:1 THE
FREEDMEN’S BUREAU: A CHAPTER IN THE HISTORY OF RECONSTRUCTION 59–61 (1904);
Meizhu Lui, Doubly Divided: The Racial Wealth Gap, in THE WEALTH INEQUALITY
READER 42, 44–47 (Dollars & Sense & United for a Fair Econ. eds., 2004).
52. Act of Apr. 16, 1862, ch. 54, §§ 2–3, 12 Stat. 376, 376–77 (permitting compensation for
former slave owners after abolishing slavery in the District of Columbia).
53. Chris Kromm, The Real Story of Racism at the USDA, NATION (July 23, 2010), http://
www.thenation.com/article/real-story-racism-usda/ [https://perma.cc/UPQ6-K3Z3]. The USDA
granted its farm loans almost exclusively to White farmers, making it virtually impossible for
Black farmers to expand to meet the subsidy requirements favoring large over small farms.
See Jim Chen, Of Agriculture’s First Disobedience and Its Fruit, 48 VAND. L. REV. 1261, 1306
(1995); Andrea Freeman, The 2014 Farm Bill: Farm Subsidies and Food Oppression, 38
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1271, 1277 n.32 (2015) (“The first farm subsidies allowed the white
owners of large farms to invest in machines and chemicals, leading to their growth, while small
farms operated by blacks received no assistance in the quest to modernize. In 2007, after
many years of documented discrimination against black and Latino farmers by the USDA and
other federal agencies, farm owners were ninety-eight percent white.” (citations omitted));
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billion settlement in the ensuing landmark discrimination case against
the USDA, Pigford v. Glickman,54 represented the largest civil rights
settlement in United States history,55 the one-time cash payment of
$50,000 that most plaintiffs could obtain did little to compensate for the
losses of generations of Black farmers driven from the land.56 By 2007,
98% of farm owners were White,57 and Blacks retained little hope of
regaining their foothold in agriculture.
Parallel to the decline of Black farming was the trajectory of Black
business, which peaked in the early twentieth century in cities including
Atlanta; Chicago; Washington, D.C.; Knoxville; New York; East St.
Louis; Tulsa, Oklahoma; and Rosewood, Florida.58 Unfortunately,
Whites who resented Black economic success often responded to
thriving Black communities with acts of violence.59 Perhaps the worst of
these attacks took place in Tulsa on June 1, 1921, when bombing and
burning completely destroyed the city’s “Black Wall Street” over the
course of twelve hours.60 Other smaller Black business areas, however,
such as Augusta’s Golden Blocks and Atlanta’s Auburn Avenue,
survived into the 1950s.61
Black Codes also contributed to the segregated economy. For
example, South Carolina’s Black Code prohibited Blacks from
practicing any trade except domestic or agricultural work unless a
district court judge granted them a license to do so, a highly unlikely

Madeleine Thomas, What Happened to America’s Black Farmers?, GRIST (Apr. 24, 2015),
http://grist.org/people/what-happened-to-americas-black-farmers/ [https://perma.cc/QX5QU2AH].
54. 185 F.R.D. 82 (D.D.C. 1999), aff’d, 206 F.3d 1212 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
55. Id. at 95.
56. See Kromm, supra note 53; Thomas, supra note 53.
57. See Dorothy A. Brown, Race and Class Matters in Tax Policy, 107 COLUM. L. REV.
790, 815 (2007).
58. See A Moore, 8 Successful and Aspiring Black Communities Destroyed by White
Neighbors, ATLANTA BLACK STAR (Dec. 4, 2013), http://atlantablackstar.com/2013/12/04/8successful-aspiring-black-communities-destroyed-white-neighbors/ [https://perma.cc/6LG5-D6PQ].
59. Id. The attacks happened in Atlanta, Georgia, in 1906; Tulsa, Oklahoma, in 1921;
Chicago in 1919; Rosewood, Florida, in 1923; Washington, D.C., in 1919; Knoxville,
Tennessee, in 1919; New York City, New York, in 1863; and East St. Louis, Missouri, in 1917.
Id.
60. See EDDIE FAYE GATES, RIOT ON GREENWOOD: THE TOTAL DESTRUCTION OF
BLACK WALL STREET 7–29 (2003) (detailing the Tulsa race riot of 1921); JAMES S. HIRSCH,
RIOT AND REMEMBRANCE: THE TULSA RACE WAR AND ITS LEGACY 77–98 (1st ed. 2002)
(describing the Tulsa race riots and their legacy).
61. See Blacks-Only Business District Thrived: Lenox Theatre Was Inspired by Jim
Crowism, AUGUSTA CHRON. (Aug. 29, 2010, 10:25 PM), http://chronicle.augusta.com/225/2010
-08-29/blacks-only-business-district-thrived [https://perma.cc/AG76-AJBH]; Sweet Auburn
History District, NAT’L PARK SERV.: ATLANTA, http://www.nps.gov/nr/travel/atlanta/aub.htm
[https://perma.cc/7K8K-PNVR].
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eventuality.62 Similarly, a Louisiana parish ordinance put severe
limitations on Blacks’ ability to engage in gainful employment by
declaring that
every negro is required to be in the regular service of some white
person, or former owner, who shall be held responsible for the
conduct of said negro. But said employer or former owner may
permit said negro to hire his own time by special permission in
writing, which permission shall not extend over seven days at any
one time. Any negro violating the provisions of this section shall
be fined five dollars for each offence, or in default of the payment
thereof shall be forced to work five days on the public road, or
suffer corporeal punishment as hereinafter provided.63
Mississippi’s Black Code required Black workers to register with local
authorities.64
In 1896, Plessy v. Ferguson65 upheld the doctrine of “separate but
equal” public accommodations, leading to the entrenchment of
segregation into the national economy.66 This segregation compelled
Black business owners, prohibited from buying White land, to operate
on the margins of cities and sell to a restricted market containing only

62. Mechanics, Artisans, and Shopkeepers, § LXXII, 1865 S.C. Acts 279, 279.
63. St. Landry, La., An Ordinance Relative to the Police of Negroes Recently
Emancipating Within the Parish of St. Landry, No. 35, §§ 4, 8 (July 15, 1865), reprinted in S.
EXEC. DOC. NO. 39-2, at 93–94 (1865) (“[N]o negro shall sell, barter, or exchange any articles
of merchandise or traffic within said parish without the special written permission of his
employer, specifying the articles of sale, barter or traffic. Any one thus offending shall pay a
fine of one dollar for each offence, and suffer the forfeiture of said articles, or in default of the
payment of said fine shall work one day on the public road, or suffer corporeal punishment as
hereinafter provided.”). See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 322 (1866) (statement of
Sen. Trumbull) (describing Black Codes as “laws that prevented the colored man going from
home, that did not allow him to buy or to sell, or to make contracts; that did not allow him to
own property; that did not allow him to enforce rights”).
64. An Act to Confer Civil Rights on Freedmen, and for Other Purposes, § 5, 1865 Miss.
Laws 82, 83 (“[E]very freedman, free negro and mulatto, shall, on the second Monday of
January, [1866], and annually thereafter, have a lawful home or employment, and shall have
written evidence thereof, as follows, to-wit: if living in any incorporated city, town or village, a
license from the mayor thereof; and if living outside of any incorporated city, town or village,
from the member of the board of police of his beat, authorizing him or her to do irregular and
job work, or a written contract . . . which licenses may be revoked for cause, at any time, by
the authority granting the same.”).
65. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
66. See id. at 550–52. The inability of Blacks to participate equally with Whites in social
activities relegated them to a fringe social and economic sphere that did not offer the same
opportunities for economic prosperity available to White businesses that could cater to the
more financially stable segment of the population. See LAURIE COLLIER HILLSTROM,
DEFINING MOMENTS: PLESSY V. FERGUSON 63–69 (2013).
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other Blacks.67 Over the same period, Jim Crow laws, enacted in the late
19th and early 20th centuries and finally invalidated in the 1960s,68
ensured Black subordination and the perpetuation of White privilege
through fierce segregation of all sectors of society.69 For example, a 1904
Oklahoma law declared:
Any instructor who shall teach in any school, college or
institution, where members of the white race and colored race are
received and enrolled as pupils for instruction, shall be deemed
guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction thereof shall be
fined in any sum not less than ten dollars nor more than fifty
dollars for each offense . . . .70
Similarly, a 1913 North Carolina law proclaimed:
67. See JOHN SIBLEY BUTLER, ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND SELF-HELP AMONG BLACK
AMERICANS: A RECONSIDERATION OF RACE AND ECONOMICS 151–53 (rev. ed. 2005);
JULIET E. K. WALKER, THE HISTORY OF BLACK BUSINESS IN AMERICA: CAPITALISM,
RACE, ENTREPRENEURSHIP 193–96 (1st ed. 1998); see also Freeman, supra note 37, at 182–83
(“African-American businesses were traditionally confined to African-American
neighborhoods and catered to a mostly African-American clientele, many of whom did not
have high levels of disposable income. Although some of these niche industries flourished,
such as hair and beauty products (which depend for the most part on the negative societal
images of their clientele), many African-American businesses struggled to survive,
particularly as successful African Americans emigrated away from all-African-American
neighborhoods. Ghettoized economies prevent financial growth for small African-American
businesses and individual consumers, forcing them to rely on debt to meet monthly expenses.”
(citing OLIVER & SHAPIRO, supra note 44, at 48–51; GOOD HAIR (Chris Rock Productions &
HBO Films 2009)).
68. An Act to Amend and Consolidate the Military Laws of North Carolina, ch. 47, § 14852, 1913 N.C. Sess. Laws 82, 82; Act of May 5, 1908, ch. 77, § 6, 1908 Okla. Sess. Laws 694,
695. After Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), held segregation in public
schools unconstitutional, id. at 495, a line of cases and laws rendered all institutional
segregation illegal, see Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 305 (1964) (holding that
Congress acted within its power in forbidding racial discrimination in restaurants); Johnson v.
Virginia, 373 U.S. 61, 62 (1963) (desegregating courthouse seating); New Orleans City Park
Improvement Ass’n v. Detiege, 252 F.2d 122, 123 (5th Cir. 1958) (per curiam) (affirming
lower court decision that a city’s refusal to make publicly supported facilities available on an
integrated basis to African American citizens is unconstitutional), aff’d per curiam, 358 U.S.
54 (1958); Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 223 F.2d 93, 95 (5th Cir. 1955) (ruling segregation at
public golf courses unconstitutional), vacated per curiam, 350 U.S. 879 (1955); Dawson v.
Mayor of Baltimore, 220 F.2d 386, 387–88 (4th Cir. 1955) (holding segregation at public
beaches and bathhouses unconstitutional), aff’d per curiam, 350 U.S. 877 (1955); Browder v.
Gayle, 142 F. Supp. 707, 717 (M.D. Ala. 1956) (holding statutes and ordinances requiring
segregation on public buses unconstitutional), aff’d per curiam, 352 U.S. 903 (1956). See
generally Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 1981–2000h-6 (2015)) (invalidating government-sponsored discrimination based on
race, among other protected designations).
69. See An Act to Amend and Consolidate the Military Laws of North Carolina, ch. 47,
§ 1-4852, 1913 N.C. Sess. Laws 82, 82; Act of May 5, 1908, ch. 77, § 6, 1908 Okla. Sess. Laws
694, 695.
70. Act of May 5, 1908, ch. 77, § 6, 1908 Okla. Sess. Laws 694, 695.
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The white and colored militia shall be separately enrolled, and
shall never be compelled to serve in the same organization. No
organization of colored troops shall be permitted where white
troops are available, and when permitted to be organized, colored
troops shall be under command of white officers . . . .71
The harsh effects of a racially segregated military inspired the relatively
privileged Charles Hamilton Houston to devote his life to dismantling
Plessy’s “separate but equal” doctrine.72 His determination, diligence,
and prophetic strategizing led to Plessy’s eventual overruling by Brown
v. Board of Education in 1954.73
Even in the cities where some Black businesses managed to thrive,
the majority of Blacks worked as marginalized, unskilled workers and
agricultural laborers.74 Also, when calamities struck, such as the boll
weevil scourge that cut Georgia’s cotton production in half between
1914 and 192375 and the Great Depression, Blacks experienced some of
the greatest and most sustained losses.76 Further, New Deal programs
designed to lift the national economy out of the Depression and to
create important protections for workers largely bypassed Blacks.77
For example, the 1935 Social Security Act provided a safety net for
all employees but excluded certain groups, including domestic servants

71. An Act to Amend and Consolidate the Military Laws of North Carolina, ch. 47, § 14852, 1913 N.C. Sess. Laws 82, 82.
72. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 552 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting); CHARLES H.
HOUSTON: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY STUDY OF CIVIL RIGHTS LEADERSHIP 1 (James L.
Conyers, Jr. ed., 2012); José Felipé Anderson, Maryland Lawyers Who Helped Shape the
Constitution: Father of Freedom—Charles Hamilton Houston, MD. B.J., no. 4, July/Aug. 2011,
at 4, 6; Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Wielding the Double-Edged Sword: Charles Hamilton Houston
and Judicial Activism in the Age of Legal Realism, 14 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 17, 24
(1998); THE ROAD TO BROWN (Larry Adelman 1990), http://newsreel.org/transcripts/roadtob
.htm [https://perma.cc/5PVU-LFKT].
73. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954); see also CHARLES H. HOUSTON,
supra note 72, at 126; Anderson, supra note 72, at 5; Fairfax, supra note 72, at 24; THE ROAD
TO BROWN, supra note 72.
74. Edward A. Hatfield, Segregation, NEW GA. ENCYCLOPEDIA (Chris Dobbs ed., Jan.
24, 2017), http://www.georgiaencyclopedia.org/articles/history-archaeology/segregation [https://
perma.cc/DSE6-YNEB].
75. JACKIE SHECKLER FINCH, IT HAPPENED IN ALABAMA: REMARKABLE EVENTS
THAT SHAPED HISTORY 43–45 (1st ed. 2011); Fabian Lange, Alan L. Olmstead & Paul W.
Rhode, The Impact of the Boll Weevil, 1892–1932, 69 J. ECON. HIST. 685, 693 (2009); Phillip
M. Roberts, Boll Weevil, NEW GA. ENCYCLOPEDIA (Oct. 12, 2016), http://www
.georgiaencyclopedia.org/articles/business-economy/boll-weevil [https://perma.cc/CSP7-R9AP].
76. Hatfield, supra note 74.
77. E.g., Social Security Act of 1935, ch. 531, Pub. L. 74-271, § 210(b)(1)–(2), 49 Stat. 620,
625 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 410(a)(3)(A)–(B) (2012)); National Labor Relations
Act, ch. 372, Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–
169 (2012)).
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and agricultural workers, where Black labor was concentrated.78 In the
same year, the Wagner Act granted collective bargaining power to
unions, making negotiations for fair wages possible and greatly
expanding the middle class.79 The Act, however, allowed unions to
exclude domestic servants and farm workers and provided no protection
against racial discrimination in benefits including health care, job
security, and pensions.80 The ensuing exclusion was so extreme that in
1972 all of the 3,000 members of Los Angeles’s Steam Fitters Local 250
labor union were reportedly White.81
In addition to restricting Black employment and benefits, a number
of laws, policies, and legally sanctioned agreements created and
enforced residential segregation. In Buchanan v. Warley,82 in 1917, a
Black home buyer sued a White seller for refusing to complete the sale
of his house in accordance with a Louisville ordinance prohibiting the
sale of a home to a Black owner on a majority White block.83 The Court
ruled the ordinance unconstitutional under both the Fourteenth
Amendment and the Civil Rights Act of 1866.84 However, because there
must be state action, such as the Louisville ordinance, for a Fourteenth
Amendment violation, and the Civil Rights Act applies primarily to
public accommodations, the decision did not cover private agreements.85

78. Social Security Act of 1935, ch. 531, Pub. L. 74-271, § 210(b)(1)–(2), 49 Stat. 620, 625
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 410(a)(3)(A)–(B) (2012)). See IRA KATZNELSON, FEAR
ITSELF: THE NEW DEAL AND THE ORIGINS OF OUR TIME 259–60 (2013); Laura Ann Foster,
Social Security and African American Families: Unmasking Race and Gender Discrimination,
12 UCLA WOMEN’S L. J. 55, 60 (2001). But see Larry DeWitt, The Decision to Exclude
Agricultural and Domestic Workers from the 1935 Social Security Act, 70 SOC. SECURITY
BULL., no. 4, 2010, at 49, 49; Robert C. Lieberman, Race, Institutions, and the Administration
of Social Policy, 19 SOC. SCI. HIST. 511, 514 (1995).
79. National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, § 2(3), 49 Stat. 449, 450 (1935) (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2012)); KATZNELSON, supra note 78, at 257–58; Juan F.
Perea, The Echoes of Slavery: Recognizing the Racist Origins of the Agricultural and Domestic
Worker Exclusion from the National Labor Relations Act, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 95, 126 (2011);
Larry Adelman, A Long History of Racial Preferences—For Whites, PBS, http://www.pbs.org
/race/000_About/002_04-background-03-02.htm [https://perma.cc/EV9V-FYTC].
80. National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935)
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (2012)). See PAUL FRYMER, BLACK AND BLUE:
AFRICAN AMERICANS, THE LABOR MOVEMENT, AND THE DECLINE OF THE DEMOCRATIC
PARTY 1–2 (2008); Perea, supra note 79, at 125–26.
81. Adelman, supra note 79.
82. 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
83. Id. at 70.
84. Id. at 82.
85. See 1920s–1948: Racially Restrictive Covenants, FAIR HOUSING CTR. GREATER BOS.,
http://www.bostonfairhousing.org/timeline/1920s1948-Restrictive-Covenants.html [https://perma.cc
/W3XH-FGNC].
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The Court revisited the issue several years later, in 1926, in
Corrigan v. Buckley.86 Here, the Court held that racially restrictive
covenants were agreements between private citizens that fell outside the
reach of the Fifth, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth Amendments.87 The
Court also affirmed that the Civil Rights Act contained no restrictions
on the decisions of private property owners.88 Eventually, in 1948, in
Shelley v. Kraemer,89 the Court decided that, although racially restrictive
covenants created by private parties evaded review, judicial enforcement
of them constituted state action.90 Thereafter, any attempts to enforce a
covenant through the courts resulted in invalidation. Twenty years later,
in 1968, the Fair Housing Act prohibited them altogether.91
The covenant under review in Shelley is illustrative. It read:
no part of the affected property shall be “occupied by any person
not of the Caucasian race, it being intended hereby to restrict the
use of said property . . . against the occupancy as owners or tenants
of any portion of said property for resident or other purposes by
people of the Negro or Mongolian Race.”92
Other covenants provided exceptions for domestic servants residing in
the home.93 Typically, a covenant becomes part of the deed passed on to
new owners, who risk forfeiture if they violate its terms.94 Further,
covenants generally run with the land, making them enforceable against
future buyers.95 Individuals, in addition to real estate and neighborhood
boards, took responsibility for enforcing racially restrictive covenants, a
mission that often led to racial violence perpetrated to drive away Black

86. 271 U.S. 323 (1926).
87. Id. at 329–31.
88. Id.
89. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
90. Id. at 19–20.
91. Fair Housing Act, Pub. L. 90-284, 82 Stat. 81, 81 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 3601–3619 (2012)).
92. Shelley, 334 U.S. at 9–10 (omission in original) (quoting Kraemer v. Shelley, 198
S.W.2d 679, 681 (Mo. 1946)).
93. TOWN OF WEST HARTFORD, CONN., LAND RECORDS: DRYAD’S GROVE 342 (1941),
http://magic.lib.uconn.edu/magic_2/vector/37840/155/primary_source/hdming_37840_155_1941
_land_records_west_hartford_trinity_dryads_grove.pdf [https://perma.cc/5TVU-TMQ2] (“No
persons of any race other than the white race shall use or occupancy any building or lot,
except that this covenant shall not prevent occupancy by domestic servants of a different race
domiciled with an owner or tenant.”).
94. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP. (SERVITUDES) § 1.3 (AM. LAW. INST. 2000); see
also 1920s–1948: Racially Restrictive Covenants, supra note 85.
95. Id.
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home buyers.96 By 1940, racially restrictive covenants covered eighty
percent of the property owned in Chicago and Los Angeles.97
Unfortunately, the creation of the Federal Housing Administration
(“FHA”) in 1934 did little to alleviate the effects of private
discrimination on segregation.98 Instead, the agency increased
segregation through policies such as redlining, which rendered residents
of certain areas ineligible for federal housing loans.99 Redlining began
with the Federal Home Loan Bank Board’s request to the Home
Owners’ Loan Corporation in 1935 “to create ‘residential security maps’
for 239 cities[.]”100 These maps evaluated the “trend of desirability” for
mortgage lending101 and “indicate[d] the level of security for real estate
investments in each surveyed city.”102 The maps featured color-coded
grades, ranging from (A), the highest, to (D), the lowest, based on an
evaluation of housing conditions and residents’ “social status.”103
Neighborhoods with non-White, immigrant, and poor residents received

96. JEANNINE BELL, HATE THY NEIGHBOR: MOVE-IN VIOLENCE AND THE
PERSISTENCE OF RACIAL SEGREGATION IN AMERICAN HOUSING 57 (2013); see also ISABEL
WILKERSON, THE WARMTH OF OTHER SUNS: THE EPIC STORY OF AMERICA’S GREAT
MIGRATION 271–74 (2010); Coates, supra note 36, at 64 (featuring the story of Clyde Ross,
one of the founders of the Contract Buyers League, designed to fight back against housing
discrimination in Chicago).
97. U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, NO. 42, UNDERSTANDING FAIR HOUSING 4 (1973),
http://www.law.umaryland.edu/marshall/usccr/documents/cr11042.pdf [https://perma.cc/79TUJ82P] (“By 1940, according to a magazine article, 80 percent of both Chicago and Los Angeles
carried restrictive convenants [sic] barring black families.”); 1920s–1948: Racially Restrictive
Covenants, supra note 85.
98. See KATZNELSON, supra note 78, at 163; Palma Joy Strand, Inheriting Inequality:
Wealth, Race, and the Laws of Succession, 89 OR. L. REV. 453, 476 (2010); George Steven
Swan, The Law and Economics of Affirmative Action in Housing: The Diversity Impulse, 15
U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 133, 184 (2006); Alexis C. Madrigal, The Racist Housing Policy That
Made Your Neighborhood, ATLANTIC (May 22, 2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/business
/archive/2014/05/the-racist-housing-policy-that-made-your-neighborhood/371439/ [https://perma
.cc/H4PM-BQVE].
99. Strand, supra note 98, at 490; Swan, supra note 98, at 160.
100. Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Address at
the Community Affairs Research Conference: The Community Reinvestment Act: Its
Evolution and New Challenges (Mar. 30, 2007), http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents
/speech/bernanke20070330a.htm [https://perma.cc/DH2X-XTW7]. See generally HOME
OWNERS’ LOAN CORP., RESIDENTIAL SECURITY “REDLINING” MAP AND AREA
DESCRIPTIONS: HARTFORD, CONNECTICUT (1937), http://magic.lib.uconn.edu/magic_2/vector
/37840/primary_source/hdimg_37840_064_1937_holc_national_archives_trinity.pdf [https://
perma.cc/7V9V-YL2S] (demonstrating that race and social status were taken into account
when redlining neigborhoods in Hartford, Connecticut).
101. HOME OWNERS’ LOAN CORP., supra note 100, at § 1; Amy E. Hillier, Redlining and
the Homeowners’ Loan Corporation, 29 J. URB. HIST. 394, 400 (2003); Madrigal, supra note
98.
102. Bernanke, supra note 100.
103. HOME OWNERS’ LOAN CORP., supra note 100, § 1.
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the lowest grades.104 The red shading of these Type D areas thus led to
the creation of the term “redlining” to describe racial discrimination in
mortgage and credit lending.105
Redlining allowed the FHA, a crucial part of Roosevelt’s New
Deal,106 to make home ownership possible for millions of White
Americans, while excluding members of Black and integrated
communities from access to this crucial path to financial stability and
wealth accumulation, regardless of their creditworthiness.107 Of the $120
billion in home loans administered by the FHA between 1934 and 1962,
98% of them went to Whites.108 Similarly, between 1946 and 1960, less
than 100 of the 350,000 new homes in Northern California financed by
the FHA went to Black families.109
Additionally, the FHA’s policies led White middle class inhabitants
to leave integrated urban areas for the suburbs, thereby accelerating
urban decay.110 Under FHA rules, many White home owners found it
easier to obtain a loan for a new home than for repairs and abandoned
their residences accordingly.111 FHA publications further discouraged
integrated living by problematizing neighborhoods containing
“inharmonious racial or nationality groups” as ones that disseminate
“smoke, odors, and fog.”112 An extreme response to FHA policies
encouraging White flight sprang up in Detroit, where attempts to
circumvent these negative characterizations and obtain an FHA loan to

104. See id.; Bernanke, supra note 100.
105. Bernanke, supra note 100; see also HOME OWNERS’ LOAN CORP., supra note 100, at
§ 1; Analiese Fernandes, A Brief History of Racism in Redlining, IMPACT (Oct. 22, 2016),
http://upennimpact.org/brief-history-racism-redlining/ [https://perma.cc/KYR2-M2QD].
106. National Housing Act of 1934, Pub. L. 84-345, 48 Stat. 847 (creating the FHA).
107. Brian Gilmore, Home Is Where the Hatred Is: A Proposal for a Federal Housing
Administration Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 10 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION,
GENDER & CLASS 249, 259, 262 (2010); see also Aric Short, Post-Acquisition Harassment and
the Scope of the Fair Housing Act, 58 ALA. L. REV. 203, 210, 223 (2006); Bernanke, supra note
100.
108. GEORGE LIPSITZ, THE POSSESSIVE INVESTMENT IN WHITENESS: HOW WHITE
PEOPLE PROFIT FROM IDENTITY POLITICS 6 (rev. ed. 1998) (citing JULL QUADAGNO, THE
COLOR OF WELFARE: HOW RACISM UNDERMINED THE WAR ON POVERTY 91–92 (1994)).
109. Adelman, supra note 79.
110. See KEVIN M. KRUSE, WHITE FLIGHT: ATLANTA AND THE MAKING OF MODERN
CONSERVATISM 60–61 (2005) (discussing how the FHA encouraged racial restrictions that
segregated White and Black neighborhoods); Stacy E. Seicshnaydre, The Fair Housing Choice
Myth, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 967, 982 (2012).
111. Roslyn Corenzwit Lieb et al., Abandonment of Residential Property in an Urban
Context, 23 DEPAUL L. REV. 1186, 1188–98 (1974); Charles L. Nier, III, Perpetuation of
Segregation: Toward a New Historical and Legal Interpretation of Redlining Under the Fair
Housing Act, 32 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 617, 625 (1999).
112. JAMES W. LOEWEN, SUNDOWN TOWNS: A HIDDEN DIMENSION OF AMERICAN
RACISM 129 (2006).
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integrate a sparsely populated Black area led to the construction of a
concrete wall between neighboring White and Black communities.113
In conjunction with the FHA, the Serviceman’s Readjustment Act
of 1944 (“GI Bill”) failed to raise the Black community’s economic
status because it provided for fewer benefits to Black veterans than
White veterans.114 For example, under the GI Bill’s directive to offer
special support for veterans seeking to purchase new homes, less than
3% of FHA or Veterans Affairs loans went to non-White veterans.115
This extreme disparity reflected both the FHA’s racist policies and the
biases of individual loan officers and bankers.116 Other parts of the GI
Bill, which provided veterans opportunities for job skills training and
education, similarly bypassed Blacks because of the socially acceptable
racist policies and attitudes of White officials, business people,
administrators, and institutions.117
Employment programs funneled Blacks into low-paying jobs, and
educational scholarships applied only to small Black colleges with few
resources.118 Illustratively, in October 1946, of the 6,500 workers
awarded jobs through the GI Bill, Whites received 86% of the skilled
and semi-skilled positions while Blacks, in stark contrast, garnered 92%
of the unskilled positions.119 Additionally, of the 9,000 students enrolled
at the University of Pennsylvania, which had one of the most racially
inclusive policies of Ivy League schools at the time,120 only forty-six were

113. See DORCETA E. TAYLOR, TOXIC COMMUNITIES: ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM,
INDUSTRIAL POLLUTION, AND RESIDENTIAL MOBILITY 241 (2014). This divide is otherwise
“known as the Birwood Wall.” Id.
114. See Servicemen’s Readjustment Act of 1944 (G.I. Bill), Pub. L. No. 78-346, 58 Stat.
284 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 38 U.S.C.); KATZNELSON, supra note 44, at
114–15, 128; see also Mark Boulton, How the G.I. Bill Failed African-American Vietnam War
Veterans, 58 J. BLACKS HIGHER EDUC. 57, 58–59 (2007); Juan F. Perea, Doctrines of
Delusion: How the History of the G.I. Bill and Other Inconvenient Truths Undermine the
Supreme Court’s Affirmative Action Jurisprudence, 75 U. PITT. L. REV. 583, 585 (2014); Sarah
Turner & John Bound, Closing the Gap or Widening the Divide: The Effects of the G.I. Bill
and World War II on the Educational Outcomes of Black Americans, 63 J. ECON. HIST. 145,
145 (2003) (describing how Black veterans were discriminated against, as compared to their
fellow White soldiers, for educational opportunities following World War II).
115. Cyd McKenna, The Homeownership Gap: How the Post-World War II GI Bill
Shaped Modern Day Homeownership Patterns for Black and White Americans 59 (May 22,
2008) (unpublished Master in City Planning thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology), https://
dspace.mit.edu/bitstream/handle/1721.1/44333/276173994-MIT.pdf [https://perma.cc/9MCQ-J3QK].
116. GLENN C. ALTSCHULER & STUART M. BLUMIN, THE GI BILL: THE NEW DEAL FOR
VETERANS 198–99 (2009).
117. See id. at 128–29.
118. See Perea, supra note 114, at 494–95.
119. KATZNELSON, supra note 44, at 138.
120. Id. at 130.
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Black.121 Correspondingly, during this period, the overwhelming number
of enrollments in historically Black colleges and universities led those
institutions to unprecedented growth, with enrollment numbers
increasing from 29,000 in 1940 to 73,000 in 1947.122
Other laws, related to taxes123 and inheritance,124 similarly drove and
maintained a wedge between Blacks’ and Whites’ abilities to further
their economic status. Simultaneously, federal food policy contributed to
racial health disparities: facially neutral policies that disproportionately
benefited Whites took thousands of Blacks out of the workforce every
year due to illnesses and premature deaths.125 Finally, the criminal justice
system ensnared hundreds of thousands of Black men and women,
severely limiting their employment opportunities even upon release.126
121. Id.
122. Id. at 120.
123. See ANDRE L. SMITH, TAX LAW AND RACIAL ECONOMIC JUSTICE: BLACK TAX 67
(2015) (showing how tax laws have disadvantaged Black people). Professor Andre Smith
traces the complicated history of racism and taxation, describing the effect of slavery as a
100% tax on Black labor, id. at 76; oppressive taxation of free Blacks before the Civil War to
discourage slave revolts and competition with Whites, which lead to re-enslavement through
incarceration for failure to pay, id. at 85–90; poll tax requirements for voting, id. at 151–54;
preferential treatment for capital gains income, id. at 204; home mortgage deductions, id. at
167; and the redistributive potential of taxation. Id. at 181.
124. See Strand, supra note 98, at 464–68 (describing how inheritance law contributes to
racial wealth inequality and proposing changes to testacy and intestacy laws to decrease the
advantages bestowed on Whites and the disadvantages imposed on Blacks by these laws).
125. See Andrea Freeman, Behavioral Economics and Food Policy: The Limits and Politics
of Nudging, in NUDGING HEALTH: HEALTH LAW AND BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS 124, 133–
34 (I. Glen Cohen, Holly Fernandez Lynch & Christopher T. Robertson eds., 2016); Andrea
Freeman, Fast Food: Oppression Through Poor Nutrition, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 2221, 2227–28,
2242–45 (2007) (describing how cooperation between the fast food industry and the
government leads to poor access to healthy food in many low-income communities of color,
whose members suffer disproportionately from deaths and diseases related to poor nutrition);
Andrea Freeman, “First Food” Justice: Racial Disparities in Infant Feeding as Food
Oppression, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 3053, 3063–66 (2015) (exploring how law and policy that
supports the formula industry leads to racial disparities in breastfeeding, linked to higher
infant mortality rates in Black children and other health disparities); Andrea Freeman, The
Unbearable Whiteness of Milk: Food Oppression and the USDA, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 1251,
1252–54 (2013) (exploring how the USDA’s attempts to dispose of the dairy surplus through
partnerships with fast food companies and distribution through its nutrition programs
disproportionately harm communities of color); Andrea Freeman, Transparency for Food
Consumers: Nutrition Labeling and Food Oppression, 41 AM. J.L. & MED. 315, 316–21 (2015)
(examining how the USDA’s focus on improving health by altering consumer behavior
through nutrition labeling and consumer education perpetuates racial health disparities by
neglecting the absence of choice many consumers of color have regarding food selection); see
also David R. Williams & Pamela Braboy Jackson, Social Sources of Racial Disparities in
Health, 24 HEALTH AFF. 325, 327–30 (2005).
126. See MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE
AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 26–58 (2010) (explaining how the criminal justice system creates
and perpetuates a racial hierarchy in the United States). See generally ANGELA Y. DAVIS,
ARE PRISONS OBSOLETE? (2003) (suggesting that the criminal justice system can achieve
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In turn, these limitations on Black prosperity created greater
opportunities for Whites to flourish. As Oliver and Shapiro explain in
their seminal work, Black Wealth/White Wealth:
When black workers were paid less than white workers, white
workers gained a benefit; when black businesses were confined to
the segregated black market, white businesses received the benefit
of diminished competition; when FHA policies denied loans to
blacks, whites were the beneficiaries of the spectacular growth of
good housing and housing equity in the suburbs. The cumulative
effect of such a process has been to sediment blacks at the bottom
of the social hierarchy and to artificially raise the relative position
of some whites in society.127
One significant result of the systemic, institutionalized povertization
of the Black community is a great need for credit. Without a safety net
of wealth on which to fall back, even many middle-class Black families
live paycheck-to-paycheck, existing only one unforeseen expense—such
as a medical emergency or a broken car—away from financial crisis.128
In some ways, this type of urgent need for credit is unique to the
United States because the U.S. government provides far less of a social
safety net to its citizens and residents than most other developed
countries.129 For example, both Canada and England provide free health
care to their citizens, so that individuals in those countries can maintain
a minimum quality of life and need not fear that medical problems will
lead to financial crisis, or that an inability to pay will cause them to
forego necessary treatment.130 In contrast, in the United States’
justice with less incarceration); DEVAH PAGER, MARKED: RACE, CRIME, AND FINDING
WORK IN AN ERA OF MASS INCARCERATION (2007) (examining the impact of crime policies
on the rise of mass incarceration in the United States); BETH E. RICHIE, ARRESTED JUSTICE:
BLACK WOMEN, VIOLENCE, AND AMERICA’S PRISON NATION (2012) (offering a way to
broaden the collective understanding of violence against women of color and to challenge the
evolution of anti-violence efforts in the United States); GLOBAL LOCKDOWN: RACE,
GENDER, AND THE PRISON-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX (Julia Sudbury ed., 2005) (attempting to
shed new light on incarcerated women to shift the discourse on women’s imprisonment);
PRISON NATION: THE WAREHOUSING OF AMERICA’S POOR (Tara Herivel & Paul Wright
eds., 2003) (suggesting the prison system is akin to a social experiment gone wrong through a
collection of essays).
127. OLIVER & SHAPIRO, supra note 44, at 53.
128. See Freeman, supra note 37, at 181.
129. See Karen Jusko, Safety Net, PATHWAYS, no. 1, 2016, at 25, 30.
130. Canada Health Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-6; About the National Health Service (NHS),
NHS CHOICES (Apr. 13, 2016), http://www.nhs.uk/NHSEngland/thenhs/about/Pages/overview
.aspx [https://perma.cc/U3L4-BHC6]; see also Steve Gold, Four Healthcare Systems Divided
by the English Language, GUARDIAN (June 7, 2011, 2:30 AM), https://www.theguardian.com
/healthcare-network/2011/jun/07/healthcare-systems-australia-medicare-canada-saskatchewan
[https://perma.cc/7WSF-XPSH].
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capitalist-based economy, even the Affordable Care Act’s131 expansion
of health insurance, as opposed to government provision of health care,
was controversial, and one of the first targets in the subsequent
administration’s campaign to dismantle social- and welfare-minded laws
and policies.132
The absence of a social safety net in the United States makes credit
an indispensable survival tool for both the lower and middle classes, a
group often referred to as “the 99%,”133 because they are vulnerable to
shocks such as illness, job loss, and economic depression or inflation.134
Further, in spite of the many problems documented here, credit cards
are still usually preferable to fringe lending options, such as check
cashing, payday loans, and pawn shops.135 Additionally, residential and
social segregation make it less likely that Black individuals in financial
straits will have relatives or friends from whom they can borrow.136
The legacy of exploitation of Blacks’ legally created and sanctioned
economic disadvantage, originating in slavery, continues with the
predatory and discriminatory practices of credit card corporations today.
The following Section zeroes in on the history and current landscape of
racial disparities in credit card lending.
B.

Racial Disparities and Discrimination in Credit Card Use

Racial disparities in the treatment of credit card holders emerged as
the industry’s business model evolved. Initially, credit card companies
sought out wealthy consumers who would pay off their bills at the end of

131. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18001 note (2015)).
132. Vann R. Newkirk II, The Trump Administration’s First Blow to Obamacare,
ATLANTIC (Jan. 24, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/01/the-trumpadministrations-first-blow-to-obamacare/514103/ [https://perma.cc/4ZMC-JZKN].
133. See OXFAM, BRIEFING PAPER: AN ECONOMY FOR THE 99%, at 2 (2017), https://
www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/file_attachments/bp-economy-for-99-percent-160117-en
.pdf [https://perma.cc/2ZNA-KY2N]; Ezra Klein, Who Are the 99 Percent?, WASH. POST (Oct.
4, 2011), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/ezra-klein/post/who-are-the-99-percent/2011/08
/25/gIQAt87jKL_blog.html?utm_term=.aff31b024bf8 [https://perma.cc/6MAB-6UBW].
134. PEW CHARITABLE TRS., THE ROLE OF EMERGENCY SAVINGS IN FAMILY
FINANCIAL SECURITY: HOW DO FAMILIES COPE WITH FINANCIAL SHOCKS? 1–3 (2015),
http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/assets/2015/10/emergency-savings-report-1_artfinal.pdf?la
=en [https://perma.cc/NB69-GA6C].
135. See, e.g., Creola Johnson, Payday Loans: Shrewd Business or Predatory Lending?, 87
MINN. L. REV. 1, 2 (2002); Christopher L. Peterson, Usury Law, Payday Loans, and Statutory
Sleight of Hand: Salience Distortion in American Credit Pricing Limits, 92 MINN. L. REV.
1110, 1123–28 (2008).
136. Paul Kiel & Annie Waldman, The Burden of Debt on Black America, ATLANTIC
(Oct. 9, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/10/debt-black-families
/409756/ [https://perma.cc/5BQY-Z4AC].
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each month.137 The companies eventually learned, however, that,
counterintuitively, they could earn greater profits for their shareholders
by targeting high-risk consumers who could not, in fact, pay their bills
off in full, but would put some money toward them each month.138 These
“revolvers” are often “subsistence users”—consumers who rely on credit
cards to pay, at least in part, for life’s necessities.139 They are primarily
the working poor and many of them are people of color who face
significant obstacles to financial prosperity that arise from systemic and
historical structural inequality.140
Credit card companies compound the financial difficulties of these
subsistence users through unreasonable but unavoidable fees and high
and fluctuating interest rates.141 Further, drawing from the insights of
behavioral economics, credit card companies attract these customers
with appealingly low “teaser rates” (such as “0% introductory APR”)
that skyrocket several months down the line.142 Credit card companies
also make unsolicited mass mailings of “pre-approved” card offers to
households living in economically depressed neighborhoods, extending
137. For a comprehensive explanation of the evolution and present state of the credit card
industry’s business model, as well as a discussion of structural racism in the credit card
industry, see generally Freeman, supra note 37.
138. See RONALD J. MANN, CHARGING AHEAD: THE GROWTH AND REGULATION OF
PAYMENT CARD MARKETS 81–82 (2006); Freeman, supra note 37, 161–62.
139. See TRAUB & REUTSCHLIN, supra note 32, at 9–10. Revolvers are credit card users
who carry a balance from month to month. Transactor, INVESTOPEDIA.COM, http://www
.investopedia.com/terms/t/transactor.asp [https://perma.cc/2QUR-6LCX]. Subsistence users
do this out of necessity. Mary Beth Matthews, The Credit CARD Act of 2009–Four Years
Later, 2013 ARK. L. NOTES 1488, ¶ 52; Freeman, supra note 37, at 153 (“A subsistence user is
someone who uses credit cards to survive, to pay the electricity bill one month and the phone
bill the next, or to purchase essential items such as gas, groceries, or diapers. This type of user
contrasts with the ‘lifestyle user,’ who uses credit cards to enhance her lifestyle, either
minimally or considerably.”). Lifestyle users generally enjoy the perks of credit card use, such
as cash back and airline miles, for which subsistence users foot the bill. Adam J. Levitin, The
Antitrust Super Bowl: America’s Payment Systems, No-Surcharge Rules, and the Hidden Costs
of Credit, 3 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 265, 317 (2005).
140. See, e.g., Paul Burstein & Mark Evan Edwards, The Impact of Employment
Discrimination Litigation on Racial Disparity in Earnings: Evidence and Unresolved Issues, 28
L. & SOC’Y REV. 79, 79–80 (1994); Freeman. supra note 37, at 179–88; Devah Pager & Hana
Shepherd, The Sociology of Discrimination: Racial Discrimination in Employment, Housing,
Credit, and Consumer Markets, 34 ANN. REV. SOC. 181, 182 (2008); Lathonia Denise Stewart
& Richard Perlow, Applicant Race, Job Status, and Racial Attitude as Predictors of
Employment Discrimination, 16 J. BUS. & PSYCHOL. 259, 260–61 (2001); Jonathan C. Zeigert
& Paul J. Hanges, Employment Discrimination: The Role of Implicit Attitudes, Motivation, and
a Climate for Racial Bias, 90 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 553, 553 (2005); see also supra Part I.A.
141. See Freeman, supra note 37, at 166–68; Oren Bar-Gill, Seduction by Plastic, 98 NW. U.
L. REV. 1373, 1392–93 (2004). Although amendments to the CARD Act eliminated some of
the more egregious fees, late fees and rising interest rates continue to be a problem. TRAUB &
REUTSCHLIN, supra note 32, at 24.
142. Freeman, supra note 37, at 166–68; Oren Bar-Gill, supra note 141, at 1392–93.
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exploitative credit terms to residents of predominately Black or Latino
neighborhoods, while enticing residents of affluent, White
neighborhoods with offers of “pre-approved” cards with perks such as
cash back, air miles, and low interest rates.143 In lower-income
neighborhoods, it is likely that residents sometimes accept the terms of
these cards without shopping for better ones based on a belief that they
are ineligible for better, or any, credit.144
It is difficult, however, to identify the precise disparities in the
treatment of Black and White credit card consumers because regulations
do not require companies to disclose the details of their transactions,
such as which cards they offer and sell to which consumers on which
terms.145 Keeping this information secret allows the companies to engage
in discrimination that is very hard, if not impossible, for potential or
actual plaintiffs to prove.146 In the similar context of discriminatory
practices in the mortgage industry, Congress recognized and addressed
this problem in the 1975 Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (“HMDA”).147
HMDA initially required mortgage lenders in urban areas to
collect, report, and make available to the public data about their lending
practices.148 Amendments to the Act in 1989 expanded the required data
collection to include the race, gender, and income of home loan
applicants and borrowers.149 Further amendments in 2002 required
disclosure of price data.150 Unfortunately, however, continuing
documentation of racial discrimination in mortgage lending illustrates
that HMDA’s collection and disclosure requirements do not eliminate
143. See Angela Littwin, Beyond Usury: A Study of Credit-Card Use and Preference
Among Low-Income Consumers, 86 TEX. L. REV. 451, 475 (2008); Freeman, supra note 37, at
166–68.
144. See Freeman, supra note 37, at 167.
145. See Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure (CARD) Act of 2009,
Pub. L. 111-24, 123 Stat. 1734 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1637 (2012)).
146. See, e.g., Osborne v. Bank of America, Nat’l Ass’n, 234 F. Supp. 2d 804, 812 (M.D.
Tenn. 2012) (allowing the use of disparate impact analysis to prove lending discrimination).
The standard of proof required to prevail on an ECOA discrimination claim is currently
contested and unresolved by the Supreme Court. See Winnie Taylor, Proving Racial
Discrimination and Monitoring Fair Lending Compliance: The Missing Data Problem in
Nonmortgage Credit, 31 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 199, 200 & n.4 (2011–2012).
147. Home Mortgage Disclosure Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-200, § 302(a)–(b), 89 Stat.
1125, 1125 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 2801(a)–(b) (2012)); 12 U.S.C. § 2801(b) (2012). As
discussed directly above, the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (“HMDA”) does not effectively
prevent discrimination, but it does put more pressure on lending institutions to comply with
anti-discrimination laws and enable discovery of non-compliance.
148. § 304, 89 Stat. at 1125–26.
149. Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. No.
101-73, § 1211(a)(3)–(4), 103 Stat. 183, 524 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 2803(b)(4) (2012)).
150. History of HMDA, FFIEC, https://www.ffiec.gov/hmda/history2.htm [https://perma.cc
/6KG5-4AMK].
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discriminatory practices.151 Nonetheless, they represent a crucial first
step to reform that is heretofore absent in the consumer credit context.
In contrast, lack of transparency on the part of the credit card companies
enables discrimination by preventing its identification. It also helps to
ward off the potential for reputational harm or consumer response that
media attention to the problem might create.
However, despite the lack of access to definitive statistics on credit
card industry practices, two studies analyzed available data to conclude
that race, isolated from socio-economic status, has a significant effect on
a user’s ability to obtain a credit card and on which terms they receive.
Specifically, in 2010, researcher Chi-Jack Lin demonstrated that race
affects the likelihood of obtaining a credit card, the number of cards
owned, the average credit line per card, the conditions and fees attached
to a card, and the factors necessary to establish creditworthiness.152 He
found that this type of discrimination occurs based on the names listed
on an application, which can often suggest racial identity,153 or the
physical appearance of credit card applicants who walk into banks to
request a card in person.154
Additionally, a 2011 study published in the Review of Economics
and Statistics, authored by Ethan Cohen-Cole and titled Credit Card
Redlining, reports that living in a Black neighborhood significantly
affects a credit card applicant’s ability to get a card and the terms of that
card.155 The report documents that credit card applicants from White
neighborhoods with risk profiles and credit histories identical to their

151. See Richard D. Marsico, Looking Back and Looking Ahead as the Home Mortgage
Disclosure Act Turns Thirty-Five: The Role of Public Disclosure of Lending Data in a Time of
Financial Crisis, 29 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 205, 206 (2009) (positing that the 2002
amendments, like the 1989 amendments, did not require lenders to disclose the credit score of
borrowers and thus “hamper[ed] efforts to determine whether higher rates of rejections of
loan applications from minority borrowers than whites were due to relatively weaker
creditworthiness or race”); cf. Mark Fogarty, HMDA Data Offers Clues on Discrimination
Against Gays, NAT’L MORTGAGE NEWS (June 4, 2014, 4:46 PM), https://web.archive.org/web
/20160323070839/http://www.nationalmortgagenews.com/blogs/hearing/hmda-data-offers-clueson-discrimination-against-gays-1041913-1.html [https://perma.cc/4XAS-TPNW] (noting that
discrimination against same-sex couples in the housing and mortgage lending industries still
existed in 2012 despite HMDA amendments).
152. Chi-Jack Lin, Racial Discrimination in the Consumer Credit Market 45 (2010)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Ohio State University) https://etd.ohiolink.edu/!etd.send_file
?accession=osu1276708518&disposition=inline [https://perma.cc/CM3X-YCN8].
153. See Sweeney, supra note 11, at 16.
154. Id. at 32–33.
155. Ethan Cohen-Cole, Credit Card Redlining, 93 REV. ECON. & STAT. 700, 712 (2011).
Cohen-Cole’s study has been critiqued for its methodology. See Kenneth P. Brevoort, Credit
Card Redlining Revisited, REV. OF ECON. & STAT., May 2011, at 714.
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counterparts in Black neighborhoods receive approximately $7,000 more
in available credit.156
Similarly, Simon Firestone conducted a study, published in 2014,
concluding that Blacks are less than half as likely as other groups to
possess credit cards due to racial differences in credit card marketing.157
Also, to counter the common argument that differences in credit terms
and amounts simply reflect variances in credit and spending habits, a
2001 study by Sheila Ards and Samuel Myers refutes the myths that
Blacks disproportionately overspend, fail to save, and are not
creditworthy.158 The study reveals that there is no statistically significant
difference in bad credit rates between Blacks and Whites in the richest
and poorest households.159 In middle class Black and White households,
where the authors note differences in bad credit ratings, they argue that
the disparities arise from discriminatory treatment in the credit market,
not variation in personal habits.160
Contrary to the type of racism described as “post-racial,”161 which
consists of offensive epithets and clearly stated ill intentions, most racial
discrimination by the credit card industry is not the product of willful
and malicious bias. Instead, this discrimination generally reflects rational
economic decisions to exploit existing systemic and structural social
inequalities for profit.162 Racial stereotypes, pervasive in the media and
156. Cohen-Cole, supra note 155, at 708.
157. Simon Firestone, Race Ethnicity and Credit Card Monitoring, J. OF MONEY, CREDIT
& BANKING, Sept. 2014, at 1206. See also Song Han, Benjamin J. Keys & Geng Li, Unsecured
Credit Supply over the Credit Cycle: Evidence from Credit Card Mailings (manuscript at 26 &
n.29), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1848206 [https://perma.cc/9WGVGFAH (staff-uploaded archive)].
158. See Sheila D. Ards & Samuel L. Myers, Jr., The Color of Money: Bad Credit, Wealth,
and Race, 45 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 223, 238 (2001).
159. Id. at 236.
160. Id.
161. See generally DEVON W. CARBADO & MITU GULATI, ACTING WHITE? RETHINKING
RACE IN POST-RACIAL AMERICA (2013) (discussing post-racial bias in the workplace); Mario
L. Barnes, Reflection on a Dream World: Race, Post-Race and the Question of Making It Over,
11 BERKELEY J. AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y 6 (2009) (analyzing theories of a “post-racial” world);
Sumi Cho, Post-Racialism, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1589 (2009) (describing definitions in postracialism); Ian F. Haney-López, Essay, Post-Racial Racialism: Racial Stratification and Mass
Incarceration in the Age of Obama, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1023, 1024 (2010) (arguing for a
“renewed focus on racism, in particular on ‘post-racial racism’ ”); Cheryl Harris, Professor,
UCLA Sch. of Law, Address at the University of Virginia School of Law: Race Declassified:
Post-Racial Divisions (Feb. 26, 2015).
162. See Benjamin Howell, Note, Exploiting Race and Space: Concentrated Subprime
Lending as Housing Discrimination, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 101, 108–09 (2006) (endorsing this
theory in the context of redlining). When banks charge higher interest rates and fees, they
collect more money from consumers, particularly when the higher rates and fees do not reflect
credit risk. Transactor, INVESTOPEDIA.COM, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/creditrisk
.asp [https://perma.cc/U3QW-9UMW]. For an explanation of how profit motivates
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popular culture, provide support for and acceptance of this behavior.
Further, even in cases of discrimination based on a face-to-face
encounter or a person’s name, bias may be unconscious or implicit, not
intentional.163 This distinction, however, is not important because the
root of the problem and its solution are structural, not dependent on
individuals’ states of mind or personal beliefs.
Technological advancements in creditworthiness determinations
further open the door to discrimination that is hard to identify or
redress. For example, some credit card companies rely on
personalization technology, or “data mining,” to customize their
Internet offers.164 As described above, Capital One Financial
Corporation employs micro-segmentation, the practice of analyzing a
multiplicity of information gathered from data on a consumer’s
computer, to determine which cards to show first-time visitors to its
website.165 Other credit card companies, such as Citibank, previously
relied on “push” segmentation to categorize consumers, utilizing more
traditional markers, such as income, to determine card eligibility.166
Now, Citibank depends primarily on FICO scoring.167 However, FICO
scores contain racial disparities that may reflect racist bias programmed

discrimination in the mortgage industry, see Jordan Weissman, Countrywide’s Racist Lending
Practices Were Fueled by Greed, ATLANTIC (Dec. 23, 2011), http://www.theatlantic.com
/business/archive/2011/12/countrywides-racist-lending-practices-were-fueled-by-greed/250424/
[https://perma.cc/8WDL-VXHU]. For a colorful portrayal of this discrimination, see also THE
BIG SHORT (Plan B Entertainment Inc. 2015).
163. See Mahzarin R. Banaji, R. Bhaskar & Michael Brownstein, When Bias Is Implicit,
How Might We Think About Repairing Harm?, 6 CURRENT OPINION PSYCHOL. 183, 183
(2015); Erik J. Girvan, On Using the Psychological Science of Implicit Bias to Advance AntiDiscrimination Law, 26 GEO. MASON U. C.R.L.J. 1, 26 (2015); see also IMPLICIT RACIAL
BIAS ACROSS THE LAW 9–24 (Justin Levinson & Robert J. Smith eds., 2012).
164. See ANINDYA GHOSE ET AL., DYNAMIC PRICING: A STRATEGIC ADVANTAGE FOR
ELECTRONIC RETAILERS 305–06, http://people.stern.nyu.edu/aghose/Dynamic_Pricing.pdf
[https://perma.cc/TLW5-5P6S]; Emily Steel & Julia Angwin, On the Web’s Cutting Edge,
Anonymity in Name Only, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 4, 2010), http://www.wsj.com/articles
/SB10001424052748703294904575385532109190198; Jennifer Valentino-Devries, Jeremy
Singer-Vine & Ashkan Soltani, Websites Vary Prices, Deals Based on Users’ Information,
ST.
J.
(Dec.
24,
2012),
http://www.wsj.com/news/articles
WALL
/SB10001424127887323777204578189391813881534.
165. Sharon McDonnell, Microsegmentation, COMPUTERWORLD (Jan. 29, 2001, 12:00
AM), http://www.computerworld.com/article/2590756/it-management/microsegmentation
.html [https://perma.cc/3Y2B-VEC9]. See supra text accompanying notes 2–10.
166. McDonnell, supra note 165.
167. See William Charles, What Credit Bureau Does Citibank Pull?, DR. CREDIT (Sept. 8,
2016), http://www.doctorofcredit.com/credit-bureau-citibank-pull/ [https://perma.cc/B9XBQTM3] (reporting that Citibank will mostly rely on Experian and Equifax credit reports); Be
Aware—Don’t Confuse Your FICO Score with “Educational” Scores, MYFICO, http://www
.myfico.com/crediteducation/questions/why-three-scores.aspx [https://perma.cc/TFW3-TSSW]
(noting that Equifax, Experian, and TransUnion generate FICO scores).
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into the algorithms that power the data collection that produces a
score.168
Purchasing data from companies such as FICO to determine credit
denials and terms affords credit card companies the opportunity to
engage in indirect racial discrimination. For example, the companies
often assess creditworthiness based on factors that stand in for race.169
Most significantly, because most of the United States is residentially
segregated, neighborhood can serve as a proxy for race.170 Similarly,
affinities, such as professional associations and sports teams, can point to
income level or geographic location, indirectly providing insight into the
consumer’s race.171 Additionally, although the big data that
personalization technology can provide to corporations might appear to
be race-neutral, using it to classify consumers can open the door to racial
stereotyping in the marketplace.
Data analyst and writer Cecilia Rabess cautions, “When we
translate cultural clichés and stereotypes into empirically verifiable
datasets we introduce subjectivity into a discipline that strives for
objectivity. When we imbue our big data insights with our race-based
biases we project our prejudices onto subsequent observations.”172 The
potential for a collision between racism and data collection therefore
exists in credit card companies’ use of information gathered on social
media sites, such as Facebook, LinkedIn, and Twitter, to determine

168. See Sarah Ludwig, Credit Scores in America Perpetuate Racial Injustice. Here’s How,
GUARDIAN (Oct. 13, 2015, 10:14 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/oct
/13/your-credit-score-is-racist-heres-why [https://perma.cc/E679-UUVX]; cf. Lisa Rice &
Deidre Swesnik, Discriminatory Effects of Credit Scoring on Communities of Color, 46
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 935, 952–57 (2013) (outlining each category within the FICO scoring
system and explaining how they may produce “disparate impact and unintended
discriminatory outcomes”).
169. For a comprehensive description of how racism becomes coded in “neutral” language
and policy, see generally IAN HANEY-LÓPEZ, DOG WHISTLE POLITICS: HOW CODED
RACIAL APPEALS HAVE REINVENTED RACISM & WRECKED THE MIDDLE CLASS 92–102
(2014).
170. For an analysis of how racial disparities in different societal areas comprise an
integrated system of oppression, see Barbara Reskin, The Race Discrimination System, 38
ANN. REV. SOC. 17, 20–24 (2012); see also ROITHMAYR, supra note 44, at 99–100.
171. See, e.g., 2013 Sports Fan Demographics, OPENDORSE, http://opendorse.com/blog
/2013-sports-fan-demographics/ [https://perma.cc/8FJ3-KXC2]; Which Sports have the
Whitest/Oldest/Richest Fans?, ATLANTIC (Feb. 10, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/business
/archive/2014/02/which-sports-have-the-whitest-richest-oldest-fans/283626/ [https://perma.cc
/D5WK-3FK7].
172. Cecilia Esther Rabess, Can Big Data Be Racist?, BOLD ITALIC (May 31, 2014), http://
www.thebolditalic.com/articles/4502-can-big-data-be-racist [https://perma.cc/4WL3-2ESV].
See The Good Wife: Discovery (CBS Television Studios Nov. 29, 2015) (examining the legal
ramifications of racially discriminatory mapping software).
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creditworthiness.173 Also, credit scoring sites commonly provide credit
card companies with lists of applicants’ and customers’ Facebook friends
for purposes of solicitation and creditworthiness determinations.174
Depending on how the companies use this information, it could
contribute to a racial divide in credit scoring, as Black households report
having significantly lower credit scores than White households.175
Further, unfortunately, the already appreciable racial gap in credit
scores between Black and White borrowers increased after the 2008
subprime mortgage crisis.176
On a brighter note, there has been a general trend toward greater
protection for credit card users, and Black consumers report that some
of the provisions of the 2009 Credit Card Accountability Responsibility
and Disclosure Act (“CARD”) improved their borrowing experiences.177

173. Evelyn M. Rusli, Bad Credit? Start Tweeting, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 1, 2013, 7:51 PM)
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324883604578396852612756398; The “Social”
Credit Score: Separating the Data from the Noise, KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON (June 5, 2013),
http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/the-social-credit-score-separating-the-data-from-thenoise/ [https://perma.cc/ZZ69-66JV]. For instance, Nathin Bathija, the founder of Neo, a
company that assesses potential car buyers, told The Economist that he figured there would
be enough data within a year to research the relationship between the tendency to make racist
comments on Facebook and creditworthiness. Stat Oil: Lenders Are Turning to Social Media
to Assess Borrowers, ECONOMIST (Feb. 9, 2013), http://www.economist.com/news/finance-andeconomics/21571468-lenders-are-turning-social-media-assess-borrowers-stat-oil [https://perma.cc
/2L5P-WCBT]. Another start-up founder found that consumers who type using all upper or all
lower case are less likely to repay loans. Id.
174. See, e.g., Adrianne Jeffries, As Banks Start Nosing Around Facebook and Twitter, the
Wrong Friends Might Just Sink Your Credit, OBSERVER (Dec. 13, 2011, 7:39 PM), http://
observer.com/2011/12/as-banks-start-nosing-around-facebook-and-twitter-the-wrong-friendsmight-just-sink-your-credit-2/ [https://perma.cc/E2Z8-B3HX].
175. RUETSCHLIN & ASANTE-MUHAMMAD, supra note 32, at 2 (“When asked to identify
their credit score within a range, just 66% of African American households report having a
credit score of 620 or above, compared to 85 percent of white households. . . . When asked to
describe their credit score, only 42 percent of African American households reported having
“good” or “excellent” credit, compared to 74 percent of white households. . . . Among
households reporting poor credit, African American households were more likely to report
that late student loan payments or errors on their credit report contributed to their poor
credit scores. White households were more likely to report that late mortgage payments and
the use of nearly all existing lines of credit contributed to their poor credit scores.”). See Lea
Shephard, Toward a Stronger Financial History Antidiscrimination Norm, 53 B.C. L. REV.
1695, 1730–31 (2012).
176. See, e.g., Ylan Q. Mui, For Black Americans, Financial Damage from Subprime
Implosion Is Likely to Last, WASH. POST (July 8, 2012, 8:37 PM), http://www.washingtonpost
.com/business/economy/for-black-americans-financial-damage-from-subprime-implosion-is-likelyto-last/2012/07/08/gJQAwNmzWW_story.html [https://perma.cc/27KE-AFMB].
177. See Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure (CARD) Act of 2009,
Pub. L. 111-24, § 201, 123 Stat. 1734, 1744 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1637(b)(11)(B)(i)(2012));
TRAUB & REUTSCHLIN, supra note 32, at 20–21. It is important to note, however, that selfreporting does not necessarily reflect accurate statistics. See Jay L. Zagorsky, Husbands’ and
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For example, the CARD Act requires credit card companies to include
clear statements on credit card bills describing how long it will take to
pay off the balance if the customer pays only the minimum amount.178 In
one study, 37% of Black households reported that they pay more toward
their monthly balances due to receiving this information, thereby
shortening the specter of their debt.179 The CARD Act also reduces the
fees that companies can charge for exceeding credit limits and making
late payments.180 Thirty-two percent of Black households consequently
reported paying fewer fees for exceeding their credit limit, and twentyfive percent stated that they paid fewer late fees.181 Further, the
amended CARD Act restricts the conditions under which companies
can increase interest rates,182 which has led to a self-reported 25%
decrease in the amount of interest that the companies charge Black
households.183
Despite the general improvements in some credit card conditions
wrought by the CARD Act, however, there is little evidence it has
reduced racial disparities. In 2007, twice as many Black credit card
holders paid interest rates above 20% than White credit card holders
did.184 In 2013, over 40% of Black credit card users borrowed to pay for
essential items, qualifying them as subsistence users.185 Typically, when
financial conditions worsen, as they did in the 2008 recession, these users
do not reduce credit card usage in response, likely because they lack
other sources of funds, or because the alternatives, such as payday
lending, cash checking, and pawn shops, are even more exploitative than
credit cards.186 Nonetheless, because many Black credit card holders are

Wives’ View of the Family Finances, 32 J. SOCIO-ECON. 127, 127 (2003). On the other hand, it
helps to measure perceptions of fairness and financial status.
178. Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure (CARD) Act of 2009 § 201.
179. RUETSCHLIN & ASANTE-MUHAMMAD, supra note 32, at 6.
180. CARD Act § 171, 15 U.S.C. § 1666i-1 (2012).
181. RUETSCHLIN & ASANTE-MUHAMMAD, supra note 32, at 6–7 & tbl.1. The actual
percentages may be even higher than consumers reported. See CFPB Finds CARD Act
Helped Consumers Avoid More Than $16 Billion in Gotcha Credit Card Fees, CFPB (Dec. 3,
2015),
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/cfpb-finds-card-act-helpedconsumers-avoid-more-than-16-billion-in-gotcha-credit-card-fees/ [https://perma.cc/LJ2MJ7ZH].
182. See, e.g., CARD Act § 171, 15 U.S.C. § 1666i-1(b)(1)(C). For example, companies
may not impose retroactive increases. Id.
183. RUETSCHLIN & ASANTE-MUHAMMAD, supra note 32, at 7 tbl.1.
184. See JENNIFER WHEARY & TAMARA DRAUT, DĒMOS, WHO PAYS? THE WINNERS
AND LOSERS OF CREDIT CARD DEREGULATION 1, 6 tbl.4 (2007), http://www.demos.org/sites
/default/files/publications/whopays_Demos.pdf [https://perma.cc/US36-CZ89].
185. RUETSCHLIN & ASANTE-MUHAMMAD, supra note 32, at 1.
186. Id. at 3–4; see, e.g., David Ray Papke, Perpetuating Poverty: Exploitative Businesses,
the Urban Poor, and the Failure of Reform, 16 SCHOLAR 223, 224–25 (2014).
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without friends or family who possess extra resources to lend in times of
need, in 2010, Black consumers were more than three times more likely
than White consumers to pay off their credit card bills by going to loan
sharks.187 They were also more likely to declare bankruptcy due to credit
card debt,188 and to reach a settlement agreement with a credit card
company.189 These types of settlement agreements often harm, rather
than help, the consumer.190
Credit card debt amassed to finance education also creates a
particular burden for Black graduates, who have the highest debt
balances among college graduates.191 Over a thirty-year period beginning
in the mid-1980s, the common perception of education as a public good
worthy of state investment shifted to one of it as a private benefit that
individuals should finance independently.192 During that time, as states
contributed increasingly less to the cost of higher education, an
unprecedented number of Blacks and Latinos enrolled in colleges and
universities and prepared to exchange debt for a diploma.193 Due to the
wealth gap, Black students are more likely than White students to take
on debt to pay for college.194 Additionally, disproportionately more
Black parents incur credit card debt to finance their children’s
education.195 Sadly, Blacks and Latinos are also three times as likely as
Whites to stop going to school in order to pay off their credit card
debt.196 Further, Black students who graduate with student debt owe the
largest amounts comparatively, with average reported debt thousands of
187. See DĒMOS, THE COLOR OF DEBT: CREDIT CARD DEBT BY RACE AND ETHNICITY 1,
3 (2010), http://www.demos.org/sites/default/files/publications/FACTSHEET_TheColorofDebt
_Demos.pdf [https://perma.cc/24PG-AWYY].
188. Id. at 3 fig.5.
189. DĒMOS, THE COLOR OF DEBT: CREDIT CARD DEBT BY RACE AND ETHNICITY 3
(2008), http://www.demos.org/sites/default/files/publications/FACTSHEET_TheColorofDebt
_Demos.pdf [https://perma.cc/2ZSU-N6SG]; Gene Park, Don’t Get Hooked, HONOLULU STAR
ADVERTISER (June 7, 2010), http://www.staradvertiser.com/2010/06/07/business/dont-gethooked/ [https://perma.cc/8E99-YYY8].
190. See Settling Credit Card Debt, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.consumer.ftc.gov
/articles/0145-settling-credit-card-debt [https://perma.cc/GT8B-X8XW]. The Federal Trade
Commission warns of the risks involved in debt settlement, including negative effects on
credit scores, the growth of fees and interest rates that can increase debt, the potential to be
sued, scamming by companies, and hidden fees. Id.
191. RUETSCHLIN & ASANTE-MUHAMMAD, supra note 32, at 12.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id. (“Eighty percent of African American college grads took out some amount of
loans in order to attain a higher education, compared to 65 percent of whites.”).
195. Id. (“[Fifty] percent of indebted African American households who incurred expenses
related to sending a child to college report that it contributed to their current credit card
debt.”).
196. DĒMOS, supra note 187, at 3.
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dollars higher than White students’ debt.197 Although policy reforms that
would make education more financially accessible would provide the
best solution to this type of disproportionate debt, more credit card
companies could ease this burden by offering low and fair terms for
credit used to pay for education.
In addition to educational expenses, medical bills represent a
significant cost that leads many Black families to spiral into debt. Many
Black households do not have health insurance and, even when they do,
the cost of deductibles, co-pays, and prescriptions often requires
resorting to credit to pay them.198 Even worse, the cost of health care can
be prohibitive. Almost half of middle class Black families with credit
card debt report that they have skipped a medical test, treatment, or
follow-up, or did not fill a prescription or see a doctor when they needed
to, in order to avoid increasing their debt.199 Additionally, the exorbitant
cost of emergency room visits is particularly problematic for Black
families, whose members are more likely to suffer from chronic
conditions, such as asthma, that require emergency care.200 In these types
of situations, credit cards can act as lifesavers, but the subsequent debt,
exacerbated by exploitative interest rates and fees, can quickly spiral
and contribute to enduring or additional health problems.201
Notwithstanding these bleak statistics, however, Black subsistence
users often find ways to make monthly payments on their credit cards.
Most of these payments do not reach the principal owed on the account
or alleviate the consumer’s debt in any way.202 They do, however,
generate profits for the credit card companies. Nonetheless, widespread
stereotypes of these consumers as high credit risks persist. These false
197. RUETSCHLIN & ASANTE-MUHAMMAD, supra note 32, at 12 (“In 2008, student loan
debt affected 15 percent more African American graduates than white graduates. . . . In the
same year, the average African American senior leaving college with student loans owed
$28,692, compared to $24,742 for whites.”).
198. Id. at 13.
199. Id. at 15.
200. Id. (“According to the Department of Health and Human Services, the average
emergency room visit costs $1349. For the uninsured that price tag is even higher, at $1843.”
(citing Medical Expenditure Panel Survey, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. (2011), https://
meps.ahrq.gov/data_stats/tables_compendia_hh_interactive.jsp?_SERVICE=MEPSSocket0&
_PROGRAM=MEPSPGM.TC.SAS&File=HCFY2011&Table=HCFY2011_PLEXP_E&VAR1
=AGE&VAR2=SEX&VAR3=RACETH5C&VAR4=INSURCOV&VAR5=POVCAT11
&VAR6=MSA&VAR7=REGION&VAR8=HEALTH&VARO1=4+17+44+64&VARO2=1
&VARO3=1&VARO4=1&VARO5=1&VARO6=1&VARO7=1&VARO8=1&_Debug
[https://perma.cc/6BCU-LTAM])).
201. Angus Deaton, Health, Income, and Inequality, NBER REP., Spring 2003, at 9, 10;
David Odrakiewicz, The Connection Between Health and Economic Growth: Policy
Implications Re-examined, 4 GLOBAL MGMT. J. 65, 67 (2012).
202. RUETSCHLIN & ASANTE-MUHAMMAD, supra note 32, at 8–9.
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characterizations pervade popular culture through common and widely
accepted racial and cultural stereotypes, labeling Blacks as lazy or
materialistic.203 Credit card companies stand to gain from these racial
tropes because they justify steering Black customers into a subprime
credit market on the false premise that they often default on their loans.
The unfair and exploitative terms that characterize this subprime market
become invisible when lenders, credit card holders, and racial advocates
alike mistakenly believe that racial disparities in the treatment of credit
card users arise from genuine differences in credit profiles, instead of
deliberate corporate choices.
C.

How Racial Stereotypes Mask Structural and Institutional Racism
Against Credit Consumers

This analysis of racism against credit card consumers relies on the
fundamental principles of critical race theory (“CRT”): that racism is a
structural problem, not an individual one, and that racism is both
pervasive and permanent.204 These principles are central to the
rehabilitative reparations approach205 proposed in this Article, which
shifts the focus from redress of individual harms to rebuilding
communities. This analysis also relies on two important CRT
methodologies. The first is the importance of narrative to shaping and
countering collective understandings about race.206 This Section, which
explores how the stories that popular culture tells about Black
203. STEVEN W. BENDER, GREASERS AND GRINGOS: LATINOS, LAW, AND THE
AMERICAN IMAGINATION 11–20 (2005); Regina Austin, “A Nation of Thieves”: Securing
Black People’s Right to Shop and to Sell in White America, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 147, 147–48;
see S. Christian Wheeler, W. Blair G. Jarvis & Richard E. Petty, Think Unto Others: The SelfDestructive Impact of Negative Racial Stereotypes, 37 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 173,
179 (2001). See generally Laura Green, Stereotypes: Negative Racial Stereotypes and Their
Effect on Attitudes Toward African-Americans, 11 PERSP. ON MULTICULTURALISM &
CULTURAL DIVERSITY, no. 1, Winter 1998–1999, http://www.ferris.edu/HTMLS/news/jimcrow
/links/VCU.htm [https://perma.cc/C7VV-VUQ7] (providing examples of different stereotypes of
Blacks).
204. See, e.g., BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL, supra note 40, at ix.
205. See Eric K. Yamamoto, Sandra Hye Yun Kim & Abigail M. Holden, American
Reparations Theory and Practice at the Crossroads, 44 CAL. W. L. REV. 1, 15–17 (2007).
206. See BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL, supra note 40, at 10; Robert M.
Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term: Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4,
4–5 (1983); Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Narrative,
87 MICH. L. REV. 2411, 2440–41 (1989); Charles Lawrence III, Listening for Stories in All the
Right Places: Narrative and Racial Formation Theory, 46 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 247, 251 (2012);
Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323, 324 (1987). See generally DERRICK BELL, RACE, RACISM AND
AMERICAN LAW (6th ed. 2008) (documenting and narrating litigation and policy reform
efforts aimed at improving rights of Black American rights in several areas, including
education and housing).
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consumers lead to stereotypes that justify discriminatory outcomes,
proceeds from a belief in the power of storytelling to influence hearts,
minds, law, and policy. The second and relatively new critical race
theory approach utilized here is empirical critical race theory (“eCRT”),
the marriage of critical race theory with empirical methods.207 eCRT
allows data, such as the statistics in the preceding Section, to illustrate
that discrimination is often at work, even when the laws, policies, or
practices that create the conditions described by the data appear to be
facially neutral.208
A central tenet of CRT is that race is a social construction, created
to rationalize and perpetuate social and economic equality.209 Because
race depends on social norms and expediencies, as opposed to
biological, genetic, or cultural realities, race is fluid.210 New races form
when privileged members of society seek to oppress a group that has not
yet been clearly racially identified, such as the quasi-religious “race” of
Muslims.211 Markers and perceptions of race are also fluid, and pliable
through shifting allegories told in mass media and popular culture.
Stereotypes infiltrate the collective consciousness through the news
media, movies, music, video games, and television. Often unconsciously,
common stereotypes become part of the way that individuals see and
order the world, influencing their decisions and attitudes.212 The effects
of this often “unconscious bias” can manifest themselves in both small

207. See, e.g., Kimani Paul-Emile, Foreword: Critical Race Theory and Empirical Methods
Conference, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 2953, 2954 (2015); Osagie K. Obasogie, Foreword: Critical
Race Theory and Empirical Methods, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 183, 185 (2013).
208. See Paul-Emile, supra note 207, at 2954–55.
209. See Ian Haney López, The Social Construction of Race: Some Observations on
Illusion, Fabrication, and Choice, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 27–28 (1994).
210. Id. See KHIARA M. BRIDGES, REPRODUCING RACE: AN ETHNOGRAPHY OF
PREGNANCY AS A SITE OF RACIALIZATION 8–10 (2011); LÓPEZ, supra note 43, at 2 (rev. ed.
2006); DOROTHY ROBERTS, FATAL INVENTION: HOW SCIENCE, POLITICS AND BIG
BUSINESS RE-CREATE RACE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 4–5 (2011).
211. See, e.g., Craig Considine, Muslims Aren’t a Race, So I Can’t Be Racist, Right?
Wrong., HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 19, 2016), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/craig-considine
/muslims-are-not-a-race_b_8591660.html [https://perma.cc/XQ75-ZSK2].
212. Girvan, supra note 163, at 32–33; Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our
Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment
Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1166–67, 1247–48 (1995); Charles R. Lawrence III, The
Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317,
323 (1987); Justin D. Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality: Implicit Bias, Decisionmaking, and
Misremembering, 57 DUKE L.J. 345, 345 (2007) [hereinafter Levinson, Forgotten Racial
Equality]; Justin D. Levinson, Koichi Hioki & Syugo Hotta, Implicit Bias in Hawai‘i: An
Empirical Study, 37 U. HAW. L. REV. 429, 429–30 (2015) [hereinafter Levinson et al., Implicit
Bias]; Yi Mou & Wi Peng, Gender and Racial Stereotypes in Popular Video Games, in
HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH ON EFFECTIVE ELECTRONIC GAMING IN EDUCATION 922, 923
(Richard E. Ferdig, ed., 2009).
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and large acts,213 from selecting a seat on a bus to fatally shooting a child
playing with a toy gun.214 Stereotypes also affect decisions involving
employment,215 housing,216 and credit.217 Impressed almost indelibly into
people’s psyches, stereotypes can be so powerful that it is extremely
difficult for individuals to separate them from their lived experiences
and recognize them as externally created biases. Consequently,
stereotypes often simply become unexamined truths that feel like
common sense and guide people’s behavior.218
Stereotypes about creditworthiness can be particularly harmful
because of the key role that credit plays in modern life. According to a
2013 study, 70% of American consumers possess credit cards219 and 34%
of households do not pay them off in full at the end of the month.220
Unfortunately, the reality of credit is that, instead of enabling people to
make extravagant purchases, it barely covers the regular expenses of
daily life, such as food, bills, transportation, and other necessities.221
Further, debt prevents many individuals from advancing their lives in
213. Christopher Ingraham, Three Quarters of Whites Don’t Have Any Non-White Friends,
WASH. POST: WONKBLOG (Aug. 25, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonkblog/wp
/2014/08/25/three-quarters-of-whites-dont-have-any-non-white-friends/ [https://perma.cc/5GMHTFDF].
214. See Ralph Ellis & Melissa Gray, Tamir Rice Report: No Proof Police Officer Shouted
Warning Before Shooting, CNN (June 15, 2015, 10:36 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/06/13/us
/tamir-rice-report/ [https://perma.cc/P4YV-EQCV].
215. Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Are Emily and Greg More Employable
Than Lakisha and Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labor Market Discrimination, 94 AM.
ECON. REV. 991, 991 (2004); Katie Sanders, Do Job-Seekers with ‘White’ Names Get More
Callbacks Than ‘Black’ Names?, POLITIFACT: PUNDITFACT (Mar. 15, 2015, 6:29 PM), http://
www.politifact.com/punditfact/statements/2015/mar/15/jalen-ross/black-name-resume-50-percent
-less-likely-get-respo/ [https://perma.cc/EQG5-9YG6].
216. J. Rosie Tighe, How Race and Class Stereotyping Shapes Attitudes Toward Affordable
Housing, 27 HOUSING STUD. 962, 962 (2012); Ilyce Glink, Racism Alive and Well in Housing,
CBS (June 12, 2013, 9:03 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/racism-alive-and-well-inhousing/ [https://perma.cc/X5BQ-QBNH].
217. See Pager & Shepherd, supra note 140, at 182–85.
218. See Krieger, supra note 212, at 1191.
219. Jamie Gonzalez-Garcia, Credit Card Ownership Statistics, CREDITCARDS.COM (Oct.
25, 2016), http://www.creditcards.com/credit-card-news/ownership-statistics.php [https://perma
.cc/7VUZ-LTRX] (citing SCOTT SCHUH & JOANNA STAVINS, FED. RES. BANK BOS., NO. 154, THE 2013 SURVEY OF CONSUMER PAYMENT CHOICE: SUMMARY RESULTS (2015), http://
www.bostonfed.org/economic/rdr/2015/rdr1504.pdf [https://perma.cc/CR5H-2Q73]).
220. See Jamie Gonzalez & Tamara E. Holmes, Credit Card Debt Statistics,
CREDITCARDS.COM, http://www.creditcards.com/credit-card-news/credit-card-debt-statistics-1276
.php [https://perma.cc/TG6V-LD3G] (citing AM. BANKERS ASS’N, CREDIT CARD MARKET
MONITOR 1 (2016), http://www.aba.com/Press/Documents/ABA2016Q2CreditCardMonitor
.pdf [https://perma.cc/8S56-425G]).
221. See Martha C. White, Today’s Young Adults Will Never Pay Off Their Credit Card
Debts, TIME (Jan. 17, 2013), http://business.time.com/2013/01/17/todays-young-adults-willnever-pay-off-their-credit-card-debts/ [https://perma.cc/7362-KJA7].
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productive ways. For example, credit card debt causes many students to
reduce their course loads, in turn lengthening their education, making
graduation a more distant goal.222 Also, many Black individuals and
households are particularly susceptible to falling into debt spirals that
restrict their life choices because they lack the financial safety net of
accumulated wealth enjoyed by many Whites.223
As demonstrated above, race and economics are inextricably
intertwined.224 Part of this history is the story that popular culture tells
about Black consumers.225 This story rates Blacks far below Whites in
the hierarchy of the market economy, due to Blacks’ personal and
culture failings.226 This oft-repeated but false tale becomes truth as it
plays out relentlessly through a variety of media, including news,
dramas, comedies, and music videos.227 In turn, this pervasive story
about Blacks and money serves to justify social and economic
inequality.228 As Marlon Riggs set out in his groundbreaking film, Ethnic
Notions,229 since slavery, popular stereotypes have created myths about
history, such as the happy slave and the nurturing Mammy, that justify
oppression and subordination.230
Even as society has evolved to allow Blacks to gain greater control
over media depictions of themselves,231 many popular culture images
continue to perpetuate harmful stereotypes.232 For example, modern

222. JOSÉ GARCÍA, JAMES LARDNER & CINDY ZELDIN, UP TO OUR EYEBALLS: HOW
SHADY LENDERS AND FAILED ECONOMIC POLICIES ARE DROWNING AMERICANS IN DEBT
13 (2008).
223. See OLIVER & SHAPIRO, supra note 44, at 52–54. In 2009, the gap in average net
worth between Whites and Blacks was 20:1. HANEY-LÓPEZ, supra note 169, at 52–54.
224. See supra Section I.A.
225. See infra notes 227–73 and accompanying text.
226. See infra notes 227–73 and accompanying text.
227. See supra note 212 and accompanying text.
228. See, e.g., RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, CRITICAL RACE THEORY: AN
INTRODUCTION 48–49 (2d ed. 2012) (“These cultural influences are probably at least as
determinative of outcomes as are the formal laws, since they supply the background against
which the latter are interpreted and applied.”).
229. ETHNIC NOTIONS (Marion Riggs 1986).
230. Id. See Pamela J. Smith, Teaching the Retrenchment Generation: When Sapphire Meets
Socrates at the Intersection of Race, Gender, and Authority, 6 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L.
53, 118 (1999).
231. See RALPH J. BUNCHE CTR. FOR AFRICAN AM. STUDIES AT UCLA, 2015
HOLLYWOOD DIVERSITY REPORT: FLIPPING THE SCRIPT 1–2 (2015), http://www
.bunchecenter.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/2015-Hollywood-Diversity-Report-2-2515.pdf [https://perma.cc/3YRV-G8MB].
232. 1 AFRICAN AMERICANS AND POPULAR CULTURE 200–05 (Todd Boyd ed., 2008).
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roles that have earned Black actors the elusive Oscar award233 include
entertainer (Jennifer Hudson in Dreamgirls),234 maid (Octavia Spencer
in The Help),235 abusive mother on welfare (Mo’nique in Precious),236
and slave (Lupita Nyong’o in 12 Years a Slave).237 Similarly, Empire, a
show about a family of Black rappers, criminals, and drug dealers,
became the most popular show on network television during its first
season.238
One of the enduring cultural messages about Blacks is that they are
bad with money. In 1957, Black sociologist E. Franklin Frazier published
a scathing critique of overspending by the Black middle class titled
Black Bourgeoisie.239 A few years later, the infamous 1965 public policy
report by then Assistant Secretary of Labor Daniel Patrick Moynihan
blamed Blacks’ family values, or lack thereof, for their communities’
poverty.240 In 2004, in a controversial speech at the NAACP’s fifty-year
anniversary of Brown v. Board of Education celebration, Bill Cosby
lamented that some Black parents are willing to spend $500 on sneakers
but not $250 on Hooked on Phonics for their kids.241
Today, rapper Lil’ Kim boasts about being a baller on a reality
show,242 exposés reveal that the cast members of The Real Housewives of
Atlanta are actually broke,243 and ubiquitous images show Black
celebrities, from Oprah to Nicki Minaj, loaded down with designer
shopping bags.244 Black television icons like “Cookie” Lyon245 and Olivia

233. Yolanda Sangweni, The Way-Too-Short List of Black Oscar Winners, ESSENCE (Feb.
26, 2015), http://www.essence.com/galleries/way-too-short-list-black-oscar-winners [https://
perma.cc/XRB7-HJWG].
234. DREAMGIRLS (DreamWorks Pictures and Paramount Pictures 2006).
235. THE HELP (DreamWorks Pictures and Reliance Entertainment 2011).
236. PRECIOUS (Lionsgate 2009).
237. 12 YEARS A SLAVE (Regency Enterprises and River Road Entertainment 2013).
238. See Victor Beigelman, Empire Overtakes The Big Bang Theory as the Most Popular
Series on Network TV, A.V. CLUB (March 30, 2015, 6:15 PM), http://www.avclub.com/article
/empire-overtakes-big-bang-theory-most-popular-seri-217272 [https://perma.cc/3YTR-EXDG].
239. E. FRANKLIN FRAZIER, BLACK BOURGEOISIE 230 (1st ed. 1957).
240. OFFICE OF POLICY PLANNING & RESEARCH, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, THE NEGRO
FAMILY: THE CASE FOR NATIONAL ACTION 5–12 (1965) (The Moynihan Report).
241. Dr. Bill Cosby, Address at the Brown v. Board of Education 50th Anniversary
Commemoration (2004), http://www.rci.rutgers.edu/~schochet/101/Cosby_Speech.htm [https://
perma.cc/9YR7-E4F2].
242. See The Fabulous Life of: Lil’ Kim (Sharp Entertainment Nov. 12, 2003).
243. See Tracie Egan Morrissey, 4 out of 5 Real Housewives of Atlanta Are Actually
Broke, JEZEBEL (Dec. 15, 2008, 1:00 PM), http://jezebel.com/5110249/4-out-of-5-realhousewives-of-atlanta-are-actually-broke [https://perma.cc/7F96-97LM].
244. Marjon Carlos, Nicki Minaj’s Chanel Bag Habit Is Fit for a “Black Barbie,” VOGUE
(Dec. 8, 2016, 8:56 AM), http://www.vogue.com/article/nicki-minaj-chanel-karl-lagerfeld-black
-barbies-quilted-bags [https://perma.cc/WS8W-5289]; Cassie Carpenter, Mamma Mia!
Billionaire Oprah Winfrey Beams with Delight after Buying 4 Bags of Clothes on Roman
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Pope246 wear nothing but high-end designer clothing. And hip hop
heroes, from EPMD (“Erick and Parrish Making Dollars”) in 1990247 to
Jay Z in 1998248 to Kanye West in 2005,249 release hits about “gold
diggers.”
These stereotypes about Black consumers’ relationships to money
and credit permeate the media and popular culture, influencing both
creditors and borrowers. In particular, stereotypes of Blacks as
profligate overspenders and irresponsible or deviant consumers, which
date back to Reconstruction,250 create obstacles to structural reform by
attributing credit and financial disparities to cultural and personal
differences instead of systemic, institutional discrimination. Credit card
corporations stand to gain substantial profits from exploiting these racial
tropes and, therefore, have a significant investment in perpetuating
them. Additionally, in some cases, discrimination by credit card
companies might not merely reflect profit-seeking efforts, but also the
explicit and implicit biases of individual employees that arise from
exposure to these stereotypes.
Specifically, powerful archetypes, such as the “welfare queen” and
the “thug,” perpetuate stereotypes of Black women and men as
materialistic, criminal overspenders. The welfare queen is a Black single
mother who irresponsibly reproduces so that she can collect government
benefits and live beyond her means.251 In her case, reproduction is an act

Holiday With BFF Gayle King, DAILY MAIL.COM (Oct. 16, 2014, 11:26 EDT), http://www
.dailymail.co.uk/tvshowbiz/article-2795686/billionaire-oprah-winfrey-beams-delight-buying-4-bagsclothes-roman-holiday-bff-gayle-king.html [https://perma.cc/XS2Y-V35V].
245. See Empire (Imagine Television et al. Jan. 7, 2015–present); Cookie’s Closet, FOX,
http://www.fox.com/empire/article/cookies-closet-3 [https://perma.cc/9YYH-J9EP].
246. See Scandal (ShondaLand and ABC Studios Apr. 5, 2012–present); see also Janelle
Grodsky, The 15 Best Fashion Moments from Scandal Season 5, INSTYLE (May 12, 2016, 12:45
PM), http://www.instyle.com/reviews-coverage/tv-shows/scandal-season-5-olivia-pope-bestlooks#1067206 [https://perma.cc/L5QK-2E26] (discussing Olivia Pope’s designer outfits from
Scandal Season 5).
247. EMPD, Gold Digger, on BUSINESS AS USUAL, (Def Jam Recordings Dec. 18, 1990).
248. JAY Z, Can I get A . . . , on DEF JAM’S RUSH HOUR SOUNDTRACK (Roc-A-Fella
Records, Aug. 22, 1998)
249. KANYE WEST, Gold Digger, on LATE REGISTRATION (Roc-A-Fella Records Aug.
30, 2005).
250. See GEORGE RITZER, INTRODUCTION TO SOCIOLOGY 184 (2d ed. 2016); Heather
Cox Richardson, Killing Reconstruction, JACOBIN (Aug. 19, 2015), https://www.jacobinmag
.com/2015/08/racism-reconstruction-homestead-act-black-suffrage/ [https://perma.cc/H5Q2Q8X5].
251. See ANGE-MARIE HANCOCK, THE POLITICS OF DISGUST: THE PUBLIC IDENTITY OF
THE WELFARE QUEEN 20–23 (2004); Ann Cammett, Welfare Queens Redux: Criminalizing
Black Mothers in the Age of Neoliberalism, S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 363, 367 (2016); Dawn
Marie Dow, Negotiating “The Welfare Queen” and “The Strong Black Woman:” African
American Middle-Class Mothers’ Work and Family Perspectives, 58 SOCIOLOGICAL
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of fraud against the government.252 Therefore, the trope goes, Black
women should have restricted access to money and credit.253 The reality
of single Black mothers’ lives differs radically from what this portrait
suggests. Nonetheless, this powerful, false image influences society’s
vision of all Black women, contributing to a public blindness to the
reality of race and poverty in the context of personal credit.
The myth of the welfare queen became popular through stories told
by Ronald Reagan, during his 1976 presidential campaign, about Linda
Taylor, a Chicago woman who had defrauded the government out of
hundreds of thousands of dollars.254 Taylor came to represent to the
public all poor Black women and all Black single mothers.255 This story
of the welfare queen subsequently informed policymakers and
government workers on issues ranging from how to police women in
public housing to how to treat pregnant women who do drugs.256 It also
cautioned against putting cash into these women’s hands under any
circumstances.257 Therefore, banks or other companies that extend credit
to Black women essentially perform an act of charity, taking a great risk
for which they should be (over) compensated.
Testing the power of the welfare queen myth, political scientist
Shanto Iyengar found that, when presented with the image of a Black
mother on welfare, viewers commonly attributed her need for benefits
to her own personal failings instead of to public policy, historical

PERSPECTIVES 36, 37 (2015); Camille Gear Rich, Reclaiming the Welfare Queen: Feminist and
Critical Race Theory Alternatives to Existing Anti-Poverty Discourse, 25 S. CAL. INTERDISC.
L.J. 257, 260; Robin A. Lehnhardt, Black Citizenship Through Marriage?: Reflections on the
Moynihan Report at Fifty, 25 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 347, 356–57 (2016).
252. Michele Estrin Gilman, The Return of the Welfare Queen, 22 AM. U. J. GENDER, SOC.
POL’Y & L. 247, 247–48 (2014).
253. See id. at 256–66.
254. Josh Levin, The Welfare Queen, SLATE (Dec. 19, 2013, 12:41 AM), http://www.slate
.com/articles/news_and_politics/history/2013/12/linda_taylor_welfare_queen_ronald_reagan_made
_her_a_notorious_american_villain.html [https://perma.cc/TT46-YX4A (staff-uploaded archive)]
(“She used 80 names, 30 addresses, 15 telephone numbers to collect food stamps, Social
Security, veterans’ benefits for four nonexistent, deceased veteran husbands, as well as
welfare. Her tax-free cash income alone has been running $150,000 a year.” (quoting
President Reagan’s characterization of the welfare queen at a presidential campaign rally in
1976)).
255. See Rich, supra note 251, at 260.
256. See Priscilla Ocen, Punishing Pregnancy: Race, Incarceration, and the Shackling

of Pregnant Prisoners, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 1239, 1271 (2012); Priscilla Ocen, The New
Racially Restrictive Covenants: Race, Welfare and the Policing of Black Women in Public
Housing, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1540, 1562–63 (2012).
257. See Gilman, supra note 252, at 256–66 (outlining political responses to the “welfare
queen” myth).
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discrimination, or any other structural factor.258 Many Whites have no
significant interaction with Blacks that would counter this false
perception.259 This racial segregation accounts for their inability to filter
stereotypical images presented by popular culture, including news
media, through their own lived experiences and understand these
stereotypes as incorrect and harmful.
Instead, people often buy into a narrative script that equates
welfare and poverty with Black single motherhood. A further study by
Franklin Gilliam found that repeated exposure to this script leads to and
reinforces the views: that receiving welfare is a result of personal
failings; the government should cut spending on welfare; and women
should take on traditional gender roles that entail financial dependency
on men.260 Further, even though significantly more Whites than Blacks
receive welfare, the majority of images of welfare recipients in the media
are of Blacks.261
Similarly, the popular image of the thug influences perceptions of
Black male creditworthiness. The thug appears in countless hip hop
videos,262 an entire genre of movies focused on urban life,263 and

258. SHANTO IYENGAR & DONALD R. KINDER, NEWS THAT MATTERS: TELEVISION
AMERICAN PERCEPTION 39–42 (1987) (examining the affect Television has on
perceptions on race and other cultural issues); Shanto Iyengar, Framing Responsibility for
Political Issues, 546 AM. ACADEMY POL. & SOC. SCI. 59, 66 (1996). See also Franklin D.
Gilliam, Jr., The ‘Welfare Queen’ Experiment: How Viewers React to Images of AfricanAmerican Mothers on Welfare, 53 NIEMAN REP., Summer 1999, at 49, 50 (discussing Shanto
Iyengar’s results from a series of laboratory experiments that tested viewers’ assumptions of
women on welfare after seeing depictions of “a black welfare mother in the television news”).
259. Gilliam, supra note 258, at 50–51.
260. Id. at 49–52; see also FRANKLIN D. GILLIAM, JR., FRAMEWORKS INST., THE
ARCHITECTURE OF A NEW RACIAL DISCOURSE 11–13 (2006), http://www
.frameworksinstitute.org/assets/files/PDF/gilliam_memo1106.pdf [https://perma.cc/KS8QB54B].
261. See RACE AND POLITICS OF WELFARE REFORM 111 (Sanford F. Schram, Joe Soss &
Richard C. Fording, eds., 2003) (tracing the racialization of poverty and noting that from 1950
to 1992 the percentage of Blacks depicted in newsmagazine photos of the poor increased from
twenty percent to more than sixty percent and peaked at almost seventy-five percent in 1972);
Arthur Delaney & Alissa Scheller, Who Gets Food Stamps? White People, Mostly,
HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 28, 2015, 7:30 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/02/28/foodstamp-demographics_n_6771938.html [https://perma.cc/EQD4-SZT3] (noting that 40.2% of
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (“SNAP”) recipients in 2013 were White, while
25.7% of SNAP recipients in 2013 were Black).
262. See, e.g., 50 Cent, Many Men (Wish Death), YOUTUBE (Sept. 14, 2010), https://www
.youtube.com/watch?v=rnGZFzTAuAM; Akon, Locked Up ft. Styles P, YOUTUBE (June 16,
2009), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=14PgWitIbSk; C-Murder, Y’all Heard of Me,
YOUTUBE (July 7, 2007), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VbMuPvaxwn4; Boosie Badazz,
Problem, YOUTUBE (Feb. 9, 2016), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_cPOv9ZE7Oo. For a
general overview of masculinity in hip-hop and the stereotypes it perpetuates, see generally
Petra Filipová, Images of African-American Masculinity in Hip Hop Music (2011)
AND
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unbalanced media portrayals of crime.264 Racism in the criminal justice
system and mass incarceration265 further reinforce this historical,
“cartoonish, one-dimensional image[] of black men as sex-crazed,
materialistic criminals.”266 Elements of this stereotype include
ostentatious dress, such as oversized jewelry and designer sneakers, and
a taste for the finer things in life.267 The thug’s desire to live the high life
at all costs contributes to perceptions of Black men as individuals
consistently purchasing beyond their means who are therefore unworthy
of credit.
Both the welfare queen and the thug are modern incarnations of
stereotypes with deep roots. During slavery, images in popular culture,
(unpublished Master thesis, University of Pardubice), https://dk.upce.cz/bitstream/handle
/10195/40478/DP_poslat.pdf?sequence=3&isAllowed=y [https://perma.cc/3TTM-ZD4Q].
263. See, e.g., BARBERSHOP (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 2002); BARBERSHOP 2: BACK IN
BUSINESS (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 2004); BOYZ N THE HOOD (Columbia Pictures Corp.
1991); Empire, supra note 245; FRIDAY (New Line Cinema 1995); FRIDAY AFTER NEXT
(Avery Pix, Cube Vision & New Line Cinema 2002); HUSTLE & FLOW (Crunk Pictures et al.
2005); MENACE II SOCIETY (New Line Cinema 1993); NEW JACK CITY (Warner Bros. 1991);
NEXT FRIDAY (New Line Cinema & Cube Vision 2000).
264. See, e.g., Travis L. Dixon, Psychological Reactions to Crime News Portrayals of Black
Criminals: Understanding the Moderating Roles of Prior News Viewing and Stereotype
Endorsement, 73 COMM. MONOGRAPHS 162, 162 (2006); Travis L. Dixon & Daniel Linz, Race
and the Misrepresentation of Victimization on Local Television News, 27 COMM. RES. 547, 547
(2000); Travis L. Dixon & Keith B. Maddox, Skin Tone, Crime News, and Social Reality
Judgments: Priming the Stereotype of the Dark and Dangerous Black Criminal, 35 J. APPLIED
SOC. PSYCHOL. 1555, 1555 (2005); Ryan J. Hurley et al., Viewer Ethnicity Matters: Black
Crime in TV News and Its Impact on Decisions Regarding Public Policy, 71 J. SOC. ISSUES
155, 155 (2015).
265. See, e.g., Sara Sun Beale, The News Media’s Influence on Criminal Justice Policy: How
Market-Driven News Promotes Punitiveness, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 397, 400 (2006);
Robert M. Entman & Kimberly A. Gross, Race to Judgment: Stereotyping Media and Criminal
Defendants, 71 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. no. 4, Autumn 2008, at 93, 102–03; Gary Ford, The
New Jim Crow: Male and Female, South and North, from Cradle to Grave, Perception and
Reality: Racial Disparity and Bias in America’s Criminal Justice System, 11 RUTGERS RACE &
L. REV. 324, 330 (2010).
266. Lauren Carter, The Black Thug Stereotype, RAP REHAB (Jan. 30, 2014), http://
raprehab.com/richard-sherman-rap-music-and-the-black-thug-stereotype/ [https://perma.cc
/4869-X5W4]; see also Commentary, All Things Considered: The Racially Charged Meaning
Behind the Word ‘Thug’, NPR (Apr. 30, 2015, 5:25 PM), http://www.npr.org/2015/04/30
/403362626/the-racially-charged-meaning-behind-the-word-thug [https://perma.cc/VC36-QZPU]
(discussing the use of the word “thug” to describe Baltimore rioters).
267. See BEN BURGESS, JR., Stereotypes, in TIMES HAVE CHANGED AND LIFE IS
STRANGE: COLLECTIVE WORKS OF URBAN POETRY AND STORY-TELLING 30, 30 (2008)
(describing “new sneakers and baggy clothes” as stereotypical “characteristics of a thug”);
Annabel Fenwick Elliott, Photographer Creates Powerful Portraits of Nurses, Pastors and
CEOs Dressed as Terrorists, Thugs and Vagrants to Challenge Social Stereotypes, DAILY
MAIL.COM (Oct. 2, 2014, 9:13 EDT), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/femail/article-2777122
/Photographer-creates-powerful-portraits-nurses-pastors-CEOs-dressed-terrorists-thugs-vagrantschallenge-social-stereotypes.html [https://perma.cc/6TYJ-T3E7] (depicting a man in stereotypical
“thug” clothing, which includes several large pieces of jewelry).
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such as the Sambo and the Savage, commonly portrayed Blacks as less
than human.268 In the Reconstruction era, Whites had strong emotional
reactions to seeing recently freed Blacks spend money and engage in
previously forbidden activities such as going out to theatres and
restaurants.269 From that time, society has framed Black consumerism,
particularly when it is ostentatious, as deviant and morally corrupt.270
Regina Austin eloquently summarizes the common understanding
of the relationship between Blacks and money as follows: “It is assumed
that blacks do not earn their money honestly, work for it diligently, or
spend it wisely. When blacks have money, they squander it and cannot
save it.”271 Austin further explains that, through this lens, the companies
or individuals who seek to exploit these assumed propensities to remain
ignorant of financial best practices and overspend are blameless.272 The
onus is on Blacks to wise up or suffer the consequences: caveat
emptor.273
In contrast, some social critics argue that stereotypes about Black
consumerism are not false; instead, they assert that these portrayals
accurately represent overspending as a form of resistance exercised by
Black consumers, an expression of freedom.274 From this perspective,
“consumption is about pleasure, performance, and participation in
prosperity.”275 It is also “the site of a struggle to exploit the
transformative potential of commodities” by using them “in ways that
reveal the repressed or negated contradictions that underlie their
production and distribution.”276
An example of this type of radical conspicuous consumerism exists
in the hip hop fashions popularized in the 1990s. Black designers took
expensive designer labels and enlarged them or created patterns of these
logos to cover clothing and accessories in order to exaggerate the status

268. ETHNIC NOTIONS, supra note 229 (explaining that by reducing Blacks to dumb,
primitive caricatures, these stereotypes justified their enslavement).
269. See Freeman, supra note 37, at 185 (citing Hannah Rosen, “Not That Sort of Women”:
Race, Gender, and Sexual Violence During the Memphis Riot of 1866, in SEX, LOVE, RACE:
CROSSING BOUNDARIES IN NORTH AMERICAN HISTORY 267, 269–71 (Martha Hodes ed.,
1999)).
270. Nathaniel Mills, Playing the Dozens and Consuming the Cadillac: Ralph Ellison and
Civil Rights Politics, 61 TWENTIETH-CENTURY LITERATURE 147, 160 (2015).
271. Austin, supra note 203, at 151.
272. Id.
273. See id. at 154–56.
274. See, e.g., Austin, supra note 203, at 154, 160; Roopali Mukherjee, The Ghetto
Fabulous Aesthetic in Contemporary Black Culture: Class and Consumption in the Barbershop
Films, 20 CULTURAL STUD. 599, 612 (2006).
275. Austin, supra note 203, at 160.
276. Id.
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achieved by the wearer through designer clothing.277 This style became
so popular that it entered the mainstream and allowed certain Black hip
hop artists and designers access to previously untapped fashion
markets.278 Roopali Mukherjee argues that this style—often called
“bling” or “ghetto fabulous”—disrupts social expectations because it
“points to African Americans indulging in conspicuous consumption as
their ticket to the American Dream, their way into the American
polity.”279 In this way, Black consumption can be truly transformative
because it signals a shift from Blackness-as-commodity to Black-asconsumer.280
Conversely, others contest popular stereotypes by viewing Black
consumption as a symptom of alienation, a way to compensate for lives
filled with micro-aggressions281 and ever-present threats of violence,
discrimination, exploitation, and humiliation.282 This type of
consumption, however, can ultimately cause more harm than good
because it buys into a capitalist framework that equates consumption
with status and material acquisitions with the good life.283 In reality,
dollars can never buy acceptance and equality. Advocates for racial
justice, therefore, lament any attempts by Blacks to consume solely in
order to accomplish or signal upward social mobility, particularly to the
extent that this consumption replaces a struggle against White
supremacy.284
A widely accepted equation of Blacks with materialistic
overspending helps to explain the lack of effective legal recourse for
discriminatory treatment against Black consumers under the Equal
Credit Opportunity Act.285 Additionally, due to the internalization of
common, powerful stereotypes about Black creditworthiness, many
277. See, e.g., FRESH DRESSED (Mass Appeal 2015); see also Sacha Jenkins, The Spirit of
Being, Looking ‘Fresh,’ CNN (Sept. 3, 2015, 3:22 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/08/28
/opinions/fresh-dressed-sacha-jenkins-opinion/ [https://perma.cc/EMS7-6VUC] (director of
Freshly Dressed) (ascribing clothing the role of radiating one’s identity and status).
278. See, e.g., FRESH DRESSED, supra note 277; Booth Moore, ‘Fresh Dressed’
Documentary Explores Hip-hop Fashion Through the Years, L.A. TIMES (June 25, 2015, 5:00
AM), http://www.latimes.com/entertainment/movies/la-et-mn-fresh-dressed-20150625-story
.html [https://perma.cc/5XJH-S5V4].
279. Mukherjee, supra note 274, at 612.
280. Id.
281. See, e.g., CLAUDIA RANKINE, CITIZEN: AN AMERICAN LYRIC 23–33 (2014).
282. Austin, supra note 203, at 156.
283. Id. at 164.
284. See, e.g., id. at 157–60.
285. See infra Part II; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a) (2012); Austin, supra note 203, at 151–
53. Although Austin discusses this phenomenon in the context of racial profiling shoppers, it
is equally applicable to discrimination by the credit card industry. See Austin, supra note 203,
at 151–53.
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Black consumers may not view their treatment by credit card companies
as discriminatory, but instead mistakenly perceive it as merely reflective
of their weak financial standing.
Further, despite the overwhelming evidence that debt disparities
are a product of laws and policies,286 very few people view credit card
debt as a structural, rather than personal, problem.287 Critiques of
personal financial management, whether they are benign (originating
from members of the Black community seeking to uplift themselves and
others)288 or hostile (expressed by White voters and politicians as
justification for withholding certain benefits),289 tend to ascribe debt to
personal failings. Reflecting this popular paradigm, a proliferation of
materials promises to help individuals, and Blacks in particular, improve
their financial standing.290 This literature, however, ignores the structural
realities that place many Blacks in a precarious financial position,
making credit simultaneously more necessary and more difficult to
obtain.

286. See supra Section I.A.
287. DIANA KENDALL, SOCIOLOGY IN OUR TIMES 4 (8th ed. 2011) (stating that although
most people view the world in individualistic rather than structural frameworks, credit card
debt and consumption habits are more appropriately viewed as rooted in structural conditions
rather than characteristics of the individual).
288. See, e.g., GLINDA BRIDGFORTH, GIRL, GET YOUR CREDIT STRAIGHT! A SISTER’S
GUIDE TO DITCHING YOUR DEBT, MENDING YOUR CREDIT, AND BUILDING A STRONG
FINANCIAL FUTURE 2 (2007); PATRICE C. WASHINGTON, REAL MONEY ANSWERS FOR
EVERY WOMAN: HOW TO WIN THE MONEY GAME WITH OR WITHOUT A MAN 1–2 (2013);
Linton Hinds, Jr., 13 Reasons Why African Americans Are Broke and Most Likely Will
Remain Broke, Unless . . . , THYBLACKMAN.COM (Sept. 25, 2015), http://thyblackman.com
/2015/09/25/13-reasons-why-african-americans-are-broke-and-most-likely-will-remain-brokeunless/ [https://perma.cc/4LQ8-4HZS]; Lynnette Khalfani-Cox, Opinion, Who Has a ‘Moral
Obligation’ to Pay Off Our Debt?, GRIO (June 29, 2011, 7:36 AM), http://thegrio.com/2011/06
/29/who-has-a-moral-obligation-to-repay-their-debts/ [https://perma.cc/8WYC-2DRT]; John H.
McWhorter, What’s Holding Blacks Back?, CITY J., Winter 2001, at 24, 26–31, https://www
.heartland.org/_template-assets/documents/publications/7928.pdf [https://perma.cc/6MNLM968].
289. Brian Montopoli, S.C. Lt. Gov. Andre Bauer Compares Helping Poor to Feeding Stray
Animals, CBS NEWS (Jan. 25, 2010, 11:52 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/sc-lt-gov-andrebauer-compares-helping-poor-to-feeding-stray-animals/ [https://perma.cc/4RCV-V8TD].
290. See, e.g., Best Money Sites for Young People, BLACK ENTERPRISE (July 14, 2010),
http://www.blackenterprise.com/be-next/best-money-sites-for-young-people/ [https://perma.cc
/5Q4F-LZD2]; Sheiresa Ngo, 4 Ways to Raise a Bad Credit Score, BLACK ENTERPRISE (Feb.
12, 2013), http://www.blackenterprise.com/b-e-exclusives/4-ways-raise-bad-credit-score/
[https://perma.cc/9Q5W-T2MS]; Required Reading: 20 Books to Boost Your Financial
Literacy, BLACK ENTERPRISE (Apr. 22, 2010), http://www.blackenterprise.com/lifestyle/artsculture/required-reading-20-books-to-boost-your-financial-literacy/ [https://perma.cc/U7Z4VUAP].
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The following Part explains why the current legal regime designed
to protect consumers from racial disparities and discrimination fails to
do so.
II. HOW CONSUMER LAW FAILS TO PROTECT CONSUMERS FROM
RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
Consumer law is ill-equipped to police or redress inequitable
treatment. Historically, consumer law has offered very limited
protection to consumers.291 Its restricted nature, in large part, reflects its
position in the consumer capitalist society. Consumer law seeks
primarily to encourage, not inhibit, consumption. Therefore, despite its
somewhat deceptive name, it tends to favor corporate interests.
Credit card companies are profit-seeking corporations that exploit
consumer weaknesses in order to maximize their earnings, benefit their
shareholders, and increase their power.292 Moreover, the consolidation
of the credit card industry over time into an oligopoly dominated by two
major players, Visa and Mastercard, with only a handful of other
contenders, has left consumers with very few options when it comes to
credit card terms and conditions.293 Further, the greater the need
individuals have for credit, the more susceptible they become to
discriminatory and predatory practices. The founder of Providian
Financial Services, Andrew Kahr, demonstrated how knowledge of this
vulnerability permeates credit card companies’ approach to poor
consumers in a memo stating, “Is any bit of food too small to grab when

291. See Lauren E. Willis, Performance-Based Consumer Law; 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 1309,
1311 (2015); Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1,
70 (2008); Lauren E. Willis, Against Financial Literacy Education, 94 IOWA L. REV. 197, 264
(2008).
292. See Revlon Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del.
1986) (“A board may have regard for various constituencies in discharging its responsibilities,
provided there are rationally related benefits accruing to the stockholders.” (citing Unocal v.
Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985))); Leo E. Strine, Jr., Our Continuing
Struggle with the Idea that For-Profit Corporations Seek Profit, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 135,
155 (2012) (“[T]he corporate law requires directors, as a matter of their duty of loyalty, to
pursue a good faith strategy to maximize profits for the stockholders.”); Noah Smith, CreditCard Companies Know How Little You Know, BLOOMBERGVIEW (June 30, 2016, 8:00 AM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2016-06-30/credit-card-companies-know-how-little-youknow [https://perma.cc/L5PN-Y2CV] (“Credit-card companies need people to spend more than
they can afford, but not so much that they default on their payments. So they could benefit
from targeting individuals who are more likely to have cognitive failings. This is the dark side
of behavioral finance.”).
293. Lawrence M. Ausubel, The Failure of Competition in the Credit Card Market, 81 AM.
ECON. REV. 50, 51 (1991); Freeman, supra note 37, at 172–75; Nancy Folbre, The Power of
Plastic, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 12, 2012, 6:00 AM), https://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/11/12
/the-power-of-plastic/ [https://perma.cc/N5VL-NWT2].
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you’re starving and when there is nothing else in sight? The trick is
charging a lot, repeatedly, for small doses of incremental credit.”294
Confronted with this merciless business philosophy and the
immense power held by the credit card industry, it is inevitable that
consumers suffer at the hands of their credit providers. This Part
describes the laws currently in place to respond to this eventuality. The
first, the ECOA, allows plaintiffs to bring suits against credit providers
for unlawful discrimination.295 Unfortunately, however, these suits rarely
resolve in plaintiff’s favor, often because they require them to prove
intentional discrimination, a nearly impossible task.296 The second, the
CRA,297 takes more of a preventive approach to the problem. It requires
lending institutions to serve the needs of the communities in which they
are located.298 Banks rarely follow this admonition, however, due to
erratic enforcement and their ability to flee low-income communities
and relocate to wealthier neighborhoods or serve online constituents.299
Fundamental weaknesses in both laws thus render their combined effect
negligible in terms of preventing or penalizing racial discrimination by
credit card companies.
A. The Equal Credit Opportunity Act
The enactment of the ECOA in 1974 reflected the efforts of a
coalition of feminist organizations that decried widespread credit
discrimination against women.300 The five forms of credit discrimination
294. GARCÍA ET AL., supra note 222, at 48 (quoting Sam Zuckerman, How Providian
Misled Card Holders, SFGATE (May 5, 2002, 4:00 AM), http://www.sfgate.com/news/article
/How-Providian-misled-card-holders-2840684.php [https://perma.cc/FH9X-AHBA]).
295. Equal Credit Opportunity Act, Pub. L. No. 93-495, 88 Stat. 1521 (1974) (codified at 15
U.S.C. §§ 1691–1691f (2012)).
296. See, e.g., Wise v. Vilsack, 496 Fed.Appx. 283, 285–86 (4th Cir. 2012) (per curiam);
McDowell v. Huntington Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 826 F.2d 1060 (4th Cir. 1987) (unpublished
table decision) (per curiam), 1987 WL 38379, at *1; Willis v. Countrywide Home Loans
Servicing, L.P., No. CIVA CCB-09-1455, 2009 WL 5206475, at *7 (D. Md. Dec. 23, 2009);
Reece v. Countrywide Home Loans Inc., No. 7:06-CV-181-0, 2008 WL 4559809, at *3 (N.D.
Tex. Oct. 10, 2008).
297. Community Reinvestment Act, Pub L. No. 95-128, 91 Stat. 111 (1977) (codified as
amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901–2908 (2012)).
298. 12 U.S.C. § 2901(b) (2012).
299. See Michael S. Barr, Credit Where It Counts: The Community Reinvestment Act and
Its Critics, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 513, 528–29 (2005).
300. Fair Credit Billing: Hearing on S. 65 Before the Subcomm. On Fin. Insts. of the Comm.
On Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, 92d Cong. 59–64 (1971) (statements of Agnes D.
Jeffrey, Phyllis Thompson, and Catharine Pszwaro) (collecting statements of women who
experienced difficulty with credit card companies); FLORA DAVIS, MOVING THE MOUNTAIN:
THE WOMEN’S MOVEMENT IN AMERICA SINCE 1960, at 147–52 (1st ed. 1991); see also
LIZABETH COHEN, A CONSUMERS’ REPUBLIC: THE POLITICS OF MASS CONSUMPTION IN
POSTWAR AMERICA 368–70 (2003) (describing the greater access men had over women for
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against women that catalyzed the Act were that (1) single women had
more trouble obtaining credit than single men; (2) creditors generally
required a woman to reapply for credit upon marriage, usually in her
husband’s name, while similar reapplication was not necessary for
newlywed men; (3) creditors were unwilling to extend credit to a
married woman in her own name; (4) creditors were generally unwilling
to count the wife’s income when a married couple applied for credit,
even if she provided the sole support for the household; and (5) divorced
or widowed women had trouble reestablishing credit.301 Although not
mentioned in the Act, perhaps the most egregious form of
discrimination was some mortgage lenders’ requirement of proof of a
wife’s birth control or sterilization before guaranteeing a married couple
a loan.302
After the National Commission on Consumer Finance heard
testimony on these issues in 1972, the National Organization of
Women’s (“NOW”) Task Force on Consumer Credit received an
outpouring of similar stories in support of its lobbying efforts.303 At the
same time, the American Civil Liberties Union, Parents Without
Partners, and the Women’s Equity Action League began to investigate
credit discrimination complaints.304 After Ralph Nader’s organization
donated $10,000 to NOW for the cause, economist Jane Roberts
Chapman and attorney Margaret Gates formed the Center for Women
Policy Studies, and the Ford Foundation further enabled their research
with a $40,000 grant.305
The resulting efforts proved successful, culminating in Congress
enacting the ECOA in 1974.306 Its passage reflected the growing
importance of credit and concerns about the possible effects of
discriminatory and arbitrary standards for determining creditworthiness

home mortgages and credit); KIMBERLY A. REED, MANAGING OUR MARGINS: WOMEN
ENTREPRENEURS IN THE SUBURBS 129–30 (2013).
301. See NAT’L COMM’N ON CONSUMER FIN., CONSUMER CREDIT IN THE UNITED
STATES 152–53 (1972); see also Gerald R. Ford, Statement on Signing Legislation Increasing
Federal Deposit Insurance (Oct. 29, 1974), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=4522
[https://perma.cc/RD6L-QUWH] (noting that “[w]omen are still too often treated as secondclass citizens in the credit world. . . . [and] should have access to credit on the same terms as
men” but remaining silent as to issues of racial or national origin discrimination).
302. DAVIS, supra note 300, at 148.
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. Id.
306. Equal Credit Opportunity Act, Pub. L. No. 93-495, 88 Stat. 1521 (1974) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691–1691f (2012)).
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on individuals’ ability to exercise constitutionally guaranteed rights.307
The first version of the ECOA focused almost entirely on the
prohibition of discrimination on the basis of sex and marital status,308
despite some testimony on racially discriminatory credit lending
practices,309 including testimony on the effect of intersectional
discrimination on women of color.310 Two years later, Congress amended
the ECOA to add protections against unfair credit lending practices on
the bases of age, religion, race, color, and national origin.311
The ECOA is the primary source of consumer protection against
racial discrimination by credit card companies. Nonetheless, despite
documentation of persistent and significant discrimination in this
industry since the law’s enactment in 1974,312 to date there have been
only three major settlements in favor of plaintiffs alleging discrimination
by credit card companies on the basis of race or national origin.313 This
307. See NAT’L COMM’N ON CONSUMER FIN., supra note 301, at 1–4; Linda S. Hume, A
Suggested Analysis for Regulation of Equal Credit Opportunity, 52 WASH. L. REV. 335, 335–38
(1977); see also To Amend the Equal Credit Opportunity Act of 1974: Hearings on H.R. 3386
Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Affairs of the H. Comm. on Banking, Currency & Hous.,
94th Cong. 98 (1975) (statement of Homer L. Stewart, Jr., Senior Vice President, Republic
Bank of Dallas); Credit Discrimination: Hearings on H.R. 14856 and H.R. 14908 Before the
Subcomm. on Consumer Affairs of the H. Comm. on Banking & Currency, 93rd Cong. 1
(1974) (Hon. Leonor K. Sullivan, Chairman, Subcomm. on Consumer Affairs of the H.
Comm. on Banking & Currency) [hereinafter Credit Discrimination Hearings].
308. See Equal Credit Opportunity Act, § 701, 88 Stat. at 1521–22.
309. See, e.g., Credit Discrimination Hearings, supra note 307, at 41 (statement of John H.
Powell, Jr., Chairman, Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n) (“[I]t is very likely that the
inability to obtain credit, or if obtained, the discriminatory terms and conditions which
accompany its extension to certain groups in our society, are directly related to discrimination
in employment.”); id. at 131 (statement of Hon. Arthur S. Flemming, Chairman, U.S. Comm’n
on Civil Rights, and Comm’r, Admin. on Aging, Dep’t of Health, Educ. & Welfare).
310. Id. at 131–37 (statement of Hon. Arthur S. Flemming, Chairman, U.S. Comm’n on
Civil Rights, and Comm’r, Admin. on Aging, Dep’t of Health, Educ. & Welfare).
311. Act of Mar. 23, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-239, § 701, 90 Stat. 251, 251 (codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a) (2012)).
312. Cohen-Cole, supra note 155, at 702; Lin, supra note 152, at 45–50.
313. Consent Order at 10–13, United States v. Synchrony Bank, No. 2:14-CV-00454 (D.
Utah June 27, 2014), ECF No. 16; Settlement Agreement and Order at 10–12, United States v.
Fidelity Fed. Bank, No. CV-02-3906 (E.D.N.Y. July 25, 2002), https://www.clearinghouse.net
/chDocs/public/FH-NY-0021-0002.pdf [https://perma.cc/WVJ7-5ZXL]; Settlement Agreement
at 2, United States v. Assocs. Nat’l Bank, 1:99-cv-00196-SLR (D. Del. 1999), https://www
.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/FH-DE-0002-0003.pdf [https://perma.cc/3WZQ-NJ7W];
VANITA GUPTA, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S 2014 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS
PURSUANT TO THE EQUAL CREDIT OPPORTUNITY AMENDMENTS OF 1976, at 3–4 (2015),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/legacy/2015/04/13/ecoareport2014.pdf [https://
perma.cc/6HKQ-4LSF]; R. Alexander Acosta, The Attorney General’s 2002 Annual Report to
Congress Pursuant to the Equal Credit Opportunity Amendments of 1976, U.S. DEP’T JUST.
(Sept. 2003), http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/hce/documents/ecoa2002.php [https://perma.cc
/22PV-Q7AM] (discussing Fidelity’s $1.6 million settlement with plaintiffs concerning
allegations of harassment based on customers’ “Hispanic national origin”); William R.
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fact suggests that the substance or procedure of the law may be tipped in
defendants’ favor, and analysis of how these cases often proceed in court
bear out this suspicion. Specifically, in this era of post-racialism, overt
racism is socially unacceptable, such that credit providers rarely, if ever,
make blatantly racist statements. Consequently, plaintiffs consistently
lack “smoking gun” evidence of discrimination. Nonetheless, the
Supreme Court has not decided whether plaintiffs may rely on statistics
to prove discrimination under a disparate impact analysis.314 This
uncertainty leads to confusion and inconsistency among the lower
courts.315
Additionally, because the law does not require credit card
companies to collect and report data on the racial breakdown of their
customers and applicants, plaintiffs rarely have access to the statistics
they need to prove discrimination under a “disparate impact” theory.316
Therefore, absent or awaiting significant legal reform to the adjudication
of discrimination cases, the ECOA is of little use to borrowers denied
access to necessary or fair credit due to their race.
The ECOA provides that it is “unlawful for any creditor to
discriminate against any applicant, with respect to any aspect of a credit
transaction . . . on the basis of race.”317 The law defines an “adverse
Yeomans, The Attorney General’s 2000 Annual Report to Congress Pursuant to the Equal
Credit Opportunity Act Amendments of 1976, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (Apr. 2001), https://www
.justice.gov/crt/housing-and-civil-enforcement-cases-documents-162 [https://perma.cc/293383XG] (detailing plaintiff’s claims of discrimination on the basis of national origin by
Associates National Bank and the subsequent $1.5 million settlement).
314. Leonard N. Chanin, Credit Cards May be Vulnerable to “Disparate Impact” Claims,
AM. BANKER: BANKTHINK (Nov. 12, 2013, 10:00 AM), https://www.americanbanker.com
/opinion/credit-cards-may-be-vulnerable-to-disparate-impact-claims [https://perma.cc/6PTCETPR(staff-uploaded archive)] (analyzing the issue in light of the decision that disparate
impact applies in Fair Housing Act claims in Texas Department of Housing and Community
Affairs v. The Inclusive Communities Project, 135 S. Ct. 2507 (2015), and noting that key
language in the FHA that the Court interpreted to point to Congressional intention to allow
disparate impact claims is missing from the ECOA).
315. See Golden v. City of Columbus, 404 F.3d 950, 963 n.11 (6th Cir. 2005) (expressing
some uncertainty as to whether disparate impact claims are cognizable under the ECOA but
ultimately assuming that they are); Ramirez v. GerrnPoint Mortg. Funding, Inc., 633 F. Supp.
2d 922, 927 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (allowing disparate impact claim under the ECOA to proceed);
see also Francesca Lina Procaccini, Stemming The Rising Risk of Credit Inequality: The Fair
and Faithful Interpretation of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act’s Disparate Impact
Prohibition, 9 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. S43, S70 (2015) (outlining arguments that courts are
frequently presented as to why disparate impact claims are not cognizable under the ECOA).
316. See, e.g., Golden, 404 F.3d at 963.
317. 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a) (2012). The ECOA, as enacted in 1974, prohibited financial
institutions from discriminating on the grounds of marital status or gender. Equal Credit
Opportunity Act, Pub. L. No. 93-495, § 502, 88 Stat. 1521, 1521 (1974) (codified as amended at
15 U.S.C. § 1691 (2012)). Congress added race, color, religion, national origin, age, the receipt
of public assistance income, and the good faith exercise of any right under the Consumer
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action” as “a denial or revocation of credit, a change in the terms of an
existing credit arrangement, or a refusal to grant credit in substantially
the amount or on substantially the terms requested.”318 As part of an
initial challenge to an adverse action, an applicant is entitled to a
statement of specific reasons for the action by the creditor.319
The regulations associated with the statute, promulgated by the
Federal Reserve, also state that a creditor may not discourage
prospective credit applicants from applying based on a protected
ground.320 A creditor may not inquire about a person’s race or national
origin in relation to a credit transaction (including persons other than
the applicant), but may inquire into an applicant’s permanent residence
or immigration status.321 As an exception to this rule, the regulations
allow for the existence of a “special purpose credit program” where a
creditor may extend credit to a class of persons who otherwise likely
would not receive such credit or would receive it on less favorable
terms.322 For the purposes of establishing eligibility for one of these
programs, creditors may inquire into otherwise prohibited areas, such as
race and national origin.323
If an individual suspects that a credit issuer has violated their rights
under the ECOA, they may complain to the creditor, ask the state
attorney general’s office for advice, sue the creditor in federal court
individually or as part of a class action, or report violations to the
appropriate government agency.324 In the event of a suit, the ECOA
allows for actual damages, punitive damages, equitable relief, and
attorneys’ fees.325 Some district courts analyze ECOA cases using the
same standards as cases alleging employment discrimination under Title

Credit Protection Act as prohibited grounds for discrimination in 1976 amendments. Equal
Credit Opportunity Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-239, § 701(a), 90 Stat. 251, 251
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (2012)). Amendments in 1988 extended protection
to small business credit applicants in addition to consumers. Equal Credit Opportunity Act
Amendments of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-533, § 301, 102 Stat. 2689, 2692 (codified as amended at
15 U.S.C. § 1691b(a) (2012)); DEE PRIDGEN & RICHARD M. ALDERMAN, 1 CONSUMER
CREDIT AND THE LAW § 3:1, at 182–83 (2010–2011 ed. 2010).
318. 15 U.S.C. § 1691(d)(6).
319. Id. § 1691(d)(2)–(3).
320. 12 C.F.R. § 202.5(b) (2016).
321. Id. § 202.5(b), (e).
322. Id. § 202.8(a)(3).
323. Id. § 202.8(b)(2).
324. FED. TRADE COMM’N, YOUR EQUAL CREDIT OPPORTUNITY RIGHTS 8–9 (2013),
https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/pdf-0071-equal-credit-opportunity.pdf#page=1&zoom
=auto,-136,19 [https://perma.cc/MWF4-GFK6].
325. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691e(a)–(d), 1691(d) (2012).
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VII of the Civil Rights Act.326 Under Title VII jurisprudence, plaintiffs
who lack smoking gun evidence of the prohibited acts must follow the
analysis established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green.327
The McDonnell Douglas test first requires the plaintiff to establish
a prima facie case of discrimination.328 This is a low hurdle to clear
because a plaintiff can establish a prima facie case by demonstrating four
relatively simple facts that led to the instigation of a suit.329 First, the
plaintiff must show that they are a member of the protected class—in
this case, a racial minority.330 Second, they must demonstrate that they
were qualified to receive a benefit from the creditor, such as a credit
card or a higher credit limit.331 Third, they must prove that the creditor
refused to grant them this benefit and, finally, they must demonstrate a
“causal nexus between the harm suffered and the plaintiff’s membership
in a protected class[.]”332 During this initial phase, some courts allow
plaintiffs to proceed under a disparate impact theory, which allows the
use of statistics to establish a prima facie case.333
326. See, e.g., Anderson v. Wachovia Mortg. Corp, 621 F.3d 261, 268 (3d Cir. 2010)
(holding that “McDonnell Douglas tests should be applied to lending discrimination claims
brought under § 1981”); Hood v. Midwest Sav. Bank, 95 Fed. App’x 768, 781 (6th Cir. 2004);
Moore v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric. ex rel. Farmer’s Home Admin., 55 F.3d 991, 993 n.5 (5th Cir.
1995) (noting that although there is little ECOA case law to guide courts, the similarities
between cases involving the refusal to extend credit and those involving refusals to hire
allowed the lower court to borrow from the Title VII framework in its ECOA analysis);
Frederick v. Capital One Bank (USA), N.A., No. 14-CV-5460 AJN, 2015 WL 5521769, at *3
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 2015), opinion amended on reconsideration sub nom. Frederick v. Capital
One (USA) N.A., No. 14-CV-5460 (AJN), 2015 WL 8484560 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 8, 2015);
Germain v. M & T Bank Corp., 111 F.Supp.3d 506, 525–26 (S.D.N.Y. 2015); Boardley v.
Household Fin. Corp. III, 39 F.Supp.3d 689, 709–10 (D. Md. 2014); Lugo-Berrios v. Citibank,
N.A., No. CIV. 11-1224 JAF, 2013 WL 1314752, at *2 (D.P.R. Mar. 26, 2013); But see
Latimore v. Citibank Fed. Sav. Bank, 151 F.3d 712, 714–15 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding that the
McDonnell Douglas test does not apply in claims of credit discrimination).
327. 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
328. Id.
329. Id.
330. McDonnell, 411 U.S. at 802; Anderson, 621 F.3d at 275.
331. McDonnell, 411 U.S. at 802; Anderson, 621 F.3d at 275.
332. Anderson, 621 F.3d at 275; see McDonnell, 411 U.S. at 802.
333. See, e.g., Golden v. City of Columbus, 404 F.3d 950, 963 (6th Cir. 2005); Taylor v.
Accredited Home Lenders, Inc., 580 F. Supp. 2d 1062, 1067 (S.D. Cal. 2008) (collecting cases).
Not all courts allow use of this theory, however, due to doubts about the reliability of the data
presented. See, e.g., Bhandari v. First Nat. Bank of Commerce, 808 F.2d 1082, 1101 (5th Cir.);
O’Dowd v. S. Cent. Bell, 729 F.2d 347, 350 (5th Cir. 1984); Umney v. Cmty. Fin. Members
Fed. Credit Union, No. CIV.A. 14-13328, 2015 WL 4530264, at *2 (E.D. Mich. July 28, 2015);
Germain v. M & T Bank Corp., 111 F.Supp.3d 506, 525–26 (S.D.N.Y. 2015); Chau v. Ball, No.
5:13-CV-233-JMH, 2014 WL 1338683, at *2 (E.D. Ky. Mar. 28, 2014); Craig E. Marcus, Note,
Beyond the Boundaries of the Community Reinvestment Act and the Fair Lending Laws:
Developing a Market-Based Framework for Generating Low- and Moderate-Income Lending,
96 COLUM. L. REV. 710, 734 (1996).
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After the plaintiff meets these four elements, the burden shifts to
the defendant-creditor to proffer a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason
for the challenged action.334 This requirement is also not difficult to
satisfy. Defendants can usually put forth a reasonable business
justification for making a particular credit decision, most likely that the
risk of borrowing appeared to be too great.335 In response, the plaintiff
can attempt to prove that the defendant’s proffered reason was merely
pretextual.336 To make this argument, the plaintiff could assert, for
example, that White applicants with similar or worse credit histories
received superior cards and terms.337 Proving this assertion, however, is
difficult, if not impossible, because plaintiffs possess limited, if any,
access to this type of information absent disclosure requirements.338
Therefore, because the plaintiff has the burden to prove that illegal
discrimination took place and the creditor need only present an
acceptable motive for an adverse action, defendants generally prevail in
these cases.339
Courts do not always use the McDonnell Douglas framework,
however, due to dissimilarities between the employment and the credit
contexts.340 With allegations of employment discrimination, there is
generally a point of comparison with other employees who are similarly
situated yet receive different treatment, such as a promotion.341 Credit,
on the other hand, does not usually involve competition. Borrowers do
not vie for finite resources, and it is generally difficult, if not impossible,
for plaintiffs to prove that others received better treatment from a credit

334. Marcus, supra note 333, at 736.
335. See Powell v. Am. Gen. Fin., Inc., 310 F. Supp. 2d 481, 488 (N.D.N.Y. 2004) (finding
that defendant provided plaintiff with legitimate reasons for rejecting her application, such as
lack of credit history, lack of collateral, and the absence of a co-signer).
336. Marcus, supra note 333, at 736.
337. See Boardley v. Household Fin. Corp. III, 39 F. Supp. 3d 689, 710 (D. Md. 2014)
(finding that “Plaintiffs offer only conclusory allegations that others outside their protected
class received loans on more favorable terms”).
338. Id.; Grant v. Vilsack, No. 5:10-CV-201-BO, 2011 WL 308418, at *2 (E.D.N.C. Jan. 27,
2011) (finding that “Plaintiff has failed to plead sufficient facts plausibly demonstrating the
existence of a single non-minority who was (1) of similar credit stature as the Plaintiff and (2)
given more favorable financial or credit-related treatment than Plaintiff”).
339. See, e.g., Wise v. Vilsack, 496 Fed.Appx. 283, 285–86 (4th Cir. 2012); McDowell v.
Huntington Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 826 F.2d 1060 (4th Cir. 1987); Willis v. Countrywide
Home Loans Servicing, L.P., No. CIVA CCB-09-1455, 2009 WL 5206475, at *8 (D. Md. Dec.
23, 2009); Reece v. Countrywide Home Loans Inc., No. 7:06-CV-181-0, 2008 WL 4559809, at
*2 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 10, 2008).
340. See text accompanying supra note 333.
341. See, e.g., Coleman v. Donahoe, 667 F.3d 835, 841–42 (7th Cir. 2012).
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company based on their race. Nonetheless, many courts hold adverse
treatment insufficient to prove discrimination.342
To date, there have been three major ECOA investigations into
race or national origin discrimination by credit card issuers resulting in
settlements. All of them involved Latino borrowers. In 2000, plaintiffs
alleged that Associates National Bank (“ANB”) discriminated on the
basis of national origin by requiring higher credit scores for applicants
using a Spanish-language application form, giving lower credit limits to
approved Spanish-language applicants, and failing to offer favorable
credit promotions to Spanish-language account holders.343 After a year
of discovery, Citigroup acquired ANB and settled with the plaintiffs, a
class of several hundred individuals, for $1.5 million.344
In 2002, Fidelity Federal Bank settled a case brought by the United
States alleging, among other things, that Fidelity engaged in abusive
collection practices in its subprime credit card program that harassed
customers based on their “Hispanic national origin” and denied credit to
applicants who could not read or speak English.345 Fidelity paid out $1.6
million to victims of its ECOA violations and agreed to fund a consumer
education program.346 This aspect of the settlement appears to be of a
self-serving nature, however, because it implies that the problem lies
with the consumers’ lack of financial savvy, not the bank’s
discriminatory practices.
In 2014, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, in a joint
enforcement action with the Department of Justice (“DOJ”), ordered
GE Capital Bank (“GE”) (which changed its name to Synchrony Bank
shortly before the settlement) to pay $169 million to approximately
108,000 borrowers.347 Over a three-year time span, GE allegedly denied
these customers access to product promotions because of the customers’

342. See, e.g., Boardley, 39 F. Supp. 3d at 710; Grant, 2011 WL 308418, at *2.
343. Complaint at 1, United States v. Assocs. Nat’l Bank, 1:99-cv-00196-SLR (D. Del.
1999), https://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/FH-DE-0002-0002.pdf [https://perma.cc
/6XAQ-WCPB]; Yeomans, supra note 313.
344. Settlement Agreement, supra note 313, at 2; Yeomans, supra note 313.
345. Settlement Agreement and Order, supra note 313, at 18; Complaint at 4, United
States v. Fidelity Fed. Bank, No. 1:02-CV-03906 (E.D.N.Y. July 8, 2002), https://www
.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/FH-NY-0021-0001.pdf [https://perma.cc/MP6H-U3SM];
Acosta, supra note 313.
346. Settlement Agreement and Order, supra note 313, at 10; Acosta, supra note 313;
Yeomans, supra note 313.
347. Consent Order, supra note 313, at 17; CFPB Orders GE Capital to Pay $225 Million
in Consumer Relief for Deceptive and Discriminatory Credit Card Practices, CFPB (June 19,
2014), http://www.consumerfinance.gov/newsroom/cfpb-orders-ge-capital-to-pay-225-millionin-consumer-relief-for-deceptive-and-discriminatory-credit-card-practices/ [https://perma.cc
/C5D3-BQNJ] [hereinafter CFPB Order Press Release].
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Latino national origin.348 Specifically, between 2009 and 2012, GE
offered certain qualifying borrowers the opportunity to receive a credit
or waive their remaining account balances after paying a specified
percentage of their balance.349 Customers who indicated a preference to
communicate in Spanish or had Puerto Rico addresses did not receive
notice of these promotions.350 Consequently, the settlement awarded
these customers the amount they would have saved had they taken
advantage of the offers.351 Interestingly, GE instigated the investigation
itself by self-reporting its discriminatory practices to the CFPB, likely to
avoid harsher penalties.352 The resulting court order represented the
federal government’s largest settlement for credit card discrimination to
date.353
Despite these settlements, individual plaintiffs face an uphill battle
establishing discrimination under the ECOA.354 This fact supports
critiques of the McDonnell Douglas framework as it operates both in
ECOA cases and in the context of employment discrimination.355
Additionally, the lack of racial data on credit card lending prevents
plaintiffs from proving their cases based on disparate impact in
jurisdictions that allow those claims.356
In summary, the ECOA’s significant shortcomings render it
inadequate to influence corporate practices or to make whole
individuals who experience racial discrimination by credit card
companies. Even the rare settlements described above represent a small
percentage of the profits that credit card companies stand to make by
imposing unfair interest rates and fees on Black and Latino cardholders
348. Complaint at 4, United States v. Synchrony Bank, No. 2:14-CV-00454 (D. Utah,
2014), https://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/505201461912455667192.pdf [https://perma.cc
/A7ZU-QLHK]; CFPB Order Press Release, supra note 347.
349. Complaint, supra note 348, at 4; CFPB Order Press Release, supra note 347.
350. Complaint, supra note 348, at 4; CFPB Order Press Release, supra note 347.
351. Complaint, supra note 348, at 17; CFPB Order Press Release, supra note 347.
352. CFPB Order Press Release, supra note 347. The bank successfully avoided the civil
penalties. See Nancy R. Thomas & Angela E. Kleine, Takeaways from GE Capital’s $225M
Credit Card Settlement, LAW360 (June 25, 2014, 9:05 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles
/551283/takeaways-from-ge-capital-s-225m-credit-card-settlement [https://perma.cc/5LR9A2BK].
353. GUPTA, supra note 313, at 4.
354. Majorie A. Shields, Discrimination Against Credit Applicant on Basis of Race or
National Origin Under Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1691 et seq., 13 A.L.R. FED.
3D ART. 9 (2016) (demonstrating, for example, that in the 1st through 6th circuit’s ECOA
cases, plaintiffs won thirteen and defendants won forty-five).
355. See, e.g., Sandra F. Sperino, Essay, Beyond McDonnell Douglas, 34 BERKELEY J.
EMP. & LAB. L. 257, 257 (2013).
356. See Winnie Taylor, Proving Racial Discrimination and Monitoring Fair Lending
Compliance: The Missing Data Problem in Nonmortgage Credit, 31 REV. BANKING & FIN. L.
199, 201 (2011).
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that should qualify for more favorable terms. These settlements
therefore do not act as deterrents to unlawful conduct. Moreover,
individual compensation represents a piecemeal approach to redressing
and preventing discrimination that is unlikely to lead to significant
change. The next Section evaluates the efficacy of the CRA, which
contemplates a more holistic method of eliminating or reducing
discrimination.
B.

The Community Reinvestment Act

The impetus for the CRA came from concerns about urban decay
in many of the United States’ major cities, particularly in low-income
Black and Latino neighborhoods.357 Testimony in favor of the Act linked
credit availability to urban blight, asserting that limited access to credit
encouraged White flight and impeded the rehabilitation of deteriorating
neighborhoods.358 The Act’s proponents focused specifically on the
actions of large financial institutions that managed the money of small,
minority-owned businesses and lower-income residents but refused to
lend to or invest in these companies and communities, regardless of their
creditworthiness.359 In short, the CRA was necessary to combat the
racial discrimination that led to widespread disinvestment from lowerincome neighborhoods.360 Nonetheless, although the CRA committees
heard and considered extensive testimony on racially discriminatory
mortgage lending practices,361 no language within the CRA expressly
mentions racial discrimination.
Instead, banks’ hostility to the Act’s original objective of
eliminating vestiges of redlining362 resulted in a watered-down, vague,
and conditional statement of purpose: “to encourage such institutions to
help meet the credit needs of the local communities in which they are
chartered consistent with the safe and sound operation of such
institutions.”363 Moreover, the CRA’s enforcement mechanism is so
357. H.R. REP. NO. 95-236, at 2–3 (1977).
358. See H.R. REP. NO. 95-236, at 2–4; Bernanke, supra note 100.
359. See Bernanke, supra note 100; Michael S. Barr, Credit Where it Counts: The
Community Reinvestment Act and Its Critics, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 513, 515–17 (2005).
360. Cf. Bernanke, supra note 100; Thomas W. Beetham, Note, The Community
Reinvestment Act and Internet Banks: Redefining the Community, 39 B.C. L. REV. 911, 913–15
(1998).
361. See, e.g., Credit Discrimination Hearings, supra note 307, at 39–53 (statement of John
H. Powell, Jr., Chairman, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission).
362. See Credit Discrimination Hearings, supra note 307, at 39–53 (statement of John H.
Powell, Jr., Chairman, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission); Barr, supra note 359, at
516–19 (stating that the CRA was passed in response to concerns about redlining and
outlining major arguments that critics of the CRA employ).
363. 12 U.S.C. § 2901(b) (2012).
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weak that, in its current form, it appears to have a negligible impact on
banks’ conduct.364 Nonetheless, its underlying principles could serve as
the basis for a revamping of the law to transform it into a strong tool
against racial discrimination in credit.
The CRA authorizes regulators to make periodic assessments of
banks’ compliance with the mandate to meet the needs of traditionally
underserved communities located within their purview.365 The objectivity
of these assessments, however, is questionable. First, banks possess a
considerable degree of control over which entity regulates them. By
creating either a state or a federal charter, a lending institution
determines its regulator. The Federal Reserve and the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) regulate state-chartered banks.366 The
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (“OCC”) regulates nationally
chartered banks.367
Second, the companies that the OCC regulates provide funding for
the agency.368 This relationship has the potential to erode the OCC’s
desire to make objective, negative assessments. The OCC’s desire to
keep its benefactors happy manifests itself, for example, in the steps it
takes to protect the companies it regulates from potentially costly
government attempts to protect consumers. To this end, the OCC has
intervened in the efforts of several state attorney generals to crack down
on credit card companies’ predatory practices.369 To halt these
investigations, the OCC successfully argued that it, not the attorney
generals’ offices, has sole jurisdiction over the institutions it regulates.370
Further, the CRA assessment process appears to be ripe for abuse
because it lacks definitive guidelines, allowing wide latitude for

364. See Keith D. Harvey et al., Disparities in Mortgage Lending, Bank Performance,
Economic Influence, and Regulatory Oversight, 23 J. REAL EST. FIN. & ECON. 379, 405–06
(2001) (reporting on a study which provided “no support for a regulatory response to CRA
ratings” and stating that other studies “may overstate the influence of regulatory factors on
lending outcomes”). But see Linda Fischer, CRA: How It Affects Communities and Banks,
BRIDGES, Summer 2003, at 4, 4, https://www.stlouisfed.org/~/media/Files/PDFs/publications
/pub_assets/pdf/br/2003/br_su_03.pdf [https://perma.cc/SA6X-EPSH] (suggesting that the
effects of the CRA are unclear).
365. 12 U.S.C. § 2903(a).
366. 12 U.S.C. §§ 248, 1811, 1813. The Office of Thrift Supervision also performed this
function before its dissolution in 2011. See 12 U.S.C. § 5412.
367. 12 U.S.C. § 24; GARCÍA ET AL., supra note 222, at 35.
368. 12 U.S.C. § 16; GARCÍA ET AL., supra note 222, at 35.
369. GARCÍA ET AL., supra note 222, at 35 (citing Samuel Issacharoff & Erin F. Delaney,
Credit Card Accountability 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 157, 161 & n.26 (2006)).
370. GARCÍA ET AL., supra note 222, at 35 (citing Credit Cards: They Really Are out to Get
You, CONSUMER REPS., Nov. 2005, at 12, 15).
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discretion.371 The system works as follows: after examining a lending
institution’s record serving low- and moderate-income (“LMI”)
communities, the FDIC regulator selects one of four ratings, which
include “Outstanding,” “Satisfactory” (which can be modified High or
Low), “Needs To Improve,” or “Substantial Noncompliance.”372 The
CRA does not list specific criteria for regulators’ evaluation of
compliance. The FDIC asserts, however, that it considers, among other
things, demographic data that reveals median income levels, household
income distribution, housing costs, and the banks’ self-reported product
offerings and business strategy.373
Upon receipt of a poor rating, a bank receives a plan for
improvement and must subsequently file public periodic reports
describing its progress toward correction.374 In New York, the law
prohibits banks with the poorest CRA ratings from holding public
deposits.375 Additionally, the rating can affect how frequently the
Federal Reserve makes future evaluations. A rating of Outstanding or
Satisfactory serves to reduce the subsequent number of times that the
Federal Reserve will assess a small bank.376
CRA ratings are available to the public on the Internet.377
Consumers’ ability to use this information to make decisions regarding
which bank they wish to patronize represents one of the disciplinary
371. See Barr, supra note 359, at 603–04 (describing the CRA’s “lack of clear rules,” that
many criticize but ultimately considering this one of the Act’s chief virtues).
372. 12 U.S.C. § 2906(b)(2).
373. 12 C.F.R. § 345.21(b) (2016).
374. See id. § 345.21(a)(4).
375. See N.Y. STATE FIN. LAW § 106(C) (McKinney, Westlaw through ch. 7 2017). New
York prohibits depositing state funds into a banking institution to which the CRA applies
unless the institution has received at least a “satisfactory” rating. See id. Iowa allows
substitution of the rating for a written statement (provided by the institution) that the
institution has complied with state requirements and has a commitment to community
reinvestment with a rating of satisfactory or higher. IOWA CODE ANN. § 12C.6A(2) (West,
Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess.). In Maine, the state treasurer must consider the rating. ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 135 (Westlaw through ch. 1 of the 1st Reg. Sess.). In Illinois, the
CRA rating “may” be considered. 30 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 235/8(a)(1) (West, Westlaw
through P.A. 99-937 of 2016 Reg. Sess.) (emphasis added). Nebraska requires subsidiary
banks of out-of-state banks to file a copy of the bank’s written evaluation per the CRA, but
does not require a Satisfactory CRA rating for these banks to receive public funds. NEB. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 72-1268.07 (West, Westlaw through 2016 2d Reg. Sess.). Louisiana repealed its
requirement for banks to have adequate ratings under the CRA in 2013. See Act No. 32, H.B.
No. 114, 2013 Reg. Sess. (La. 2013).
376. See 12 U.S.C. § 2908(a), (c); NAT’L CMTY. REINVESTMENT COAL., CRA MANUAL 25
(2007), http://www.ncrc.org/images/stories/pdf/cra_manual.pdf [https://perma.cc/GJ65-Z687].
Small banks are banks with less than $1.216 billion in assets. 12 C.F.R. § 228.12(u) (2016).
377. Community Reinvestment Act (CRA): CRA Ratings Search, BOARD GOVERNORS
FED. RES. SYS., http://www.federalreserve.gov/apps/crape/BankRating.aspx [https://perma.cc
/ZHJ9-3EQL].
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aspects of the rating system. Also, community groups or media outlets
may disseminate this information in efforts to affect a bank’s reputation
and potentially damage its bottom line. These options, however, were
primarily theoretical until amendments to the Act in 1989 and 1994
rendered the ratings more accessible to the public, making enforcement
through public pressure more viable.378 Simultaneously, with the
introduction of monolithic, nationwide banks through the Riegle-Neal
Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994,379 more
community groups devoted to the protection of consumer interests
emerged.380
The chief enforcement mechanism of the CRA is the possibility that
regulators will deny requests for mergers, acquisitions, closures,
relocations, and new branches based on poor CRA performance.381
Regulators can deny an application outright based on a poor rating, or
give conditional approval pending steps taken to improve
performance.382 In 1989, twelve years after its enactment, the Federal
Reserve first denied a proposed merger, between the Continental
Illinois Corporation and Grand Canyon State Bank, due to a poor
rating.383 Since then, enforcement through this method remains
extremely rare. In fact, a Federal Reserve Board official testified in 2007
that the agency held only thirteen public meetings on mergers in the
previous seventeen years, despite a trend toward major consolidations
during that period.384 Further, although the Board received 13,500
applications for mergers and new banks since 1988, it denied only

378. Community Reinvestment Act (CRA): CRA Ratings Search, supra note 377; see also
Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-328,
§ 110, 108 Stat. 2338, 2364–65 (codified as amended scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.); Financial
Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub L. No. 101-73, § 807(b),
103 Stat. 183, 527–28 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 2906 (2012)).
379. Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act § 110, 108 Stat. at 2364–
65.
380. Ellen Seidman, Don’t Blame the Community Reinvestment Act, AM. PROSPECT (June
26, 2009), http://prospect.org/article/dont-blame-community-reinvestment-act [https://perma
.cc/775K-B9KL].
381. 12 U.S.C. §§ 2902–03.
382. 12 C.F.R. § 25.29(d), 228.29, 345.29 (2016). See Allen J. Fishbein, The Community
Reinvestment Act After Fifteen Years: It Works, but Strengthened Federal Enforcement Is
Needed, 20 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 293, 297 (1993).
383. Cont’l Ill. Bancorp., Inc., 75 Fed. Res. Bull. 304, 306 (1989); Fishbein, supra note 382,
at 297.
384. John Taylor & Josh Silver, The Community Reinvestment Act: 30 Years of Wealth
Building and What We Must Do to Finish the Job, 4 COMMUNITY DEV. INV. REV., Feb. 2009,
at 148, 155.
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twenty-five of those proposals and rejected only eight due to consumer
protection or community-needs issues.385
Astonishingly, since the law’s inception in 1977, regulators have
awarded ninety-seven percent of the banks they evaluated a rating of
Satisfactory or Outstanding.386 These overwhelmingly positive
assessments fail to reflect the reality of low-income borrowers who find
themselves excluded from regular credit and banking institutions. In
fact, many households turn to exploitative alternative lending
businesses, such as payday lenders and pawn shops, to meet their credit
and banking needs.387 In turn, most banks focus on lucrative, wealthy
clients, and fail to improve community access to their services unless
required to do so to accomplish one of their own objectives.388 This
behavior is not unusual for a profit-seeking corporation. The desirability
of tempering shareholder satisfaction with community responsibility,
however, creates a need for regulatory intervention that the CRA
appears unable to satisfy.
Additionally, enforcement inconsistency renders some lending
institutions skeptical of the CRA’s power. For example, in 2010, two
New Jersey banks, Clifton Savings and Saddle River Valley, were the
first in the state to receive poor CRA ratings since 2004, despite New
Jersey’s significant, underserved LMI population.389 Both banks earned
a Needs To Improve rating.390 In response, Clifton postponed a stock

385. Id.
386. DARRYL E. GETTER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43661, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF
THE COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ACT 9 (2015); David Dayen, Banks Get Credit for Helping
the Poor—By Financing Their Evictions?, INTERCEPT (Aug. 24, 2015, 10:32 AM), https://
theintercept.com/2015/08/24/banks-get-credit-helping-poor-financing-evictions/ [https://perma
.cc/C8QX-376D].
387. GARCÍA ET AL., supra note 222, at 27.
388. See Lawrence White, Standard Chartered Targets Wealthier Customers in Retail Bank
Revamp, REUTERS (Feb. 9, 2015, 5:28 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-stanchart-retail
-idUSKBN0LD0E820150209 [https://perma.cc/Z8ZY-9KWJ].
389. OFFICE OF THRIFT SUPERVISION, COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ACT
PERFORMANCE EVALUATION: CLIFTON SAVINGS BANK 2 (2010) [hereinafter OFFICE OF
THRIFT SUPERVISION, CRA EVALUATION CLIFTON SAVINGS], https://www.occ.gov/static/cra
/craeval/OTS/CRAE_17988_20100907_65.pdf [https://perma.cc/E7MP-ZTU8]; OFFICE OF
THRIFT SUPERVISION, COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ACT PERFORMANCE EVALUATION:
SADDLE RIVER VALLEY BANK 2 (2010) [hereinafter OFFICE OF THRIFT SUPERVISION, CRA
EVALUATION SADDLE RIVER], https://www.occ.gov/static/cra/craeval/OTS/CRAE_01997
_20101227_59.pdf [https://perma.cc/GT32-EK8S]; Richard Newman, OTS Says 2 NJ Banks
Need to Improve Lending Practices, NORTHJERSEY.COM (Mar. 9, 2011), http://www
.northjersey.com/news/banks-failed-to-serve-poor-feds-say-1.167648 [https://perma.cc/NLU792B7].
390. OFFICE OF THRIFT SUPERVISION, CRA EVALUATION CLIFTON SAVINGS, supra note
389, at 2; OFFICE OF THRIFT SUPERVISION, CRA EVALUATION SADDLE RIVER, supra note
389, at 2. See Newman, supra note 389.
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offering originally planned for four days after the assessment became
public.391 In contrast, Saddle River experienced no ascertainable
consequences, and its CEO publicly expressed doubt that the rating
would serve as an obstacle to the bank’s plans for future expansion.392
A few years later, in 2014, national and state groups sought to block
the acquisition of the Florida bank First United Bancorp by New
Jersey’s Valley National Bancorp (“Valley”) based on Valley’s poor
record of lending to low-income and Black households.393 The
community groups referenced government data from 2012 revealing that
Valley made only 4.5% of its home loans to low-income individuals,
despite the fact that 41.5% of the households in northern New Jersey
and New York City are low-income.394 Similarly, Valley reportedly gave
only 1.5% of its home loans to Black households, which represented
20.5% of the area’s population.395 Nonetheless, Valley received a CRA
rating of High Satisfactory in 2013.396
In rare cases, regulators have taken into account deceptive or
predatory practices when making their assessments. In one such
departure from the norm, the OCC gave Woodforest National Bank a
Needs To Improve rating in 2012 based, not on its poor record of
community investment, but on its unfair and deceptive overdraft
program.397 The CRA report on this conduct led to a $32 million
settlement with the government.398 The OCC, however, did not release

391. See Newman, supra note 389.
392. Newman, supra note 389.
393. See Richard Newman, Housing Groups Urge Regulators to Block Valley National
Bancorp Purchase of Florida Bank, NORTHJERSEY.COM (July 17, 2014, 8:26 AM), http://www
.northjersey.com/news/business/protests-over-bank-deal-1.1052171 [https://perma.cc/ABJ85QDK]; Tess Stynes, Valley National to Buy 1st United Bancorp for $300 Million,
W ALL S T. J. (May 8, 2014, 9:27 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles
/SB10001424052702304431104579549623011989090 [https://perma.cc/8ZM5-6FGL].
394. Newman, supra note 393.
395. Newman, supra note 393.
396. OFFICE OF THRIFT SUPERVISION, COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ACT
PERFORMANCE EVALUATION: VALLEY NATIONAL BANK 2 (2013), https://www.occ.gov
/static/cra/craeval/jun14/15790.pdf [https://perma.cc/3R9F-5ZAZ]; Newman, supra note 393.
397. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, CHARTER NO. 16892,
COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ACT PERFORMANCE EVALUATION: WOODFOREST
NATIONAL BANK 2 (2012) https://www.occ.gov/static/cra/craeval/dec13/16892.PDF [https://
perma.cc/D2Q5-LZB5]; Collin Eaton, Banks Face Scrutiny to Repair Overdraft Policies,
Practices, HOUS. BUS. J. (Apr. 27, 2012, 10:50 AM), http://www.bizjournals.com/houston/blog
/money-makers/2012/04/how-banks-repair-overdraft-policies-prac.html [https://perma.cc/Q7VWFV4V (staff-uploaded archive)].
398. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, AGREEMENT BY AND
BETWEEN WOODFOREST NAT’L BANK AND THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY 8
(2010), https://www.occ.treas.gov/news-issuances/news-releases/2010/nr-occ-2010-122b.pdf
[https://perma.cc/C4RH-5XSR]; Eaton, supra note 397.
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the Needs To Improve rating to the public until close to three years
later.399
Similarly, the FDIC bestowed a Substantial Noncompliance rating
on Evergreen Bank Group because of the unusual practices of one of its
members, Oak Brook bank.400 Oak Brook engaged in a national
motorcycle lending business that offered variable interest rates, allowing
a dealer to mark up rates and keep additional profits for itself as the
originator of the loan.401 Based on this practice, the FDIC determined
that the bank treated similar borrowers differently, in violation of the
CRA’s principles.402 In response to the Substantial Noncompliance
rating, Oak Brook shifted to a flat fee arrangement with its dealers.403
Eagle Bank, based in Missouri, also made some changes based on a
poor CRA rating. After receiving a Needs To Improve rating in 2012,404
Eagle opened a branch in an economically diverse neighborhood.405 This
new branch offered postal services and the ability to pay utility bills free
of charge.406 Eagle also partnered with a number of other banks to create
a construction loan fund for women and minority contractors featuring
“relaxed qualifying criteria.”407 In May 2014, Eagle received a revised
rating of Satisfactory.408 Similarly, in West Virginia, WesBanco’s CRA
399. COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY ADM’R FOR NAT’L BANKS, CHARTER NO.
16892, COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ACT PERFORMANCE EVALUATION: WOODFOREST
NATIONAL BANK 2 (2012) https://www.occ.gov/static/cra/craeval/dec13/16892.PDF [https://
perma.cc/D2Q5-LZB5]; Eaton, supra note 397.
400. Complaint at 5, United States v. Evergreen Bank Corp., No. 1:15-cv-04059 (N.D. Ill.
May 7, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/file/evergreen-complaint/download [https://perma.cc
/T9T5-HLVS]; Steve Daniels, Feds Slap Oak Brook Bank over National Motorcycle Lending
Business, CHI. BUS.: CRAIN’S (Mar. 4, 2014), http://www.chicagobusiness.com/article/20140304
/NEWS01/140309919/feds-slap-oak-brook-bank-over-national-motorcycle-lending-business
[https://perma.cc/7TXH-4J8W].
401. Complaint, supra note 400, at 2; Daniels, supra note 400.
402. Complaint, supra note 400, at 4–5; Daniels, supra note 400.
403. Daniels, supra note 400.
404. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., NO. 17691, COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ACT
PERFORMANCE EVALUATION: EAGLE BANK AND TRUST 2 (2012), https://www5.fdic.gov
/crapes/2012/17691_120521.PDF [https://perma.cc/US8D-4SM6].
405. Lisa Brown, Eagle Bank Gets Low Rating on CRA Evaluation, STLTODAY.COM
(Aug. 5, 2013), http://www.stltoday.com/business/local/eagle-bank-gets-low-rating-on-craevaluation/article_d0ae7c93-790e-5389-bc34-3e4b8528099f.html [https://perma.cc/A6N6-HCH4].
406. Id.
407. Rebecca Rivas, Regional Leaders Start Loan Fund for Minority and Women
Contractors, ST. LOUIS AM. (June 4, 2015), http://www.stlamerican.com/business/local_business
/article_5d1b1974-0a40-11e5-afb6-f79a4dd7f2f9.html [https://perma.cc/KC3Y-3WDQ].
408. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., NO. 17691, COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ACT
PERFORMANCE EVALUATION: EAGLE BANK AND TRUST 2 (2012), https://www5.fdic.gov
/crapes/2014/17691_140512.PDF [https://perma.cc/J7R3-R3XZ]; Lisa Brown, Eagle Bank
Opening Central West End Branch in September, STLTODAY.COM (Feb. 12, 2015), http://www
.stltoday.com/business/columns/building-blocks/eagle-bank-opening-central-west-end-branch-
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assessment reported poor performance based on failure to make
sufficient loans to minorities and LMI borrowers.409 The bank appealed
its initial rating and ultimately passed the exam, but the delay caused by
the appeal process postponed regulatory approval of a desired merger.410
WesBanco consequently increased its lending to its underserved
constituents.411
In California, a community group, California Reinvestment
Coalition, negotiated with Banc of California pending the bank’s
acquisition of twenty former Banco Popular branches.412 As a result of
this discussion, the bank committed to devoting twenty percent of its
annual deposit earnings to public benefits and charitable lending for
low-income members of the community.413 On several other occasions,
proposed mergers have given community groups opportunities to lobby
banks to make pledges to improve their CRA performance.414 A
National Community Reinvestment Coalition (“NCRC”) report stated
that banks have made $4.5 trillion in CRA agreements and
commitments to LMI and minority communities,415 which may be due in
part to this type of community pressure. Also, after the report’s release,
in-september/article_0140d1ab-8da7-5ffe-8684-8c95669a0e90.html [https://perma.cc/JQL7QHHL]. Additionally, national bank BBVA Compass Bancshares, Inc. pledged $11 billion in
loans and investments to LMI customers and promised to fund a series of technology and
outreach programs Press Release, In First Full Year of Its $11 Billion Commitment, BBVA
Compass Puts 5,427 Families into Homes, Boosted 24,019 Small Businesses, BBVA COMPASS
(Apr. 20, 2016), http://newsroom.bbvacompass.com/press_releases?item=132867 [https://
perma.cc/9TPP-H6G4]; Michael Seale, BBVA Compass Improves CRA Rating, BIRMINGHAM
BUS. J. (Apr. 20, 2016, 3:47 PM), http://www.bizjournals.com/birmingham/news/2016/04/20/bbva
-compass-improves-cra-rating.html [https://perma.cc/88PT-S6AH (staff-uploaded archive)].
409. FED. RESERVE BANK OF CLEVELAND, RSSD: 645625, COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT
ACT PERFORMANCE EVALUATION: WESBANCO BANK, INC., 45, 61, 101 (2007), https://www
.clevelandfed.org/banking-oversight/financial-system-supervisors/~/media/Files/Banking
%20Oversight/CRA%20PEs/2007/645625.pdf [https://perma.cc/TJ28-88PQ]; Taylor &
Silver, supra note 384, at 149.
410. Laura K. Thompson, CRA Victory for WesBanco of W.Va., AM. BANKER (Nov. 13,
2001, 2:00 AM), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/cra-victory-for-wesbanco-of-wva
[https://perma.cc/46QC-NQRU (staff-uploaded archive)]; Taylor & Silver, supra note 384, at
149.
411. Taylor & Silver, supra note 384, at 149.
412. E. Scott Reckard, Groups Urge U.S. to Reject CIT Takeover of OneWest Bank, L.A.
TIMES (Oct. 14, 2014, 5:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-onewest-cit-protest20141014-story.html [https://perma.cc/BJU8-R38A].
413. See Letter from Steven Sugarman, President & CEO, Banc of Cal. 1 (Aug. 25, 2014),
http://www.calreinvest.org/system/resources/W1siZiIsIjIwMTQvMDkvMDQvMTlfNTR
fNTlfNDg2X0JhbmNfb2ZfQ2FsaWZvcm5pYV9DUkFfUGxhbi5wZGYiXV0/Banc%20of
%20California%20CRA%20Plan.pdf [https://perma.cc/VMG6-VZ4Z]; Reckard, supra note 412.
414. Taylor & Silver, supra note 384, at 149.
415. NAT’L CMTY. REINVESTMENT COAL., CRA COMMITMENTS 4 (2007), http://www
.ncrc.org/images/stories/whatWeDo_promote/cra_commitments_07.pdf [https://perma.cc
/SVU8-Z36Y]; Taylor & Silver, supra note 384, at 149.
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Bank of America pledged a further $1.5 trillion to LMI lending during
its acquisition of Countrywide.416 The NCRC report also spurred further
study by Federal Reserve economists, who concluded that banks make
more home loans in areas covered by CRA agreements than in those
where no pledges exist.417
Additionally, community groups sometimes leverage CRA ratings
simply for the opportunity to acquire a voice in the discussion of a
bank’s proposed movements. For example, in 2015, several groups
succeeded in persuading the Federal Reserve to hold a public hearing on
the planned acquisition of OneWest Bank in Pasadena by New Yorkbased CIT Group Inc. due to CRA-related concerns.418
Following this, albeit limited, success, activists sought a similar
opportunity to voice their concerns about Royal Bank of Canada’s
proposed $5.4 billion takeover of Los Angeles’s City National Corp.
(“National”), relying in part on National’s CRA rating to insist on a
public hearing.419 According to a representative of the Los Angeles
Latino Chamber of Commerce, National catered primarily to wealthy
clients, providing no services to East Los Angeles’s substantial Latino
population, thereby widening the city’s racial wealth divide.420 In 2012,
the OCC gave National a rating of Satisfactory because it made some
loans to small businesses, despite the fact that most of its mortgage
lending was to wealthy homeowners.421 Seeking to reduce opposition to
the takeover from the Latino community, and in spite of its Satisfactory
rating, National pledged to expand its commitments under the CRA and
designate over $11 billion over five years for low-income customers and
small businesses.422 The new pledge carved out mortgages specifically for
minority borrowers.423

416. Taylor & Silver, supra note 384, at 149 (citing Press Release, Bank of America Details
Community Development, Foreclosure Relief Goals, BANK AM. (Apr. 28, 2008), http://
newsroom.bankofamerica.com/index.php?s=press_releases&item=8152 [https://perma.cc
/U9RD-ZEXH]).
417. Raphael W. Bostic & Breck L. Robinson, Do CRA Agreements Influence Lending
Patterns?, 31 REAL EST. ECON. 23, 23 (2003); Taylor & Silver, supra note 384, at 149.
418. Reckard, supra note 412.
419. E. Scott Reckard, City National Critics Want ‘Bank to the Stars’ to ‘Cater to the Poor’,
L.A. TIMES (Apr. 30, 2015, 7:32 AM), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-city-national-rbccra-20150423-story.html [https://perma.cc/97J9-DJFG].
420. See id. (recounting a comment from Gilbert R. Vasquez, chairman of the Los Angeles
Latino Chamber of Commerce).
421. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT
ACT PERFORMANCE EVALUATION: CITY NATIONAL BANK 2 (2012), https://www.occ.gov
/static/cra/craeval/may14/14695.pdf [https://perma.cc/XJ68-ZBCV]; Reckard, supra note 419.
422. City National Announces New $11 Billion, Five-Year Community Commitment, CITY
NAT’L BANK (Apr. 24, 2015), https://newsroom.cnb.com/news/city-national-announces-new-
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Concerned community activists in San Francisco similarly hoped to
wield some power from the threat of poor CRA ratings to change the
policies of First Republic Bank, a lending institution that reportedly
services primarily wealthy customers.424 In August 2015, protesters
picketed outside First Republic Bank’s headquarters in an effort to stop
it from contributing to the displacement of the city’s residents.425 First
Republic Bank allegedly provided loans to real estate investors who
purchased property in San Francisco, evicted low-income and elderly
tenants, and then sold the buildings to rich homeowners through
California’s legal loophole of “tenancy in common” ownership.426
California’s Ellis Act makes these evictions legal, despite the harm they
do to low-income tenants who lack political clout.427 The California
Reinvestment Coalition claims that First Republic Bank’s loans violate
the CRA because they intentionally push renters out of the city instead
of serving their needs.428
In 2011, the FDIC gave First Republic Bank’s lending practice a
rating of Low Satisfactory.429 The FDIC stated that First Republic
Bank’s “distribution of borrowers reflects poor penetration among retail
customers of different income levels and business customers of different
revenue sizes, given the product lines offered by the bank.”430 In light of
this statement and the claims of protesters, the rating, although low,
seems generous. Moreover, it seems unlikely that it will have any
negative impact on the bank. For example, Boston’s OneUnited Bank, a
similar lending institution, received a Needs To Improve rating based

11-billion-%E2%80%A8five-year-community-commitment [https://perma.cc/XKF7-RE3V];
Reckard, supra note 419.
423. City National Announces New $11 Billion, Five-Year Community Commitment, supra
note 422.
424. Darwin BondGraham, Tenants Accuse San Francisco Bank of Financing Evictions, E.
BAY EXPRESS (Aug. 18, 2015), http://m.eastbayexpress.com/SevenDays/archives/2015/08/18
/tenants-accuse-san-francisco-bank-of-financing-evictions [https://perma.cc/5T4J-KW6X].
425. Id.; see also Dayen, supra note 386.
426. BondGraham, supra note 424.
427. See CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 7060–7060.7 (West, Westlaw through Ch.3 of 2017 Reg.
Sess.); Lisa T. Alexander, Occupying the Constitutional Right to Housing, 94 NEB. L. REV.
245, 247–48 (2015) (describing the ill effects of the Act).
428. BondGraham, supra note 424; Paulina Gonzales, CRC Guest Blog: Families Win
When Banks Stop Funding Displacement, MEDA (Feb. 18, 2016), http://medasf.org/crc-guestblog-families-win-banks-stop-funding-displacement/ [https://perma.cc/DVF4-7PQZ].
429. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., NO. 59017, COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ACT
PERFORMANCE EVALUATION: FIRST REPUBLIC BANK, at 2 (2011), https://www5.fdic.gov
/crapes/2011/59017_111031.PDF [https://perma.cc/H35J-Z7EG].
430. Id.
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upon its poor lending performance to low-income individuals,431 but still
received the approval it sought for a bank closure.432
Consequently, despite the occasional and notable opportunities that
the CRA affords for greater community investment, leading scholars
have criticized the law extensively from its inception.433 Much of this
criticism focuses on its lack of effective enforcement mechanisms and
the apparent collusion between regulators and the institutions they
supervise.434 Despite the large arsenal of possible enforcement actions
available, including cease and desist orders, formal agreements, and civil
monetary penalties, Congress decided not to institute any of these as
penalties for CRA non-compliance.435 Critics also point to the sporadic
nature of evaluations and uneven or non-existent consequences for noncompliance.436
Even worse, some banks’ responses to potentially poor CRA
ratings do more harm than good to households in need. For example,
431. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., NO. 23966, COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ACT
PERFORMANCE EVALUATION: ONEUNITED BANK 2 (2013), http://www.mass.gov/ocabr/docs
/dob/community-reinvestment-act/bosboc.pdf [https://perma.cc/RLL3-E4AK].
432. Dierdre Fernandes, OneUnited Bank Closes L.A. Branch, BOS. GLOBE (Feb. 18,
2015), https://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2015/02/18/oneunited-closes-branch-that-waspart-its-expansion/yiKGhib1cV2AjVRsEJ598H/story.html [https://perma.cc/QF6A-AUF4];
Beth Healy, OneUnited Bank Gets ‘Needs to Improve’ on Community Lending, BOS, GLOBE
(Nov. 6, 2014), https://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2014/11/06/oneunited-bank-gets-needsimprove-community-lending/ZWKcneQUTGsjusdhgveKSJ/story.html [https://perma.cc/76VY
-FMDV].
433. See, e.g., Barr, supra note 299, at 519, 526–33; Raymond H. Brescia, Part of the
Disease or Part of the Cure: The Financial Crisis and the Community Reinvestment Act, 60 S.C.
L. REV. 617, 626–27 (2009); Raymond H. Brescia, The Community Reinvestment Act: Guilty,
but Not as Charged, 88 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1, 11–17 (2014); Cassandra Jones Havard,
Advancing the CRA—Using the CRA’s Strategic Plan Option to Promote Community
Inclusion: The CRA and Community Inclusion, 29 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 37, 44–47 (2006);
Brent J. Horton, In Defense of Private-Label Mortgage-Backed Securities, 61 FLA. L. REV.
827, 863 (2009); Keith N. Hylton, Development Lending and the Community Reinvestment
Act, 29 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 59, 67–69 (2006); Keith N. Hylton & Vincent D. Rougeau,
Lending Discrimination: Economic Theory, Econometric Evidence, and the Community
Reinvestment Act, 85 GEO. L.J. 237, 241–46 (1996); Michael Klausner, Market Failure and
Community Investment: A Market-Oriented Alternative to the Community Reinvestment Act,
143 U. PA. L. REV. 1561, 1592–93 (1995); A. Brooke Overby, The Community Reinvestment
Act Reconsidered, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1431, 1453–58 (1995).
434. See Barr, supra note 299, at 528–30 (cataloging arguments against the CRA).
435. Compare 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b)(1) (2012) (allowing federal agencies to bring cease and
desist actions against financial institutions for “unsafe or unsound practice[s,]” violations of
law, or breach of agreements with regulators), with id. § 2906(1) (requiring agencies to write
reports evaluating “the institution’s record of meeting the credit needs of its entire
community”).
436. See GETTER, supra note 386, at 8 (2015); Barr, supra note 299, at 529; Lawrence J.
White, Essay, The Community Reinvestment Act: Good Goals, Flawed Concept, COMMUNITY
DEV. INV. REV., Feb. 2009, at 185, 187; Mark Willis, It’s the Rating, Stupid: A Banker’s
Perspective on the CRA, COMMUNITY DEV. INV. REV., Feb. 2009, at 59, 59.
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many banks simply move out of underserved areas, leaving a gap that
exploitative fringe lenders are delighted to fill.437 In Chicago, for
instance, low-income neighborhoods are home to only 2.3% of the city’s
full-service banking branches.438 Moreover, savvy banks, such as
JPMorgan and Wells Fargo, create partnerships with check cashing
outlets and pay day lenders that remain to serve the areas that the banks
no longer occupy.439 By financing these ventures, the banks have the
potential to profit twofold from their flight from economically depressed
areas, making greater yields elsewhere while keeping a hand in the
earnings from the poor they leave behind.440 The CRA’s regulations do
nothing to address or prevent these practices.
Additionally, the CRA does not establish concrete guidelines for
best practices, such as quotas for lending to LMI and minority
individuals and businesses.441 It also does not require regulators to use
an objective scale to determine best practices.442 Regulators simply
compare banks to each other, and the different regulators do not
coordinate or align their criteria.443 Significantly, banks that do business
over the Internet can evade thorough CRA assessment due to the
difficulty in accurately identifying the geographic scope of their
clientele.444 Also, unsurprisingly, regulators generally establish
437. See Michael A. Stegman, Kelly Thompson Cochran & Robert Faris, Toward a More
Performance-Driven Service Test: Strengthening Basic Banking Services Under the Community
Reinvestment Act, 9 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 405, 445 (2002).
438. GARCÍA ET AL., supra note 222, at 27.
439. See KEVIN CONNOR & MATTHEW SKOMAROVSKY, THE PREDATORS’ CREDITORS:
HOW THE BIGGEST BANKS ARE BANKROLLING THE PAYDAY LOAN INDUSTRY 3 (2011),
http://public-accountability.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/payday-final-091410.pdf [https://
perma.cc/7QTU-PYFY]; Alexander Eichler, Banks Increasingly Use Payday Loans Despite
Crackdown on Predatory Lending: Study, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 21, 2011), http://www
.huffingtonpost.com/2011/07/22/payday-loans-banks_n_906765.html [https://perma.cc/LL56ZAPF]; Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Major Banks Aid in Payday Loans Banned by States, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 23, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/24/business/major-banks-aid-in-paydayloans-banned-by-states.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/X9BN-NVPA].
440. See Eichler, supra note 439.
441. See Willis, supra note 436, at 60.
442. Id. at 60–63.
443. Id. at 66.
444. See 12 U.S.C. § 2901(a)(1) (2012) (“[R]egulated financial institutions are required by
law to demonstrate that their deposit facilities serve the convenience and the needs of the
communities in which they are chartered to do business[.]”); see also Raymond H. Brescia,
The Community Reinvestment Act: Guilty, But Not as Charged, 88 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1, 27
(2014) (“[A] bank's CRA assessment areas are those communities in which that bank has
branches, ATMs, or does a substantial amount of its lending.”); Beetham, supra note 360, at
913, 924–928 (1998) (noting that “regulators are grappling with how to apply the CRA to the
growing number of institutions on-line”); Oliver A Thoenen, Comment, Functional
Obsolescence: The Community Reinvestment Act the Dilemma of Internet Banking Regulation,
5 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. 425, 425, 440–44 (2001) (arguing that “in the absence of
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relationships with the banks that they oversee, not the communities that
the CRA requires them to serve. Finally, although discriminatory
lending provides grounds for a poor rating, it appears that regulators do
no more than a cursory inquiry into whether this type of conduct is
occurring.445
These copious critiques of the CRA suggest that a complete
overhaul is necessary to give teeth to the Act and effectively prevent
exploitation and neglect of the poor by lending institutions. Nonetheless,
the principles behind the CRA remain strong, and lend themselves
nicely to a refashioning of the law into a tool to reduce or eliminate
discrimination.446 The following Part proposes amendments to the
CARD Act that draw on these principles.
III. CALL TO REFORM CONSUMER LAW BASED ON
REHABILITATIVE REPARATIONS THEORY
In light of the failure of the present legal regime to redress and
deter racial discrimination against credit card consumers, it is instructive
to turn to models outside of the ECOA’s anti-discrimination context for
potential solutions. The reparations movement has long recognized that
racially subordinated groups’ inferior social and economic statuses arise
from historical and present injustices, and that the entities complicit in
creating these conditions should take affirmative steps to transform
them.447 Rehabilitative reparations focus on group, as opposed to
individual, compensation for past harms.448 Slavery disclosure laws
embody this theory of rehabilitative reparations by holding
corporations, in addition to governments, responsible for their role in
perpetuating and exploiting economic disparities based on social
congressional action, the CRA will become functionally irrelevant with regard to Internet
banking services because of the inherent geographic limitations of the existing regulatory
scheme under the statute”).
445. Taylor & Silver, supra note 384, at 156 (“In most cases, even for the largest banks, the
fair-lending section of the CRA exam reports in one to three sentences that the regulatory
agency tested for evidence of illegal and discriminatory lending and that no such lending was
found. Yet there is no discussion of what precisely had been done to reach its conclusion. In
the past, agencies provided detailed descriptions in the fair-lending section of CRA exams
under the “assessment factor” format of the exams. For example, under Assessment Factor F,
which assessed evidence of discriminatory or illegal practices, the Federal Reserve Bank of
Richmond in January 1996 conducted matched file reviews of more than 300 loan applications
in a CRA exam of Signet Bank. The exam also described a regression analysis, which sought
to determine if race was a factor in loan rejections.” (footnote omitted)).
446. See generally THE IMPACT OF PUBLIC POLICY ON CONSUMER CREDIT (Thomas A.
Durkin & Michael E. Staten eds., 2002) (discussing the issues surrounding consumer credit
markets at the beginning of the twenty-first century and current policy debate).
447. See Yamamoto et al., supra note 205, at 2–3.
448. See infra notes 492–93 and accompanying text.
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inequality and injustice.449 These laws, by requiring disclosure, advance
one of the reparations movement’s main goals of truth-telling.450
This Part interrogates rehabilitative reparations’ focus on
community, instead of individual, repair, as well as slavery disclosure
laws’ ability to hold corporations accountable for their complicity in
racial injustice. It argues that the principles behind rehabilitative
reparations and slavery disclosure laws establish a framework and
support for requiring credit card companies that engage in racial
discrimination or exploit racial inequality to make reparative
investments into the communities they harm. The Part begins with a
proposal to reform consumer law by enacting those requirements.
A. Proposal to Reform Consumer Law
The CARD Act should require credit card corporations held to
discriminate against consumers based on race to make significant
financial investments into the harmed communities. The definition of
“discrimination” under the law should encompass, in addition to explicit
racism, unconscious, implicit, and structural racism, demonstrable
through statistical racial disparities that do not correlate to credit risk, as
revealed in compulsory, frequent, and public reports. These reporting
requirements should follow the model provided by the Home Mortgage
Disclosure Act (“HMDA”), and include the race, gender, and income of
credit card applicants and borrowers, in addition to price data.
Although the failure of HMDA’s disclosure requirements to
prevent racial discrimination in mortgage lending casts some doubt on
the potential of disclosure to lead to reform,451 it is possible that HMDA
simply does not go far enough in its reporting requirements.452 To be
useful, reporting must be comprehensive, and include every factor that
goes into the creditworthiness determination, including neighborhood,
affinities, and Facebook friends. Further, disclosure alone is insufficient
to transform entrenched and profitable policies. Instead, accountability
must form part of the law and the law must not be dependent on public
response for enforcement.
The cost of these investments should serve to deter credit card
companies from further discrimination, and their substance should
facilitate considerable economic growth in the communities that receive
449. See infra Section III.C.
450. See infra note 473–75 and accompanying text.
451. See Cassandra Jones Havard, Post-Racial Lending?, 24 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 176,
183 (2014).
452. Charles M. Lamb, et. al, HMDA, Housing Segregation, and Racial Disparities in
Mortgage Lending, 12 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 249, 277–82 (2016).
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them. For example, the investment might consist of the building and
continued funding of educational institutions, affordable housing, or
medical or legal clinics; large-scale business lending; or other significant
support for projects designed to provide economic stability, essential
and affordable services, and substantial entrepreneurial opportunities.
The identification of companies engaged in culpable conduct would
occur through reporting requirements mandating disclosure of predatory
practices such as credit card redlining, as well as detailed data that would
reveal unwarranted disparities: which consumers, classified by race and
other protected categories, receive which cards, and under which terms.
The studies conducted by Chi-Jack Lin453 and Ethan Cohen-Cole454
documenting racial discrimination in the industry would provide
direction on how to structure and analyze these disclosures.
The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau should oversee these
disclosures and create guidelines to establish the threshold of allowable
disparities and appropriate consequences that correspond to culpability.
The public nature of the disclosures would also facilitate community
response to revealed discrimination, which can encourage compliance
and, in some cases, lead to even more extensive, voluntary changes.
The models for this proposal are the concept of rehabilitative
reparations, which seeks redress for harms to racial groups through
efforts directed at communities, instead of individuals;455 and slavery
disclosure laws, which attempt to hold corporations accountable for
profits derived from racist and exploitative practices.456 These innovative
laws have elicited a number of substantial contributions from
corporations to the Black community, despite the fact that the law does
not require them.457 Taking these types of laws one step further, by
compelling corporate investment in response to discriminatory practices,
would encourage lenders to eliminate these practices through
reconfiguration of the credit industry’s business model from one based
on exploiting the most vulnerable consumers to one offering competitive
services to consumers willing and able to pay for them.

453. See generally Lin, supra note 152 (finding statistical discrimination in the consumer
credit market against Black and Hispanic consumers).
454. See generally Cohen-Cole, supra note 155 (finding evidence of race-based differences
in the availability of credit).
455. See infra notes 492–94 and accompanying text.
456. See infra Section III.C.
457. See id.
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Rehabilitative Reparations

The reparations movement has gone through many transformations
throughout history, encompassing a variety of wrongs committed against
racial groups, from Japanese internment to the overthrow of the
Hawaiian monarchy to slavery.458 This analysis focuses on slavery
reparations. Although there is a broad range of opinions concerning
what might, if anything, suffice to repair the lasting and monumental
harms of slavery, reparations scholars generally agree that, in addition to
acknowledgment and apology, some form of reconciliatory action or
gesture is necessary.459
In contrast, some opponents of reparations assert that, in a postracial United States, slavery no longer has lingering effects.460 For
example, many post-racialists view the fact that Americans elected a
Black President twice as evidence that racial barriers no longer exist in
this country.461 Critical race scholars, in response, assert that Black
exceptionalism is not evidence of the end of racism.462 Instead, in some
cases, Obama’s presidency led to increased racial hostility toward
Blacks.463
The legal institution of slavery allowed for the cementing of White
economic and social privilege through law. Since its abolishment, there

458. For a historical overview of the American reparations movement, see Kaimipono
David Wenger, From Radical to Practical (And Back Again?): Reparations, Rhetoric, and
Revolution, J.C.R. & ECON. DEV. 697, 698–705 (2011); Yamamoto et al., supra note 205, 16–
21.
459. See generally, e.g., Alfred Brophy, Reconsidering Reparations, 81 IND. L.J. 811
(discussing various reparations theories and offering a new view for the moral basis of
reparations theories); Yamamoto et al., supra note 205 (discussing disagreement between
reparations scholars and offering a “social healing through justice” framework).
460. Eric K. Yamamoto, Racial Reparations: Japanese American Redress and African
American Claims, 40 B.C. L. REV. 477, 491 (1998) (citing Vincene Verdun, If the Shoe Fits,
Wear It: An Analysis of Reparations to African Americans, 67 TUL. L. REV. 597, 607 (1993)).
461. See, e.g., R. Drew Smith, Introduction to CONTESTING POST-RACIALISM:
CONFLICTED CHURCHES IN THE UNITED STATES AND SOUTH AFRICA 3 (R. Drew Smith et
al. eds., 2015); Shelby Steele, Obama’s Post-Racial Promise, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 5, 2008), http://
www.latimes.com/opinion/opinion-la/la-oe-steele5-2008nov05-story.html [https://perma.cc
/BP8C-CEYB] (exploring ideas of a post-racial America after the Obama election).
462. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 461, at 3. Oprah is another person often held up as an
example of why racism no longer exists in the United States. See, e.g., Tim Wise, The Oprah
Effect: Black Success, White Denial and the Reality of Racism, TIM WISE (July 28, 2006),
http://www.timwise.org/2006/07/the-oprah-effect-black-success-white-denial-and-the-reality-of
-racism/ [https://perma.cc/8P53-SXXG].
463. See Mario Barnes & Angela Onwuachi-Willig, The Obama Effect: Understanding
Emerging Meanings of Obama in Anti-Discrimination Law, 87 IND. L.J. 325, 327 (2012); see,
e.g., Peniel Joseph, Obama’s Effort to Heal Racial Divisions and Uplift Black America, WASH.
POST (Apr. 22, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/national/obama-legacy
/racism-during-presidency.html [https://perma.cc/YC3B-2Z4R].
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have been concerted and continuing efforts to maintain the financial
advantages it established for Whites.464 Laws and policies supporting
these efforts include, inter alia, Jim Crow laws,465 the Social Security
Act,466 the GI Bill,467 the Fair Housing Act,468 and the allocation of loans
and benefits to farmers by the Department of Agriculture.469
Reparations scholar Roy Brooks asserts that this history of
discrimination renders Blacks who are living in the United States today
direct victims of slavery.470 This perspective counters the contentions
that reparations are irrelevant or inappropriate because slaves and all of
their direct descendants are long deceased.471
Supporting Brooks’ claim, a quick look at statistics related to
wealth, income, health, and other measurements of societal success
reveals that, in fact, Blacks and other groups historically subject to
adverse social and legal treatment continue to lag behind Whites
significantly.472 Some social critics argue that these disparities arise from
464. See ROITHMAYR, supra note 44, at 6; Joy Milligan, Protecting Disfavored Minorities:
Towards Institutional Realism, 63 UCLA L. REV. 894, 918–21 (2016) (describing racial
inequality in U.S. Department of Agriculture farm aid); Juan F. Perea, Doctrines of Delusion:
How the History of the G.I. Bill and Other Inconvenient Truths Undermind the Supreme
Court’s Affirmative Action Jurisprudence, 75 U. PITT. L. REV. 583, 586–89 (1995) (connecting
Jim Crow laws, the G.I. Bill, and the Social Security Act to the continued entrenchment of
white supremacy); Reginald Leamon Robinson, The Racial Limits of the Fair Housing Act:
The Intersection of Dominant White Images, the Violence of Neighborhood Purity, and the
Master Narrative of Black Inferiority, 37 WM. & MARY L. REV. 69, 71–74 (1995) (connecting
the failures of the FHA to the furtherance of White supremacy).
465. See, e.g., An Act to Amend and Consolidate the Military Laws of North Carolina, ch.
47, § 1-4852, 1913 N.C. Sess. Laws 82, 82; Act of May 5, 1908, ch. 77, § 6, 1908 Okla. Sess.
Laws 694, 695.
466. Social Security Act, Pub. L. No. 74-271, 49 Stat. 620 (1935) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
467. Servicemen’s Readjustment Act of 1944 (G.I. Bill), Pub. L. No. 78-346, 58 Stat. 284
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 38 U.S.C.).
468. Fair Housing Act, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 81, 81–90 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 3601–3631 (2012)).
469. See, e.g., In re Black Farmers Discrimination Litig., 856 F. Supp. 2d 1, 14, 41–42
(D.D.C. 2011) (approving a settlement agreement between the USDA and African-American
farmers who were discriminated against on the basis of race in connection with federal farm
credit transaction or benefit application).
470. See Roy L. Brooks, The House Apologizes for Slavery and Segregation, RACISM REV.
(Aug. 7, 2008), http://www.racismreview.com/blog/2008/08/07/the-house-apologizes-forslavery-and-segregation/#more-452 [https://perma.cc/U8TN-E36G] (“The victims of Jim Crow
are as alive today as were the victims of internment in 1988.”).
471. See BORIS I. BITTKER, THE CASE FOR BLACK REPARATIONS 9–10 (1973)
(recounting these arguments and stating that when reparations are viewed as “back wages”
for slavery, arguments that wrongdoers and victims are long gone are difficult to refute);
Douglas G. Smith, An End, or Prelude, to Further Litigation in the Reparations Movement?,
ENGAGE, Feb. 2007, at 22, 22 (listing counter arguments).
472. See Braden Goyette & Alissa Scheller, 15 Charts That Prove We’re Far from PostRacial, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 3, 2016), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/07/02/civil-
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racially based cultural and personal inadequacies.473 On the contrary,
they are evidence that the United States has failed to reverse the harms
that its legal and political institutions have inflicted on Blacks and other
groups subject to hegemony and occupation, such as Latinos, Native
Americans, and Native Hawaiians.474 Reparations thus represent
continued efforts to right these wrongs in tangible and meaningful ways
that would allow Blacks and other historically marginalized groups to
gain social and financial, not just formal, equality.
In addition to seeking substantive results, there are rhetorical and
psychological objectives underlying reparations advocacy. These goals
include revealing and acknowledging truths, making apologies, and
creating space for healing both within oppressed communities and in the
relationships between the still-dominant White society and oppressed
groups.475 To these ends, some reparations advocates have sought to
establish truth commissions.476 Following this model, Brown University
voluntarily formed a commission to investigate its history of slavery.477
Additionally, Georgetown University’s president announced that it
would accord legacy status to descendants of the slaves that the
university sold in 1838.478

rights-act-anniversary-racism-charts_n_5521104.html [https://perma.cc/55RA-57KQ] (citing
JOHN R. LOGAN, BROWN UNIV., US2010 PROJECT: SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL: THE
NEIGHBORHOOD GAP FOR BLACKS, HISPANICS AND ASIANS IN METROPOLITAN AREAS
(2011), https://s4.ad.brown.edu/Projects/Diversity/Data/Report/report0727.pdf [https://perma
.cc/XDH2-W659]).
473. See JAMES M. JONES, PREJUDICE AND RACISM 13–15 (2d ed. 1997) (describing
individual, institutional, and cultural racism). Many scholars have recognized that in our lived
experiences it is quite difficult to separate cultural from institutional racism, especially when
our analytical focus turns to unintentional acts of racism. See Anthony Cook, Essay, Cultural
Racism and the Limits of Rationality in the Saga of Rodney King, 70 DENV. U. L. REV. 297,
297 (1993).
474. See Yamamoto, supra note 460, at 480.
475. See Adjoa A. Aiyetoro & Adrienne D. Davis, Historic and Modern Social Movements
for Reparations: The National Coalition of Blacks for Reparations in America (N’COBRA)
and Its Antecedents, 16 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 687, 689 (2010); Kaimipono David Wenger,
“Too Big to Remedy?” Rethinking Mass Restitution for Slavery and Jim Crow, 44 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 177, 227–30 (2010).
476. See Yamamoto et al., supra note 205, at 4, 6 (discussing truth commissions used in
Indonesia and Tulsa).
477. Claudia Irene Janssen, Addressing Corporate Ties to Slavery: Corporate Apologia in a
Discourse of Reconciliation, 63 COMM. STUD. 18, 21 (2012) (citing Glenn C. Loury, Brown
University to Consider Reparations on Account of the Institution’s Past Ties to Slavery, J.
BLACKS HIGHER EDUC., Spring 2004, at 18).
478. Terry L. Jones, Georgetown Slave Descendants Bring in Legal Team to Help Negotiate
with University on Reparations, ADVOCATE (Mar. 23, 2017), http://www.theadvocate.com
/baton_rouge/news/communities/westside/article_b221befe-0f26-11e7-8783-330932e2f352.html
[https://perma.cc/RS4T-ZY95].
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Jeffrey Brown argues that structural reparations designed to
facilitate “internal cultural repair” should take priority over litigationcentered strategies intended to compensate individuals for their losses,
due to the need to heal a damaged collective psyche that has
internalized years of social stigma.479 Emma Coleman Jordan, similarly
focused on the need for mental and perceptional change, urges the
reparations movement to create an intellectual challenge to the history
of racism.480 For example, she suggests re-positioning Blacks in history
from economic parasites to unjustly deprived contributors.481
Brown and Jordan agree that reparations for slavery achieved
through litigation would have a very limited capacity to lead to
meaningful repair, in part because this type of relief necessarily focuses
on individuals directly descended from slaves.482 However, reparations
that make no distinctions between, on the one hand, direct victims of
slavery and their descendants and, on the other hand, Blacks without
ancestral connections to slavery, may also be problematic.483
Reparations that seek to uplift entire communities are
rehabilitative. Reparations that attempt to make direct victims whole are
compensatory. For example, a scholarship fund set up for a victim’s
family members would be compensatory. If, however, the fund is
available to the victim’s entire community, it is rehabilitative. Similarly,
the construction of memorials or museums is rehabilitative because it

479. Jeffery M. Brown, Deconstructing Babel: Toward a Theory of Structural Reparations,
56 RUTGERS L. REV. 463, 470–71 (2004).
480. Emma Coleman Jordan, The Non-Monetary Value of Reparations Rhetoric, 6 AFR.AM. L. & POL’Y REP. 21, 21–24 (2004) [hereinafter Jordan, Non-Monetary Value]; see also
Emma Coleman Jordan, A History Lesson: Reparations for What?, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV.
AM. L. 557, 559 (2003) [hereinafter Jordan, History Lesson] (arguing that reparations efforts
should focus on lynching and race riots instead of slavery because of their closer temporal
proximity to the present).
481. Jordan, Non-Monetary Value, supra note 480, at 21–24; see also Jordan, A History
Lesson, supra note 480, at 559.
482. See Brown, supra note 479, at 502–03; Jordan, Non-Monetary Value, supra note 480 at
24.
483. David C. Gray, A No-Excuse Approach to Transitional Justice: Reparations as Tools
of Extraordinary Justice, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 1043, 1062 (2010) (“Reparations provided to a
group as a whole fail to distinguish among former victims, providing benefits to all members
without regard to the degree of harm suffered, potentially even benefitting some who did not
suffer at all or who are themselves implicated in abuses.” (citations omitted)); see also id. at
1064 (“Perhaps more troubling is that beneficiaries may again and forever be identified as
victims, denying full autonomy to individuals and the authority of identity creation to groups.
For example, Justice Clarence Thomas, among others, has argued that affirmative action
should be abandoned because it casts a shadow over the accomplishments of all African
Americans and marks blacks as victims, incapable of succeeding on their individual merits.”
(citations omitted)).
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does not involve direct payments to individuals.484 Affirmative action is
another form of rehabilitative reparations because it is available to any
community member.485
The determination of who deserves reparations is highly
controversial. The complexity of this issue reveals itself most sharply in
the debate over affirmative action. This form of reparations extends to
individuals, regardless of ancestry.486 In the Black community, this
grouping of all Blacks into one social identity causes some individuals,
including, and perhaps most famously, Justice Clarence Thomas, to
assert that affirmative action stigmatizes Blacks and undermines the
meritocracy upon which Thomas and others believe American
institutions should be based.487 Proponents of affirmative action counter
this complaint with the contention that opportunity is more important
than stigmatization and thus a valuable trade-off.488 They also assert that
American educational and other institutions operate within racist
hierarchical structures and are therefore not in fact meritocratic, even
absent affirmative action.489
Other critics of affirmative action observe that employers and
educational institutions primarily use it to benefit wealthy, recent
immigrants without strong ancestral ties to slavery490 or to admit or hire
484. Id.
485. See ROY L. BROOKS, ATONEMENT AND FORGIVENESS: A MODEL FOR BLACK
REPARATIONS 259 (2004) (stating that affirmative action beneficiaries need not be victims of
past government discrimination).
486. See Brown, supra note 479, 499–510.
487. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 373 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); see also Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 281 (2003) (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
488. Affirmative Action: Overview, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Feb. 7, 2014), http://
www.ncsl.org/research/education/affirmative-action-overview.aspx [https://perma.cc/E5MSBPL2]. See generally AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, WHO SUPPORTS AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION?, https://www.aclu.org/files/images/asset_upload_file670_37287.pdf [https://perma.cc
/W4A3-UNYV] (detailing the various institutions and individuals that support affirmative
action).
489. See, e.g., OFFICE OF CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., CIVIL RIGHTS DATA
COLLECTION: DATA SNAPSHOT: SCHOOL DISCIPLINE 1–3 (2014), https://www2.ed.gov/about
/offices/list/ocr/docs/crdc-discipline-snapshot.pdf [https://perma.cc/NVT5-29FR] (supplying
statistics demonstrating higher rates of discipline, suspension, etc., among Black students);
Jeff Nesbit, Institutional Racism Is Our Way of Life, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (May 6, 2015,
1:16 PM), http://www.usnews.com/news/blogs/at-the-edge/2015/05/06/institutional-racism-isour-way-of-life [https://perma.cc/58EX-VSDM] (citing studies and reports by the American
Psychological Association, the U.S. Department of Education Office for Civil Rights, NPR,
and others, asserting institutional racism’s survival in modern American school systems).
490. See, e.g., Javier E. David, How Immigration Distorts Affirmative Action Policy:
Academic, CNBC (Feb. 14, 2015, 12:03 PM), http://www.cnbc.com/2015/02/14/tion-distortsaffirmative-action-policy-academic.html [https://perma.cc/6CVH-BLMM]; Lloyd Green, How
Affirmative Action Became an Upper-Middle Class Benefit, DAILY BEAST (Apr. 7, 2013, 4:45
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White-looking biracial or mixed-race individuals who often do not suffer
from discrimination to the same extent as Blacks with darker skin or
more African features.491 Extensive literature documents, however, that
people of color living in the United States generally suffer from
discrimination, regardless of their economic class, connections to
slavery, or specific physical characteristics.492
Another problematic aspect of affirmative action is the way in
which it groups all Whites as perpetrators. This classification challenges
accepted understandings of individual, not collective, responsibility.
Further, dividing perpetrators and victims by race calls for racial
categorization, an exercise that is not only often inaccurate, but also
suggests that race is biological, although an overwhelming body of
medical and scientific research establishes that it is not.493
Despite the complexities of the reparations movement, most of its
proponents agree that acknowledgment and apology alone do not suffice
to compensate for past harms.494 On the contrary, expressions of regret
usually appear empty when unaccompanied by acts that give life to the
words. A gesture of goodwill is therefore necessary to signify a sincere
attempt at repair. The act or gesture should embody either a
compensatory or a rehabilitative approach to reparations.
AM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/04/07/how-affirmative-action-became-anupper-middle-class-benefit.html [https://perma.cc/9P3X-84CC].
491. See, e.g., Taunya Lovell Banks, Colorism: A Darker Shade of Pale, 47 UCLA L. REV.
1705, 1709 (2000); Angela P. Harris, From Color Line to Color Chart?: Racism and Colorism
in the New Century, 10 BERKELEY J. AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y 52, 54 (2008); Trina Jones, IntraGroup Preferencing: Proving Skin Color and Identity Performance Discrimination, 34 N.Y.U.
REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 657, 658–59 (2010).
492. See, e.g., Devon W. Carbado, (E)racing the Fourth Amendment, 100 MICH. L. REV.
946, 952 n.28 (2002); Christian Sundquist, Critical Praxis, Spirit Healing and Community
Activism: Preserving a Subversive Dialogue on Reparations, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L.
659, 671 (2003) (arguing that reparations must focus on the community, which must itself
recognize its group injuries and need for remedies). Furthermore, “African-American
reparations claims have not succeeded because a successful Black reparations claim has the
potential to undermine white privilege and the existing structures of political power, as well as
producing monetary liability that could literally bankrupt the nation.” Sundquist, supra, at 690
(citing Yamamoto, supra note 460, at 493). Additionally, “it is vital that the reparations
movement seek to improve the conditions for all Black people in America, and not solely
those Black Americans that are able to establish a historical connection to American slavery.”
Id. at 695.
493. See GUY P. HARRISON, RACE AND REALITY: WHAT EVERYONE SHOULD KNOW
ABOUT OUR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY 21 (2010); RACE: THE POWER OF AN ILLUSION
(California Newsreel 2003); Agustín Fuentes, Race Is Real, But Not in the Way Many People
Think, PSYCHOL. TODAY (Apr. 9, 2012), https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/bustingmyths-about-human-nature/201204/race-is-real-not-in-the-way-many-people-think [https://
perma.cc/YVG9-GLJN].
494. Roy L. Brooks, Age of Apology, in WHEN SORRY ISN’T ENOUGH 3, 3–11 (Roy L.
Brooks, ed. 1999).
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Compensatory restitution seeks to make up for the losses of individual
victims or their families.495 Rehabilitative reparations, on the other hand,
strive to build up harmed communities.496 As such, they avoid the
challenges of identifying direct descendants of victims and recognize that
the structural inequalities created and perpetuated by legal, social, and
business practices affect all people of color in the United States,
regardless of their lineage.
Reparations scholar Roy Brooks explains that
reparations . . . directed toward the individual victim or the
victim’s family . . . are intended to be compensatory, but only in a
symbolic sense; for nothing can truly return the victim to the
status quo ante. In contrast, rehabilitative reparations are directed
toward the victim’s community. They are designed to benefit the
victim’s group, to nurture the group’s self-empowerment and,
thus, aid in the nation’s social and cultural transformation.497
The effectiveness and appropriateness of these types of reparations
depend in part on the entity that bestows them. For instance, apologies
from corporations likely carry little restorative power as they could
easily reflect a desire to enhance a company’s professional reputation,
not a genuine attempt to transfer profits derived from slavery or other
wrong acts to those harmed by them. Instead, corporate apologies often
appear to be acts of self-defense intended to restore a company’s
legitimacy and maintain the appearance of goodwill.498

495. BROOKS, supra note 485, at 156 (2004).
496. See id.; J. ANGELO CORLETT, HEIRS OF OPPRESSION 231 (2010); Roy L. Brooks,
Getting Reparations for Slavery Right: A Response to Posner and Vermeule, 80 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 251, 270 (2004); Gray, supra note 483, at 1063–64 (“[G]roup-based reparations must
confront the twin concerns of essentialism and perpetuating a culture of victimhood. Paying
reparations to a group ignores differences among individuals in the beneficiary group. So
doing risks reifying and perhaps providing renewed legitimacy to the lines of opposition
implicated in past abuses.” (citations omitted)); Natsu Taylor Saito, Rebellious Lawyering in
the Courts of the Conqueror: The Legacy of the Hirabayashi Coram Nobis Case, 11 SEATTLE
J. FOR SOC. JUST. 89, 109 (2012) (“The Basic Principles further articulate four dimensions of
reparations: (1) restitution, designed to restore the victim as nearly as possible to the position
they occupied prior to the harm; (2) compensation for damages that can be economically
redressed; (3) rehabilitation, encompassing medical, psychological, social, and legal services;
and (4) guarantees that the wrong will not be repeated.” (citations omitted)); Carlton
Waterhouse, Total Recall: Restoring the Public Memory of Enslaved African-Americans and
the American System of Slavery Through Rectificatory Justice and Reparations, 14 J. GENDER,
RACE & JUST. 703, 711 (2011). See generally SHOULD AMERICA PAY? SLAVERY AND THE
RAGING DEBATE ON REPARATIONS (Raymond A. Winbush ed., 2003) (collecting historical,
legal, and other perspectives on reparations for slavery).
497. BROOKS, supra note 485, at 156 (2004) (quoting Roy L. Brooks, supra note 494, at 9).
498. Janssen, supra note 477, at 19 (citing John B. Hatch, Beyond Apologia: Racial
Reconciliation and Apologies for Slavery, 70 W.J. COMM. 186 (2006)); see also Keith Michael

95 N.C. L. REV. 1071 (2017)

1150

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 95

Wary of these types of self-serving goals, a group of plaintiffs
brought a suit for damages against a large group of corporations in In re
African-American Slave Descendants Litigation.499 The plaintiffs argued
for relief under several different theories.500 One told a simple story of
unpaid debt: the descendants of slaves should receive the value of slave
labor from those who stole it.501 From this perspective, Blacks are
creditors and Whites, represented in this case by wealthy corporations,
are unjustly enriched debtors.502
By contrast, the slavery disclosure laws described in the following
Section, which evolved in response to In re African-American Slave
Descendants Litigation, are a form of rehabilitative reparations because,
by requiring businesses to research and make public their past bad acts,
they seek to uncover truths for the benefit of the community, not
individuals.503 Further, in addition to setting the historical record
straight, proponents of these laws hope that disclosures will lead
corporations to make financial investments into communities.504 The
proposal to require credit card companies that engage in racial
discrimination to invest in the communities they harm is also a form of
rehabilitative reparations because it requires both acknowledgment of
discriminatory practices and a meaningful effort to repair the harm
done.

Hearit, “Mistakes Were Made”: Organizations, Apologia, and Crises of Social Legitimacy, 46
COMM. STUD. 1, 6 (1995).
499. 375 F. Supp. 2d 721, 738 (N.D. Ill. 2005), aff’d in part as modified, rev’d in part, 471
F.3d 754 (7th Cir. 2006). For a detailed discussion of the suit, see infra notes 520–52 and
accompanying text.
500. See In re African-Am. Slave Descendants Litig., 375 F. Supp. 2d, at 740–42; infra
notes 515–47 and accompanying text.
501. See In re African-Am. Slave Descendants Litig., 375 F. Supp. 2d at 741 (quoting
Plaintiff’s Second Consolidated and Amended Complaint ¶ 305, 310, In re African-Am. Slave
Descendants Litig., 375 F. Supp. 2d 721 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (No. 02-CV-1862(CRN)), ECF No.
157); RANDALL ROBINSON, THE DEBT: WHAT AMERICA OWES TO BLACKS 207 (2000).
502. See Robert Westley, Many Billions Gone: Is It Time to Reconsider the Case for Black
Reparations?, 40 B.C. L. REV. 429, 436 (1998).
503. Alfred L. Brophy, The Cultural War over Reparations for Slavery, 53 DEPAUL L.
REV. 1181, 1185–89 (2004); see also, e.g., CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE § 2-92-585 (2016), http://
library.amlegal.com/nxt/gateway.dll/Illinois/chicago_il/title2citygovernmentandadministration
/chapter2-92departmentofpurchasescontract?f=templates$fn=altmain-nf.htm$q=[field%20foliodestination-name:%272-92-585%27]$x=Advanced#JD_2-92-585 [https://perma.cc/X65L-NG8T
(staff-uploaded archive)] (“Each contractor with whom the city enters into a contract, whether
subject to competitive bid or not, must complete an affidavit verifying that the contractor has
searched any and all records of the company or any predecessor company regarding records
of investments or profits from slavery or slaveholder insurance policies during the slavery
era.”).
504. See infra notes 528–35 and accompanying text.
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Slavery Disclosure Laws

At the beginning of the twenty-first century, several cities and states
introduced slavery disclosure laws that arose out of a multi-faceted
strategy to compensate for and acknowledge the harms inflicted by
slavery.505 Initially, reparations advocates focused their efforts solely on
government compensation, in recognition of the legal and political
infrastructure that supported slavery and continued its legacy after its
abolition.506 After a series of attempts to receive official reparations
failed, however, in the 2000s, activists turned their attention to
corporations, seeking to divest them of profits gained through slavery
and to compel community investments by these companies designed to
bring Blacks closer to the social and financial positions they would hold
absent the legacy of slavery.507
The quest for restitution from corporations began as a series of
lawsuits, directed at a variety of corporate entities.508 Reparations
activist Deadria Farmer-Paellmann selected the first defendant, Aetna
insurance company, based on the results of her investigation revealing
that Aetna had issued policies on slaves’ lives.509 These insurance
policies reduced or eliminated slaveholders’ financial risk of loaning out
their slaves for dangerous work in mines and on railroads,
simultaneously increasing the slaves’ exposure to physical harm, abuse,
and death.510 Inspired by Farmer-Paellmann’s research, the Restitution
Study Group (“RSG”) formed to investigate additional connections

505. See Jason Levy, Note, Slavery Disclosure Laws: For Financial Reparations or for
“Telling the Truth?”, 2009 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 468, 472–73 (2009).
506. See id. at 474–77.
507. Id. at 477.
508. Id.
509. See In re African-Am. Slave Descendants Litig., 375 F. Supp. 2d 721, 738 (N.D. Ill.
2005); Janssen, supra note 477, at 24.
510. See In re African-Am. Slave Descendants Litig., 375 F. Supp. 2d at 738; James Cox,
Insurance Firms Issued Slave Policies, USA TODAY (Feb. 21, 2002), http://usatoday30
.usatoday.com/money/general/2002/02/21/slave-insurance-policies.htm [https://perma.cc/4QS65U8Y] (“Early in the 19th century, insurance companies debated whether to insure slaves as
property—like work animals and buildings—or as human beings. Increasingly, owners renting
their slaves out to mines, railroads and tobacco processors wanted to protect their
investments. Insurers eventually began issuing one-year life policies at comparatively pricey
premiums that reflected the dangerous nature of the slaves’ work. . . . In 1847, the owners of
Robert Moody insured his life with Nautilus Insurance, which later changed its name to New
York Life. A handwritten note on the policy says he was hired out to work at the Clover Hill
Pits, a coal mine near Richmond. Evidence of 10 more New York Life slave policies comes
from an 1847 account book kept by the company’s Natchez, Miss., agent, W.A. Britton. The
book, part of a collection at Louisiana State University, contains Britton’s notes on slave
policies he wrote for amounts ranging from $375 to $600. A 1906 history of New York Life
says 339 of the company’s first 1,000 policies were written on the lives of slaves.”).
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between corporations’ wealth-seeking actions and slavery.511 These
studies “focused on benefits corporations had gained from slavery by
collecting duties and fees on slave ships, lending money to slave traders
and on the exploitation of slave labor.”512 This labor reportedly
amounted to three billion dollars by 1860 and contributed significantly
to the construction of buildings, streets, and railroads and the
productivity of cotton and tobacco fields.513
The media attention that the RSG’s work received contributed to
the enactment of the first slavery disclosure law in California in 2000.514
This law requires insurance companies operating in the state that have
past connections to slavery to join the State Slavery Insurance Registry
or face penalties.515 It also requires the state insurance commissioner to
obtain all records of slaveholder insurance policies issued by predecessor
corporations.516 The City of Chicago followed suit in 2002, with a more
expansive version of California’s law.517 Thanks to the advocacy of civil
rights activist and alderperson Dorothy Wright Tillman, Chicago’s law
requires disclosure of past slavery-related activities by all organizations
conducting business with the city, not just insurance companies.518
Based on the success of the Aetna suit, reparations activists
targeted seventeen different corporate entities around the country with
similar complaints.519 Defendants included companies representing the
financial, tobacco, textile, railroad, and insurance industries.520 The

511.
512.
513.
514.

Janssen, supra note 477, at 25.
Id.
Id.
Act of Sept. 29, 2000, ch. 934, 200 Cal. Sess. Laws 6971, 6971–72 (codified at CAL. INS.
CODE § 13810 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 3 of 2017 Reg. Sess.)); Janssen, supra note 477, at
25.
515. CAL. INS. CODE §§ 13811–13812 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 3 of 2017 Reg. Sess.);
Janssen, supra note 477, at 25.
516. CAL. INS. CODE § 13812; Janssen, supra note 477, at 14.
517. CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE § 2-92-585 (2016), http://library.amlegal.com/nxt/gateway.dll
/Illinois/chicago_il/title2citygovernmentandadministration/chapter2-92departmentofpurc
hasescontract?f=templates$fn=altmain-nf.htm$q=[field%20folio-destination-name:%272-92585%27]$x=Advanced#JD_2-92-585 [https://perma.cc/X65L-NG8T (staff-uploaded archive)];
Janssen, supra note 477, at 25.
518. CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE § 2-92-585, http://library.amlegal.com/nxt/gateway.dll/Illinois
/chicago_il/title2citygovernmentandadministration/chapter2-92departmentofpurchasescontract?f
=templates$fn=altmain-nf.htm$q=[field%20folio-destination-name:%272-92-585%27]$x
=Advanced#JD_2-92-585 [https://perma.cc/X65L-NG8T (staff-uploaded archive)]; Janssen,
supra note 477, at 25.
519. First Consolidated and Amended Complaint and Jury Demand, In re African-Am.
Slave Descendants Litig., 375 F. Supp. 2d 721, 738 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (No. 02-CV-1862 (CRN)),
ECF No. 58; Janssen, supra note 477, at 25.
520. In re African-Am. Slave Descendants Litig., 375 F. Supp. 2d 721, 738 (N.D. Ill. 2005);
Janssen, supra note 477, at 32–33 n.3 (“These defendants included Aetna, JP Morgan,
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federal court consolidated these lawsuits into In re African-American
Slave Descendants Litigation in the Northern District of Illinois.521 The
complaint sought relief based on both the companies’ exploitation of
slaves for profit and their attempts to deceive the public by covering up
their misdeeds.522 For example, in regard to the prominent bank
FleetBoston (now part of Bank of America), plaintiffs alleged,
FleetBoston, through its predecessor bank, made loans to slave
traders and also collected custom duties and fees on ships engaged
in the slave trade. Plaintiffs further alleged that “FleetBoston
engaged in a self-concealed business enterprise so that the
Plaintiffs and others similarly situated would not be aware of the
existence of this enterprise,” and . . . “made various misleading
statements to the Press from March 2000 to February 2002,
attempting to disassociate its predecessor company from its
current company.”523
Similarly, the suit against private bank Brown Brothers Harriman
alleged that it had “loaned millions directly to planters, merchants and
cotton brokers throughout the South” in addition to owning “at least
two cotton plantations totaling 4,614 acres and the plantations’ 346
slaves” and had attempted to conceal these facts.524
The injuries laid out in the complaint encompassed many aspects of
structural social inequality that plaintiffs traced back to slavery.
Specifically, the complaint asserted that defendants’ actions in support
of slavery collectively led African Americans to trail significantly behind
Whites in the areas of wealth accumulation, income, literacy, education,
and life expectancy, while experiencing increased incarceration,

American International Group (AIG), Lloyd’s of London, New York Life Insurance
Company, Southern Mutual Insurance Company, FleetBoston, Bank of America, AFSA Data
Corporation, Brown Brothers Harriman, Bank One, Lehman Brothers, RJ Reynolds Tobacco
Company, Brown and Williamson, Liggett Group Inc., Loews Corporation (Lorrilard),
Canadian National Railway, CSX Corporation, Norfolk Southern Corp., and Union Pacific
Railroad. Similar litigations were filed in New York, New Jersey, Virginia, North and South
Carolina, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas.”).
521. In re African-Am. Slave Descendants Litig., 375 F. Supp. 2d 721, 726 (N.D. Ill. 2005),
aff’d in part as modified, rev’d in part, 471 F.3d 736 (7th Cir. 2006).
522. See id. at 768–69.
523. Id. at 738 (citation omitted). Regarding CSX railway corporation, “[p]laintiffs allege
that CSX ‘is a successor-in-interest to numerous predecessor railroad lines that were
constructed or run, at least in part, by slave labor.’ . . . Plaintiffs further allege that ‘CSX
engaged in a self-concealed business enterprise as the plaintiffs and others similarly situated
would not be aware of the existence of this enterprise,’ and, in more recent times, ‘withheld
information or made a misleading statement to the Press regarding their participation in and
profiting from slavery.’ ” Id. at 738 (citations omitted).
524. Id. at 738.
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victimization, death penalty sentencing, and single-parent upbringings.525
It alleged that plaintiffs lacked
the
same
opportunities
as . . . their
white
contemporaries; . . . [must] overcome barriers to their human right
to development which their white contemporaries [need]
not; . . . suffer irreparable psychological damage from the loss of
their history, language and culture; [and do not] know the actual
birth names of . . . their forbearers and, consequently, to this day
do not know their own real names.526
The remedies that plaintiffs sought included an accounting of the
“monies, profits, and/or benefits derived by defendants” from their
participation in activities related to slavery, “a constructive trust in the
value of said monies, profits, and/or benefits, . . . full restitution in the
value of all monies, profits, and/or benefits derived by defendants’ use of
slave labor,” and “ ‘equitable disgorgement’ of these ‘monies, profits,
and/or benefits. . . .’ ”527

525. See Plaintiffs’ Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants’ Joint Motion to Dismiss
the Second Amended and Consolidated Complaint at 1–2, In re African-Am. Slave
Descendants Litig., 471 F.3d 754 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (No. 1:02-CV-07764), ECF No. 161; see also
In re African-Am. Slave Descendants Litig., 375 F. Supp. at 738. The complaint asserted that
the practice of slavery has caused the following specific social inequities: twenty-six
(26) percent of African-Americans in the United States live in poverty compared to
eight (8) percent of whites. . . . 14.7 percent of African-Americans have four-year
college degrees, compared with 25 percent of whites. . . . [A] black person born in
1996 can expect to live, on average, 6.6 fewer years than a white person. . . . AfricanAmericans are more likely to go to jail, to be there longer and . . . to receive the death
penalty. . . . [African-Americans] lag behind whites according to every social
yardstick: literacy, life expectancy, income and education. They are more likely to be
murdered and less likely to have a father at home. . . . Black families earn only $580
for every $1000 earned by white families.
In re African-Am. Slave Descendants Litig., 375 F. Supp. 2d at 740 (alterations in original)
(quoting Plaintiff’s Second Consolidated and Amended Complaint ¶ 41 n.1, In re AfricanAm. Slave Descendants Litig., 375 F. Supp. 2d 721 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (No. 02-CV-1862(CRN)),
ECF No. 157). These numbers represent statistics available in the 1998 census report.
Plaintiff’s Second Consolidated and Amended Complaint ¶ 41 n.1, In re African-Am. Slave
Descendants Litig., 375 F. Supp. 2d 721 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (No. 02-CV-1862(CRN)), ECF No.
157.
526. Plaintiffs’ Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants’ Joint Motion to Dismiss the
Second Amended and Consolidated Complaint, supra note 525, at 1–2; Lolita Buckner Inniss,
A Critical Legal Rhetoric Approach to the In re African-American Slave Descendants
Litigation, 24 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 649, 679 (2010).
527. In re African-Am. Slave Descendants Litig., 375 F. Supp. 2d at 757 (quoting Plaintiff’s
Second Consolidated and Amended Complaint ¶ 41 n.1, In re African-Am. Slave
Descendants Litig., 375 F. Supp. 2d 721 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (No. 02-CV-1862(CRN)), ECF No.
157).
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While this litigation ran its course in the courts, activists put
pressure on the defendant corporations to settle and make restitution
directly to the Black community.528 Several organizations, church
leaders, and politicians supported these campaigns,529 which included
boycotts against JPMorgan student loans and insurance policies from
Aetna and New York Life.530 JPMorgan and Wachovia subsequently
issued public apologies for the companies’ past ties to slavery.531 Aetna
also apologized,532 and established a minority internship program and
diversity scholarship fund.533 JPMorgan similarly created a five million
dollar scholarship fund for Black students in Louisiana.534
Farmer-Paellmann also sought restitution from corporations,
through letters she wrote to thirteen corporations that had ties to
slavery. She requested that they finance a historical commission to
examine slavery, and set up an “interim humanitarian fund” for the
health, education, and development of African Americans.535
Ultimately, the courts did not award plaintiffs damages in the
reparations cases, due to a number of challenges facing reparations
lawsuits generally, including: statutes of limitations; the difficulty of
identifying directly harmed individuals; the absence of individual
perpetrators; the lack of direct causation; and the indeterminacy of
compensation amounts.536 Courts likely also disfavored these suits

528. Janssen, supra note 477, at 26.
529. Id. at 26 (citing Diane Levick, Aetna Facing Boycott Threat: Reparations Group
Demands Trust Fund That Would Benefit Slaves’ Descendants, HARTFORD COURANT (Nov.
15, 2006), http://articles.courant.com/2006-11-15/business/0611150453_1_deadria-farmerpaellmann-reparations-descendants [https://perma.cc/E3T6-U6PB]).
530. Conal Walsh, JP Morgan Faces Boycott over Slave Trade Reparations, GUARDIAN
(Dec. 10, 2005), http://www.theguardian.com/business/2005/dec/11/usnews.theobserver
[https://perma.cc/K4BL-NAZF].
531. Diane Levick, Aetna Facing Boycott Threat: Reparations Group Demands Trust Fund
That Would Benefit Slaves’ Descendants, HARTFORD COURANT (Nov. 15, 2006), http://articles
.courant.com/2006-11-15/business/0611150453_1_deadria-farmer-paellmann-reparationsdescendants [https://perma.cc/E3T6-U6PB]; Walsh, supra note 530.
532. Janssen, supra note 477, at 26–29.
533. BROOKS, supra note 485, at 15.
534. JP MORGAN CHASE & CO., ANNUAL REPORT 2005 12 (2005) https://www
.jpmorganchase.com/corporate/investor-relations/document/ar05_complete.pdf [https://perma
.cc/J45W-FLU4] (stating plans to expand the Smart Start scholarship program to Louisiana);
John Carlisle, Slave Disclosure Shakedowns, AM. SPECTATOR (Feb. 18, 2005, 4:07 AM), http://
spectator.org/articles/48951/slave-disclosure-shakedowns [https://perma.cc/89DQ-7YUU].
535. James Cox, Aetna, CSX, FleetBoston Face Slave Reparation Suit, USA TODAY (Mar.
24, 2002, 10:11 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/money/general/2002/03/25/slavereparations.htm [https://perma.cc/MJ2U-P25K].
536. In re African-Am. Slave Descendants Litig., 375 F. Supp. 2d 721, 780–81 (N.D. Ill.
2005). See Yamamoto et al., supra note 205, at 24–27; David Horowitz, Ten Reasons Why
Reparations for Blacks Is a Bad Idea for Blacks—And Racist Too, FRONTPAGEMAG (Jan. 3,
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because of the relatively low moral culpability of corporations,
compared to long-deceased individual slaveholders or the government,
which was not available as a defendant due to sovereign immunity.537 On
the other hand, many individuals have fewer reservations about suing
corporations than the descendants of slave-owners, whom they view as
innocent in comparison.538
Despite plaintiffs’ loss, however, the court expressed its openness to
the possibility of liability based on consumer fraud and protection
resulting from corporations’ failure to disclose slavery dealings.539
Therefore, although plaintiffs did not win on this theory, it may have
opened the door to wider acceptance of and advocacy for slavery
disclosure legislation.
In any case, it is likely that plaintiffs did not envision a victory in
court. Traditionally, reparations plaintiffs have sought settlements, with
the additional goals of raising awareness of the lingering effects of
slavery, and building political pressure for legislation. By that measure,
the suits were a success. The City of Los Angeles540 and State of Iowa541
passed slavery disclosure laws in 2003. Detroit542 and Philadelphia543

2001), http://www.frontpagemag.com/Articles/ReadArticle.asp?ID=1153 [https://perma.cc
/H5SJ-D399].
537. Kaimipono David Wenger, Reparations Within the Rule of Law, 29 T. JEFFERSON L.
REV. 231, 245–46 (2007).
538. James Cox, Farmer-Paellman Not Afraid of Huge Corporations, USA TODAY (Feb.
21, 2002, 12:52 AM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/money/general/2002/02/21/slave-activist
.htm [https://perma.cc/QM9A-YD6Y].
539. See In re African-Am. Slave Descendants Litig., 471 F.3d 754, 762–63 (7th Cir. 2006)
(“The second qualification concerns a claim, rather buried in the complaint but not forfeited,
that in violation of state fraud or consumer protection law members of the plaintiff classes
have bought products or services from some of the defendants that they would not have
bought had the defendants not concealed their involvement in slavery. . . . It is a complaint of
consumers’ being deceived because sellers have concealed a material fact. . . . [T]he plaintiffs
are charging the defendants with misrepresenting their activities in relation to slavery. A
seller who learns that some class of buyers would not buy his product if they knew it
contained some component that he would normally have no duty to disclose, but fearing to
lose those buyers falsely represents that the product does not contain the component, is guilty
of fraud. An example would be a manufacturer who represented that his products were made
in the United States by companies that employ only union labor, whereas in fact they were
made in Third World sweatshops. We do not offer an opinion on the merits of the consumer
protection claims, but merely reject the district court’s ruling that they are barred at the
threshold.” (citations omitted)).
540. L.A., CAL., ADMIN. CODE, ch.1, art. 15 (2003) (codifying Ordinance No. 175346:
“Regulations Regarding Participation in or Profits Derived from Slavery by Any Company
Doing Business with the City”).
541. H.R. 29, 80th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Iowa 2003), https://www.legis.iowa.gov/docs
/publications/LGI/80/HR29.pdf [https://perma.cc/A9YL-6YNP].
542. DETROIT, MICH., CITY CODE, ch. 18, art. 5, div. 7 (2005).
543. PHILA., PA., CODE § 17-104(2) (2004).
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followed in 2004, as did San Francisco544 in 2006. There are also slavery
disclosure laws on the books in Berkeley,545 Chicago,546 Milwaukee,547
Oakland,548 Maryland,549 Illinois,550 and California.551
Despite their expansion, the somewhat limited reach of slavery
disclosure laws precludes them from providing true and full restitution
for the harms of slavery. Nonetheless, they accomplish several important
goals. First, they generate public recognition of corporations’ complicity
with slavery and the moral wrong that their involvement represented.
Second, they forge important connections between past exploitation and
present corporate wealth, contributing to the movement that seeks to
resist collective forgetting.552 Third, they have the potential to lead to
substantial investments into communities by corporations, even when
these companies have not broken the laws.553 Therefore, even though
these laws are weak in the sense that they carry penalties only for failure
to disclose, they can be effective rehabilitative tools. They also provide a
useful model for regulation of harms related to slavery, such as racial
discrimination in the credit card industry.
Clearly, racial discrimination by credit card companies is not the
moral equivalent of slavery. Nonetheless, the economic and racial
inequality that the credit card companies’ predatory practices produce
and the lack of resistance to them represent vestiges of slavery. Also,
unlike past ties to slavery, which are merely censured and sometimes

544. S.F., CAL., ADMIN. CODE § 12Y (2006) (“San Francisco Slavery Disclosure
Ordinance”).
545. BERKELEY, CAL., MUN. CODE §§ 13.96.010–.030 (2005).
546. CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE § 2-92-585 (2002).
547. MILWAUKEE, WIS., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 310-14 (2014).
548. OAKLAND, CAL., MUN. CODE § 9.60.010 (2005).
549. MD. CODE ANN., INS. §§ 30-101 to -103 (West, Westlaw through ch. 2, 2017 Reg.
Sess.).
550. 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/155.41 (West, Westlaw through P.A. 99-938, 2016 Reg.
Sess.).
551. CAL. INS. CODE § 13810 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Sess. laws). See also Levy,
supra note 512, at 486.
552. See MARTHA MINOW, BREAKING THE CYCLES OF HATRED: MEMORY, LAW, AND
REPAIR 16 (2009); Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Repairing the Past: New Efforts in the Reparations
Debate in America, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 279, 308 (2003). See generally MARTHA
MINOW, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS: FACING HISTORY AFTER GENOCIDE
AND MASS VIOLENCE (1999) (examining various reactions to mass violence and the ways in
which countries have sought to heal trauma); Peculiar Profits, MOTHER JONES, July/Aug.
2000, http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2000/07/outfront [https://perma.cc/8DGS-KMSF]
(“The statute of limitations could derail any class-action claims. But [Plaintiff] hopes that by
exposing historical practices of corporations on her list, they will feel morally obligated to
make restitution.”).
553. For example, both JPMorgan and Aetna created scholarship funds voluntarily. See
text accompanying supra notes 528–29.
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excused, racial discrimination is illegal. The current legal regime,
however, fails to penalize or prevent it effectively.
CONCLUSION
Regulatory reform of the credit card industry is essential to protect
consumers from exploitative practices that have dire consequences.
Unfortunately, however, the powerful influence that some banks and
other credit lending institutions have on Congress has heretofore
disabled most serious attempts to shield consumers from companies’
predatory tactics. Approximately $11.6 million of the political action
committee money given to the 2016 federal electoral candidates came
from finance and credit card companies.554 The size of these
contributions suggests the existence of regulatory capture that is
difficult, if not impossible, to dislodge.
Consumer advocacy is a target of the Trump administration. In
January 2017, Republicans threatened to dismantle the Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau, based largely on its lack of accountability
to elected officials.555 To this end, an executive order called for a report
on the efficacy of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Act, putting its continued existence into doubt.556
It is therefore appealing to consider remedies to this problem that
do not require increased regulation or financial sacrifice by the
corporations, such as financial education for consumers. But, although
there is no doubt that every individual can benefit from full information
regarding smart financial choices, consumer education cannot replace
structural reform as a gateway to reducing financial and credit
disparities. Realistically, even an individual armed with the best
information possible cannot control the effects of structural,
institutionalized discrimination.
Another argument against stronger regulation of credit card
companies is that these companies will respond by ceasing to lend to the
communities they currently exploit, forcing them into even more dire
financial constraints or exploitative lending conditions. This outcome is
highly unlikely, however, because of the high profit margin in subprime
lending. Therefore, even with a reduction in opportunities to
554. Finance/Credit Companies: Long-Term Contribution Trends, OPENSECRETS.ORG,
https://www.opensecrets.org/industries/totals.php?cycle=2016&ind=F06 [https://perma.cc/F5MW
-ZSZD].
555. Lucinda Shen, Donald Trump is Targeting an Agency That Has Recovered $11.8
Billion for Consumers, FORTUNE (Jan. 27, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/01/27/donald-trumpcfpb-consumer-protection-financial-bureau-elizabeth-warren/ [https://perma.cc/CG79-6T29].
556. Exec. Order No. 13,772, 82 Fed. Reg. 9,965 (Feb. 8, 2017).
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discriminate, credit card companies will most likely continue to issue
cards to borrowers who make monthly payments, regardless of the
amount of those payments.
A significant obstacle to achieving meaningful reform in this area is
that it requires a major cultural shift. Social perceptions, shaped by a
steady diet of popular culture and media, infiltrate individuals’ daily
lives. The stories they hear and the corresponding stereotypes they
embrace inform their financial decisions and transactions, in addition to
their perceptions of equality and justice. Social movements have always
been at the forefront of major changes in the law, such as the Civil
Rights Act and the Supreme Court cases recognizing marriage
equality.557 Occupy Wall Street began a conversation about economic
equality that, perhaps fatally, failed to link its struggle to racial
equality.558 An intersectional movement that understands the connection
between different forms of oppression is therefore necessary to guide
legal reform.
From a much broader perspective, it may be unrealistic to try to
solve this problem from within the system. Perhaps it is a mistake to
strive for reform instead of revolution.559 To function, capitalism relies
on economic winners and losers, and systemic, structural racism
identifies and perpetuates a racial class of losers that serves an essential
role in this economic model. It is possible that only by imagining and
adopting a completely new economic system can the law eliminate
racism in the consumer credit industry or in any other sector.
This powerful vision surfaces in the critically acclaimed television
show Mr. Robot, where masses take to the streets to celebrate after
hackers infiltrate the world’s largest bank and erase all consumer debt.560
This may be the utopia for which we must strive. Until that moment, any
social critique that focuses on the actions of the consumer instead of the
credit card companies misguidedly redirects a conversation about
structural inequality and exploitation to one about personal choices.
It is the role of the law to protect consumers from exploitation and
discrimination. In the context of consumer credit, the law has failed to
do so. Adopting disclosure and investment requirements for credit card

557. See Douglas NeJaime, Constitutional Change, Courts, and Social Movements, 111
MICH L. REV. 877, 885–86, 893 (2013) (discussing social movements in the civil rights and
marriage equality contexts).
558. See Rinku Sen, Race and Occupy Wall Street, THE NATION (Oct. 26, 2011), https://
www.thenation.com/article/race-and-occupy-wall-street/ [https://perma.cc/QUS8-RVEN].
559. Professor Amna Akbar, Remarks at the Yale CRT Conference (2016).
560. Mr. Robot: eps1.9_zer0-daY.avi (Anonymous Content and Universal Cable
Productions Aug. 19, 2015).
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companies would signal to consumers and corporations alike that the
law will not tolerate predatory practices, and significantly raise the
standards for corporate and social practice in the United States.

